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Approaching Comparative Company Law 
David C. Donald
* 
Abstract 
This paper identifies some common errors that occur in comparative law, offers some guidelines to 
help avoid such errors, and provides a framework for entering into studies of the company laws of 
three major jurisdictions.  The first section illustrates why a conscious approach to comparative 
company law is useful.  Part I discusses some of the problems that can arise in comparative law and 
offers a few points of caution that can be useful for practical, theoretical and legislative comparative 
law.  Part II discusses some relatively famous examples of comparative analysis gone astray in order 
to demonstrate the utility of heeding the  outlined points of caution.  The second section offers a 
framework for approaching comparative company law.  Part III provides an example of using 
functional definition to demarcate the  topic "company law", offering an "effects" test to determine 
whether a given provision of law should be considered as functionally part of the rules that govern the 
core characteristics of companies.  It does this by presenting the relevant company law statutes and 
related topical laws of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, using Delaware as a 
proxy for the 50 states.  On the basis of this definition, Part IV analyzes the system of legal functions 
that comprises "company law" in the United States and the European Union.  It selects as the 
predominant factor for consideration the jurisdictions, sub-jurisdictions and rule-making entities that 
have legislative or rule-making competence in the relevant territorial unit, analyzes the extent of their 
power, presents the type of law (rules) they enact (issue), and discusses the concrete manner in which 
the laws and rules of the jurisdictions and sub-jurisdictions can legally interact.  Part V looks at the 
way these jurisdictions do interact on the temporal axis of history, that is, their actual influence on 
each other, which in the relevant jurisdictions currently takes the form of regulatory competition and 
legislative harmonization.  The method of the approach  outlined in this paper borrows much from 
system theory.  The analysis attempts to be detailed without losing track of the overall jurisdictional 
framework in the countries studied.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The disciplines of "comparative law" in general and "comparative company law" in particular 
are natural companions to the globalization of social, political and economic activity.  The course of 
economic and political developments in recent decades has thus increased the amount of comparative 
law taking place at every level, whether it be  that of  fact-oriented practitioners, result-seeking 
legislators and  development agencies, or theory-focused  academics.  Each of these activities has its 
own interests, priorities, and goals.  Nevertheless, there are certain approach coordinates that mark the 
path for  all their  comparative studies.  This paper outlines these  approach  coordinates for the 
comparison of the laws that govern public companies in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Germany.  
Just as the merchants  who  engaged in  the earliest  forms of  international trade developed a 
commercial law that was trans-jurisdictional,
1 so today are merchants and their counsel  often at the 
forefront of comparative legal activity.  When a transaction spans international borders, the persons 
responsible for structuring it must of necessity become  comparatists.  As Professor Klaus Hopt has 
observed, lawyers and legal counsel "are  the real experts in both conflict of company laws and of 
                                                   
1   See e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 13 (3
rd ed. 
2007). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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foreign company laws. . . . Working out the best company and tax law structures for international 
mergers, and forming and doing legal work for groups and tax haven operations, is a high, creative 
art."
2  Legal counsel's repeated choices of a given structure or law can gradually crystallize into a "best 
practice," which independently or under the auspices of professional associations
3 can lead to many 
jurisdictions adopting the practice and converging toward a perceived optimal rule.  In this way the 
practical choices of lawyers eventually collect into recognized legal norms.  Comparative scholars like 
Professor Philip R. Wood, whose numerous books focus on the practical details of the financial laws 
and instruments  in many countries,
4 give internationally active lawyers the information they need to 
approach transnational problems.  His is a comparative law that focuses on  providing detailed and 
accurate information about disparate legal systems rather than either reflecting on the policy goals of 
legislation or seeking the overall coherence of a given system's solution to a specific problem.
5 
Comparative activity with great practical impact also occurs at  venues  quite removed from 
commercial transactions.  The unprecedented level of international cooperation occurring on the 
regulatory side of globalization creates systematic comparative studies that  have dramatically 
accelerated legal understanding and convergence.  Any project to harmonize national laws or draft a 
convention to govern an area of law among nations will likewise of necessity compare laws to find the 
best, or at least the most mutually acceptable, solution.  Institutions such as the European Union,
6 the 
United Nations,
7 the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)
8 and the 
                                                   
2   Klaus  Hopt,  Comparative Company Law, in  THE  OXFORD  HANDBOOK OF  COMPARATIVE  LAW  1169 
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., 2006) (hereinafter "HANDBOOK"). 
3   Such "associations" can range from the International Chamber of Commerce  and their "Incoterms" for 
international sales transactions, to the International Bar Association and their numerous practice guides, 
to the voluntarily adopted master framework agreements created by organizations like the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. 
4   See e.g., PHILIP WOOD, COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND TITLE FINANCE (2
nd ed. 2007) 
and COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL LAW (2000). 
5   The method used, as is appropriate for the goal of the comparative study, centers around the practitioner's 
desire to use the law: "There are three broad steps in this type of measurement: (1) the legal rules; (2) the 
weighting of the importance of the legal rules in practice; and (3) actual implementation or compliance by 
the jurisdiction concerned."  WOOD, COMPARATIVE SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 16. 
6   As it developed from an initial six to its current 27 member states over a 50 year period, the European 
Economic Community (then European Union) harmonized a core of minimum standards in many areas, 
followed this up with mutual recognition of member state law while restricting harmonization to health 
and safety, and introduced a parallel movement of European standardization.   See  PAUL  CRAIG  & 
GRÁINNE DE  BÚRCA, EU L AW: T EXT, C ASES AND  MATERIALS 620  et seq. (4
th ed. 2008).  This 
combination of legislative strategies allowed mandatory harmonization to pave an initial uniformity, 
making home rule and voluntary convergence acceptable, which in turn led to greater harmonization 
becoming unproblematic, so that the laws of the separate member states  – particularly the late entries, 
which were forced to adopt packages of introductory laws – became ever more tightly matched to each 
other.   
7   In particular the Commission on International Trade Law (UNICTRAL) and the Office of Legal Affairs, 
Codification Division's Codification of International Law.  See http://www.un.org/law. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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Hague Conference on Private International Law
9 engage in comparative law on a grand scale in order 
to produce their directives, regulations and conventions.  This activity falls under the rubric of 
"legislative comparative law" in the descriptive schema offered by Professors Konrad Zweigert und 
Hein Kötz, and has historically been one of comparative law's most solid domains.
10  If legislative 
efforts  seek to achieve a specific  result, like economic prosperity, stable government, or investor 
protection,
11 then a second level problem arises: the legislator must correctly ascertain a real, causal 
connection between  the  chosen law or legal system and the  desired  social or economic effect.  The 
latter type of project falls squarely within the mission of institutions such as the World Bank, which 
seeks to "help developing countries and their people . . . [by] building the climate for investment, jobs 
and sustainable growth . . . ."
12  In addition to the studies prepared by their own staffs and experts, 
much of the academic comparative law  produced in universities also supports the activities of 
legislators and development agencies. 
The increasingly high stakes  of  correctly understanding  foreign law for the success of 
commercial transactions and of the  comparing, choosing and implementing  of  laws  carried out by 
international organizations  have naturally drawn an increasing amount of a cademic  attention to 
comparative l aw.    Although t h e steady growth actually began in the 19
th Century, with  the major 
codifications in Continental Europe,
13 the increase was dramatic as efforts to develop the economies of 
the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China took off in the 1990's.  This activity has been 
particularly intense in the area of comparative company law, specifically addressing questions of 
"comparative corporate governance", comparative "investor protection"
14  and,  within  the  European 
Union itself,  comparative methods  of " creditor protection".
15  M ajor events in this  "academic 
comparative law" were the publication in 2006 of a collection of theoretical essays on the activity of 
                                                                                                                                                               
8   UNIDROIT "is an independent intergovernmental organisation . . . [whose] purpose is to study needs and 
methods for modernising, harmonising and co-ordinating private and, in particular, commercial law as 
between States and groups of States."  See http://www.unidroit.org. 
9   "Since 1893, the Hague Conference on Private International Law, a melting pot of different legal 
traditions, develops and services Conventions which respond to global needs . . . ."  See 
http://www.hcch.net. 
10   KONRAD ZWEIGERT & H EIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 51 (3rd ed., trans. Tony 
Weir, 1998). Also see Charles Donahue, Comparative Law Before the Code Napoleon, in HANDBOOK, 
supra note 2, at 3 ("Modern comparative lawyers . . . tend to date the foundation of their discipline to the 
nineteenth century and to the promulgation of the great European codes.")  
11   Zweigert & Kötz call this "applied comparative law." Id. at 11. 
12   See the "Challenge" of the World Bank at http://web.worldbank.org. 
13   See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 51. 
14   See Part II.B and C. 
15   See e.g., Vol. 7, EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW (2006) on creditor protection and 
Special Vol. 1, EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW (2006) on legal capital in Europe.  Draft: February 12, 2008 
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comparative  law in the  Oxford Handbook to Comparative Law
16 and, with particular regard to 
comparative company law, the teaming up of  seven  leading  corporate law scholars  from different 
jurisdictions  to produce  in 2004 a high-level comparison of the  company law  of the United States, 
Europe and Japan.
17 
Comparative  company  law is thus expanding quickly at various levels of abstraction and 
practice.  Each level has its own focus and its own tasks.  While practical comparatists might concern 
themselves with the type of document filed or lodged in order to perfect a security interest, the 
legislative comparatists could focus on whether a specific regime for collateral could stimulate desired 
commercial activity, and the theoretically oriented academic comparatists might well be occupied with 
whether practical comparatist's understanding of both "filings" and "creditor possession" as two forms 
"publicity"
18  is  a  tenable functional analysis o r  displays unacceptable levels of an  Aristotelian 
teleological essentialism.
19  All three  levels of activity occur separately  but are closely related, and 
many works, like that of Wood, tend to cross the line from practice to theory and back again.  Like any 
other theoretical activity, academic comparative law examines the steps taken in the practical activity 
of comparison in an attempt to make its methods more transparent and conscious and its results more 
objective and accurate.  This includes, at a minimum, scrutiny of the perspective from which foreign 
legal systems  are investigated and understood, the  scope and content of such investigation, the 
conceptual tools  that are used to compare and evaluate  laws, and the  basis on which  causal  links 
between law and a desired social or economic result are posited.
20 
One of the best methodological analyses of comparative law, that of Zweigert and Kötz, 
proposes a flexible, inductive process of preliminary hypotheses, investigation of functional values, 
checking of preliminary results, and reformulation of hypotheses.
21  Although Professor Ralf 
Michaels, in his excellent analysis of the functional method in comparative law, finds that  this 
approach "has an irrational ring to it" that would distance comparison from "scientific aspirations,"
22 it 
is certainly comparable to what Michaels at another point in his article praises  in the work of Ernst 
Cassirer: " it is not necessary to recognize some essence of a particular element; it is sufficient to 
                                                   
16   HANDBOOK supra note 2. 
17   REINIER R. K RAAKMAN, P AUL DAVIES, H ENRY HANSMANN, G ÉRARD HERTIG, K LAUS J. H OPT, H IDEKI 
KANDA, AND EDWARD B. ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH (2004) (hereinafter "ANATOMY"). 
18   See WOOD, COMPARATIVE SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 140 et. seq. 
19   Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, 339 at 345 et 
seq. 
20   See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 34 et seq. 
21   See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 46. 
22   See Michaels, supra note 19, at 360. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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understand the element as variable result of a functional connection with another variable element."
23  
Seen  against this background, the method proposed by Zweigert and Kötz, which  moves back and 
forth between functional parts  understood in a hypothetical whole  and  adjustments to the initial 
understanding of that whole based on  new  information gained from an analysis of the parts, is not 
irrational at all, but phenomenological; it roughly resembles a key method of one of Cassirer's more 
famous contemporaries, Martin Heidegger.  In the "hermeneutic circle" which is central to Heidegger's 
ontology, a higher-level, presupposed concept necessarily  encompasses the relational values of the 
individually existing, lower-level items, and an understanding of the latter then  helps better to 
understand the true nature of the presupposed, higher-level concept, and so on; this circle is not 
"irrational" or tautological, but a methodological tool used to grasp relational values.
24  While these 
values for Heidegger are to be understood as essential and true, for the  comparatist they are one 
solution to a given problem.
25 
Although  cautions within  this  circular  method  of using  an assumed whole to determine the 
function of the parts and a deepened understanding of the various parts' complementary functions to 
reformulate the model of the whole  cannot be reduced to a simple checklist,  they  would include at 
least the following approach coordinates against certain, predictable mistakes.  At the most basic level, 
it is important that  accurate information about the respective legal systems be procured and only 
comparable items  indeed  be  compared, so as to  avoid creating useless or misleading  comparisons.  
Next, it must be remembered that, unlike discrete objects (e.g., apples and oranges), legal rights, duties 
and forms cannot be accurately compared in isolation.  Rights and duties exist within legal systems 
and tend to serve relative (i.e., not transcendently essential) functions within their overall framework.
26  
                                                   
23   See Michaels, supra note 19, at 355. 
24   See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, S EIN UND ZEIT 7 et seq., 148 et seq. (1928).  In another context, Michaels 
accepts the hermeneutic circle as comparable to the "way in which mathematicians recognize functions." 
Michaels, supra note 19, at 369.  
25   Michaels critique on the  ends  of this method, on the other hand, appears to be both correct and a 
significant contribution to comparative law.  He observes that for Zweigert: "Institutions are contingent 
while problems are universal, the function can serve as tertium comparationis, different legal systems 
find similar solutions by different means, so universal principles of law can be found and formulated." 
Michaels, supra note 19, at 346.  By contrast a more sophisticated functionalism would recognize the 
irregularities in systems: laws have both "manifest" and "latent" functions, societies are sometimes 
dysfunctional rather than functionally symmetric, and elements of a society can even be non- or anti-
functional. Michaels,  supra note 19, at 352.  All this suggests that the search for the perfect social 
response to a universal problem is ill placed in comparative law.  
26   Ralf Michaels finds "equivalence functionalism" to bear promise for comparative law.  As he explains: 
"Functional equivalence means that similar problems may lead to different solutions; the solutions are 
similar only in their relation to the specific function under which they are regarded. . . . Equivalence 
functionalism by contrast explains an institution as a possible but not necessary response to a problem, as 
one contingent solution amongst several possibilities. As a consequence, the specificity of a system in the 
presence of (certain) universal problem lies  in its decision for one against all other (functionally Draft: February 12, 2008 
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The functions of a given right, duty or organizational form might also  complement other functions 
within the same system, so the functions create an almost organic network of interdependence within 
the legal system.  In order better to understand what is strictly considered "law", comparatists must 
also remember that legal systems exist within societies, and both receive and exercise influence vis-à-
vis such societies.  Societies further exist in history, and develop and change in relation to historical 
events, which means that the  comparatist must often be aware of the historical position of the legal 
system being studied.  Finally, since at least one leg of a legal comparison will include a law or legal 
system of a foreign state or country or from a distant time, accurate comparison will require an acute 
awareness of the distorting tendencies of one's own perspective in time, nation and culture.    The 
foregoing indicates that  comparatists should exercise caution with regard to  at least  the following 
points of approach: 
1.  Obtain accurate information and compare only comparable items; 
2.  Examine t he f unctional values of  system components,  also  within the  context  of the 
society as a whole; 
3.  Duly consider history's impact on the legal system; and 
4.  Be aware of the natural distorting tendencies of one's own perspective. 
It might  seem that the utility  of  such a  list would  be limited to an introductory text on 
comparative law, and need not be addressed to  professionals actually engaging in  comparative  or 
applied comparative law.  However, as Part II of this paper will make clear, examples of highly skilled 
professionals ignoring these approach coordinates are not difficult to find.   
The purpose of this paper is to outline a feasible approach to comparative company law that 
takes into account at least these methodological cautions, which are  straightforward  enough  for 
practitioners yet contain much of the theoretical insight offered by academic comparative law. Each of 
the four  points  will be  fleshed out  with  a  well-known  case from  the comparative law literature.  
Thereafter, the paper will sketch out a possible frame of reference for a comparison of three major 
systems of company law: the German, as found primarily in the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz 
or "AktG"),
27 the British, as found primarily in the Companies Act 2006 (Companies Act 2006 or "CA 
                                                                                                                                                               
equivalent) solutions.  Legal developments are thus no longer  necessary but only possible, not 
predetermined but contingent. This method in turn requires  an  understanding of society (and its 
subsystems, including law) as a system constituted by the relation of its elements, rather than set up by 
elements that are independent of each other."  Id.at 358 et seq. 
27   Law of September 6, 1965, as last amended on January 5, 2007, Federal Law Reporter (Bundesgesetzblatt 
– BGBl), vol. I, p. 20. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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2006"),
28 and the U.S., as found primarily in a state corporate law, represented here by the Delaware 
General Corporation Law ("DGCL" or "Title 8, Del. Code").
29  This frame will attempt to make clear 
what is comparable, the systemic boundaries within which respective functions can be sought and 
compared, and certain prejudices that the differences between these three jurisdictions can evoke at 
this point in history.  The paper will thus be organized as follows: Part II will look at examples of 
comparisons that fail to heed the points of caution summarized above.  Part III will define the term 
"company law" by examining the topical laws that  could  reasonably  be included in a study of 
company law, thus addressing the caution expressed in point 1, above.  Part IV will examine the law- 
and rulemaking bodies responsible for creating such topical laws in Germany, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, and Part V will look at how the various levels of legislation interact in these 
three jurisdictions, thus creating the framework necessary for points 2 and 3.  Part VI will then offer 
conclusions. 
II. FIVE POINTS OF CAUTION WHEN APPROACHING COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 
A. Obtain Accurate Information about the Legal System and Compare Only Comparables 
Perhaps the most  immediate danger faced by comparative lawyers is the risk of basing  an 
analysis on incomplete or incorrect information about the legal systems being  studied, especially 
because good information may be far away and written in a foreign language.  This explains the utility 
of the numerous texts that present translations or summary analyses of the laws of various countries in 
English, usually in completely separate chapters, with  little  or no  attempt to draw comparative 
conclusions about  the laws of the separate jurisdictions.
30  The problem of  incomplete or incorrect 
information can arise in even the best comparative legal scholarship and even regarding law that is 
very close to home.    Take, f or example, one of t oday's most influential schools of comparative 
company law, led by finance theorists such as Professors Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (hereinafter the "Origin Theorists").  This group of scholars is best 
known for  its argument that legal systems originating from common law lead to effective investor 
protection  – and consequently to the development of stock markets and prosperity  – while  those 
originating from the civil law do not.
31  The Origin Theorists summarize one of their key findings as 
follows: "Common law countries have the strongest protection of outside investors – both shareholders 
and creditors – whereas French civil law countries have the weakest protection. German civil law and 
                                                   
28   Companies Act 2006, Chapter 46, 8th November 2006. 
29   Delaware Code Annotated, title 8. 
30   See  e.g., SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS IN EUROPE (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), which contains separate, 
detailed chapters on the major European jurisdictions for securities transactions written by leading 
corporate and financial law firms in the respective jurisdiction. 
31   See  e.g.,  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,  Andrei Shleifer,  &  Robert Vishny,  Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 Journal of Financial Economics 3 (2000). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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Scandinavian countries fall in between, although comparatively speaking they have stronger protection 
of creditors, especially secured creditors."
32  Roughly put, the method used to obtain this result is to 
create a list of countries sorted by their lineage of legal origin, gather data on the existence of certain 
shareholder rights in each country, and rank the countries by their score on a governance index based 
on such rights.
33  From the perspective of corporate law, this method is problematic not only because it 
assumes that certain rights are universal keys to investor protection while others are not,
34 and that the 
rights on the books can in fact be effectively exercised in the jurisdictions the Origin Theorists favor,
35 
but primarily because it fails to use accurate information on the nature of the law in the jurisdictions it 
discusses.   
The Origin Theorists see civil law countries as "interventionist" and "bureaucratic",
36 while they 
understand  common law countries  to  use flexible standards like "fiduciary duty" or "fairness" to 
protect private property.
37 As Professor Mark Roe has rightly pointed out, however: "State presence in 
common law systems today exceeds its historical presence in civil law nations. . . . The United States 
began moving away from judge-made law, and even away from legislatively made but judicially 
enforced law, well over a century ago when Congress set up the Interstate Commerce Commission and 
chose to have regulators, not judges, make law."
38 At least until 2003, the rules of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission  (SEC) created a web of regulations more pervasive than those found in 
                                                   
32   Id. at 8. 
33   See Id. at 8 et seq. 
34   "[I]indices are constructed so as to treat all component governance mechanisms as complements, when 
the data suggest that several such mechanisms are actually substitutes for, and not complements to, each 
other and the relation appears to vary across firm characteristics and industry sectors. In short, one size 
does not fit all. Good governance is therefore best understood as highly context-specific, something that 
even the best-constructed index simply cannot capture and convey."  Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & 
Roberta Romano, "The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices," 67 et seq. (October 2007), 
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 89/2007, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019921. 
35   Professor Lucian Bebchuk has explained repeatedly in many contexts how the guarantees bestowed on 
shareholders by corporate statutes are not as effective in practice as they might seem on paper.  For 
example, "shareholders' veto power over charter amendments and reincorporations [is] ineffective at 
securing value-increasing changes" because it is a mere right to react, not to act, and "management's 
agenda-setting power under existing arrangements also enables it to obtain shareholder approval for 
changes that, by themselves, reduce shareholder value" by bundling the proposal to an attractive 
transaction up for shareholder vote.  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 
118 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 864 (2005). 
36   La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, supra note 31, at 12. 
37   Id. at 9. 
38   Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics and Modern Stock Markets, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 460, 484 (2006).  On 
the levels of regulatory enforcement in common and civil law countries and their correlation to market 
volume, see Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, "Public Enforcement of Securities Laws: Preliminary 
Evidence" (August 8, 2007), 2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000086, which shows a higher staffing of regulatory agencies in 
common as compared to civil law countries.  Draft: February 12, 2008 
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any European country, whether of civil or common law origin.  As discussed in Part IV.A.2-4 of this 
paper, the European Commission has all but eliminated this imbalance with a cluster of directives and 
regulations on securities regulation, some of which track recommendations from the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
39 in which the United States plays a leading role.  
Perhaps it is a point of American pride to think of the US markets as lean and unbureaucratic.  This is 
belied, however, by the fact that foreign issuers have historically found the cost of falling under the 
SEC's  extensive  regulatory regime  to outweigh  the costs of  excluding US investors from their 
offerings
40 and US journalists from their road shows
41 until the SEC issued safe harbors  rules like 
Regulation S
42 and Rule 134e,
43 in effect promising that when the safe harbor conditions are met, it 
will not reach out extraterritorially to cast its heavy regulatory net over such foreign activities.  As is 
discussed in Section C of this Part II, countries in Continental Europe may indeed have legislatively 
disfavored capital markets, but this was part of a political choice to favor labour over capital, and did 
not result from their law being less judicial or more pervasive.  A comparison of national political and 
economic  policies  would be the appropriate tool to prove this point, not a common law/civil law 
comparison.  To present US securities  regulation as slim, flexible and judicially oriented while  the 
capital markets regulation  of civil law countries is  pervasive, rigid and regulatory is simply an 
inaccurate description of the law. 
On the other hand, the Origin Theorists also depend on the rather aged argument that judges in 
civil law jurisdictions, rather than adjust law analogically to the case at hand, mechanically compare 
                                                   
39   For example, IOSCO released its report "International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings 
and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers" in 1998, which the SEC carried almost without change into an 
amended Form 20-F in 2000 (see International Disclosure Standards, Release Nos. 33–7745; 34–41936, 
64 Fed. Reg. 5390 (Oct. 5, 1999)) and the European Union incorporated into its Prospective Directive in 
2003 (see Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on 
the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 345) 64).  The result is substantially identical, annual 
disclosure for listed issuers in the United States and the European Union. 
40   "[T]he significant increase in offshore offerings of securities, as well as the significant participation by 
U.S. investors in foreign markets, present numerous questions. . . . The Regulation adopted today is based 
on a territorial approach . . . . The registration of securities is intended to protect the U.S. capital markets 
and investors purchasing in the U.S. market . . . . Principles of comity and the reasonable expectations of 
participants in the global markets justify reliance on laws applicable in jurisdictions outside the United 
States . . . ." Offshore Offers and Sales, Release Nos. 33-6863 and 34-27942, 55 Fed. Reg. 18306 (May 2, 
1990). 
41   "U.S. journalists are being excluded on a regular basis from the offshore press activities of foreign 
issuers. . . . The purpose of this rulemaking is to eliminate this unintended and undesirable consequence 
of the Commission’s rules governing offering publicity."  Offshore Press Conferences, Meetings with 
Company Representatives Conducted Offshore and Press-Related Materials Released Offshore, Release 
Nos. 33–7470 and 34–39227, 62 Fed. Reg. 38948, 38949 (Oct. 17, 1997). 
42   See 17 CFR §230.901 et seq. 
43   See 17 CFR §230.135e. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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facts to rigid rules: "The vague fiduciary duty principles of the common law are more protective of 
investors than the bright line rules of the civil law, which can often be circumvented by sufficiently 
imaginative insiders."
44  However, in 1982,  nearly twenty years before the article on investor 
protection under discussion was published, the German High Federal Court issued its landmark 
Holzmüller decision,
45 in which it judicially created a right for shareholders to vote on a management 
decision to spin off a substantial portion of the company's assets into a subsidiary.  In its opinion, the 
Court explained: 
The express provisions of the Stock Corporation Act offer the shareholders of the parent 
company insufficient protection against such encroachments. . . . At least in this case, it is 
certainly necessary to p rotect these shareholders from the danger that, by making 
fundamental decisions in the subsidiary, the management board will exploit the structure 
it has created through its power of representation to further diminish those shareholder 
rights that have already been weakened by the spin-off. . . . This is a real gap in the Stock 
Corporation Act that should be closed in accordance with the Act's systematic design and 
policy aims. It would unduly restrict a necessary extension of the law through judicial 
precedent ( Rechtsfortbildung) to ask the damaged shareholders to wait for a future 
legislative amendment or further clarification in the legal scholarship . . . .
46 
Such judicial flexibility is widely practiced in civil law countries.  For example, because much of the 
Code Napoleon still remains in its original form from 1804, French judges have through a large and 
growing body of judicial decisions over the last 200 years adapted the statutory rules to the changing 
nature and problems of society.
47 
In the presence of a  known socio-political difference like the  postwar  Continental  European 
political tendency to  prefer the protection of  labour over  the promotion  of  capital investment, a 
comparatist might be tempted not only to argue that the difference is caused by diverging legal origins, 
as do the Origin Theorists, but also to seek support for the difference in sloppy comparisons – such as 
comparing diverging laws that also have diverging  functions.  Such errors can easily occur because 
use of the functional method means one must detach laws from their "literal" meaning and derive a 
"functional" purpose based on one's understanding of the legal system in question (for example, Prof. 
                                                   
44   La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, supra note 31, at 9. 
45   German High Federal Court, 2
nd Civil Division, February 25, 1982, Doc. No. 174/80 (In re Holzmüller). 
46   Id., author's translation. This decision is merely one of the better known cases of judicially crafted 
doctrine, but is by no means an isolated occurrence.  Another landmark decision is the German High 
Federal Court's adoption of the "entity theory" over the "aggregate theory"  for general (civil law) 
partnerships in 2000 (see  German Federal Law Reporter on Civil Cases (BGHZ)  vol. 146, p. 341), 
something which in the United States the courts were not able to push through alone, and that was 
achieved by statute in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997).  This clear reversal of the antiquated 
characterization of flexible, judicially made common law and rigid, statutory civil law further calls the 
position of the Origin Theorists into question. 
47   See the discussion of judicial development of the Code Napoleon in ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 
90 et seq. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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Douglas Baird has shown that US rules on "fraudulent conveyance," the literal purpose of which is to 
protect bankruptcy creditors, actually function like European "capital maintenance" rules
48).  The 
"functional" method used in comparative law, like  functional analysis in  sociology,
49  and the 
"structural" method employed in anthropology
50 and literary criticism,
51 splits the studied object into 
the two levels of "name" or "essence" on the one hand and relative "function" on the other.  The use of 
function  instead of  name  or essence dislodges  the object of comparison from its linguistic or 
conceptual moorings and  opens up the risk that the  comparatist  will abuse the elasticity of the 
"function" concept.  A well-informed legal scholar's interpretation of function will usually be accurate, 
even if no particular comparative methodology is self-consciously applied.  For example, the cases of 
"functional convergence" in corporate governance that Professor John C. Coffee argued to exist even 
in the face of  clear  "formal divergence,"
52 have generally been seen as valid  interpretations of 
comparable functions despite different formal provisions of law.
53 
However, when comparisons are performed deductively on the basis of well known difference 
rather than inductively on the actual basis of laws or their functions rigorously seen, there is a risk of 
the comparison becoming merely  "anecdotal"  rather than  actually yielding knowledge.  Take, f or 
                                                   
48   See  Douglas G. Baird, Legal Approaches to Restricting Distributions to Shareholders: The Role of 
Fraudulent Transfer Law, 7 EBOR 199 (2006). 
49   With respect to functional a nalysis in sociology, Ralf Michaels has succinctly explained  Émile 
Durkheim's contribution: "First, he separated functions from origins and established functions as relations 
between, not qualities of, elements. Second, he emphasized that the goals of individuals were contingent 
and therefore not the valid material of scientific endeavors . . . . As long as the ends or goals of an 
institution had been its inherent elements, any explanation had to be teleological, and an analysis would 
have to focus either on the will of a transcendent creator or on the inherent nature of things. If institutions 
were defined by the purpose defined by their creators, a systematic analysis had to be impossible . . . . The 
emphasis on objective functions . . . distinct from both origin and purpose, allowed the search for general 
laws, the goal of all sciences."  Michaels, supra note 19, at 349 et seq. 
50   A memorable functional analysis in anthropology is Claude Levi-Strauss' comparison of mythical 
thought, characterized as "bricolage", to scientific thought, stating that both are merely constructive 
activities, the primary difference being that the bricoleur improvises on the basis of an existing repertoire 
while the engineer subordinates each task performed to the availability of certain materials.  See CLAUDE 
LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 17 (trans. John & Doreen Weightman, 1966). 
51   The functional method in literary criticism can be traced back to the 1928 work of  VLADIMIR PROPP, 
MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLK TALE (trans. Laurence Scott, 1968).  The school of thought that developed 
out of Propp's work became known as "Structuralism".  See  e.g.,  WINFRIED  NÖTH, HANDBOOK OF 
SEMIOTICS 298 (1990). 
52   "Although this Article agrees with the path dependency perspective that formal convergence faces too 
many obstacles to be predicted, it argues that functional convergence can be facilitated  . . . ." John C. 
Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and 
Its Implications,  93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 641,  650 (1999). Coffee focuses on how the participants in 
international mergers and listings can find ways functionally to bridge formally different legal rules.  
53   See e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 
Am. J. Comp. L. 329, 349 et seq. (2001).  Although Coffee and Gilson are to a certain extent relying on 
each other's work in these articles, the validity of functional analysis in comparative company law is 
firmly established.  See e.g., ANATOMY, supra note 17, at 4. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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example, the debate on executive compensation that followed the disclosure of the exorbitant sums 
granted former General Electric CEO Jack Welch and former New York Stock  Exchange CEO 
Richard Grasso, as well as the publication of a celebrated book on the subject by Lucian Bebchuk and 
Jesse Fried.
54  As is well known from studies such as those written by Roe,
55 Germany is, or at least 
was,
56 a "social democracy" in which the profit principle is to a certain extent subordinated to the 
general good, and in particular the good of employees, pursuant to  a generally recognized  national 
policy.  In addition, German stock corporations are managed by a board of managing directors that by 
law must  act as a "collegial" body, and this  means that  the leadership of one man or woman is 
deemphasized.
57  In 2006, the average compensation of the persons filling a role that came closest to a 
CEO in 29 major German corporations was just under €5 million. This average was drawn upward by 
Deutsche Bank's chief managing director, Josef Ackermann, earning over  €13 million,
58 a figure 
considerably lower than the $ 25 million taken home by Charles Prince of Citicorp in the same year.
59  
Nevertheless, this state of affairs prompted German politicians across the political spectrum to react.  
While  Oskar Lafontaine, leader of the Leftist Party, advocated restricting CEO compensation to a 
multiple of 20 times that of the company's lowest paid employee,  Renate Künast, a Green Party 
cabinet  member  flatly stated that salaries running into the millions are "immoral", and  Wolfgang 
Schäuble, a Christian Democratic Union cabinet member, is reported as saying that leading citizens 
must set good moral examples, and if they fail to restrict their own excessive salary then the state may 
step in to do so.
60  All evidence indicates a significant difference between how executive compensation 
is viewed in Germany and in the United States.  This is an undisputed social and legal phenomenon. 
In an article presenting an anecdotal analysis of decisions regarding executive compensation in 
German and US courts, a leading US corporate law scholar compared the German judiciary's decision 
regarding a "golden handshake" paid out to the former CEO of Mannesmann AG, Dr. Klaus Esser, 
                                                   
54   LUCIEN  A. B EBCHUK  & J ESSE  FRIED, P AY WITHOUT  PERFORMANCE: T HE  UNFULFILLED  PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
55   See e.g., MARK ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 29 et. seq. (2003) 
56   For a more recent and a rather more "German" opinion on the German economic structure, see Peer 
Zumbansen, The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law, 13 Ind. J. Glob. Leg. Stud. 
261, [♦] et seq. (2006). 
57   See § 77(1) AktG ("If the management board is composed of more than one person, all members are 
authorized only collectively for executive management. The articles or the by-laws may provide 
otherwise; they may not provide, however, that one or more members make disputed decisions against the 
position held by the majority of the board." Author's translation). 
58   Catherine Hoffmann,  Warum verdienen Manager so viel Geld?,  FRANKFURTER  ALLGEMEINE 
SONNTAGSZEITUNG, July 22, 2007, at 44. 
59   See THE WSJ/MERCER 2006 CEO COMPENSATION SURVEY (2007). 
60   Manfred Schäfers, Was darf ein Manager verdienen?, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, November 
27, 2007, at 15. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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following the company's takeover by Vodafone plc, with the Delaware judiciary's decision on a very 
large severance payment to Disney Inc.'s short-lived, former President, Michael Ovitz.  As the article 
explains: 
Delaware courts exonerated directors of The Walt Disney Company from liability for 
damages  - despite the directors having paid Michael Ovitz around $   130 million in 
exchange for a year accomplishing little as the number two executive at Disney. At about 
the same time, the German Federal Supreme Court held that directors of the German 
company, Mannesmann AG, breached their duty to the company when they awarded a 
bonus of approximately $17 million to the outgoing CEO  - whose actions apparently 
played an important role in gaining over $ 50 billion for the Mannesmann shareholders.
61  
 
This comparison would  seem to  illustrate that German courts, in line with the social and 
political differences discussed above, are much tougher on executive compensation than are those in 
Delaware.  What the comparison fails clearly to state is that the Delaware decision was made on the 
basis of corporate law whilst the German decision was made on the basis of criminal law, bodies of 
law with very different functions, and which receive different treatment from the courts.
62  Moreover, 
the payment to Ovitz was made on the basis of a negotiated contract, and most of the court's decision 
went to analyzing the adequacy of the negotiation  and approval  process for this agreement.
63  
However, as the German court stressed,
64 the payment to the outgoing CEO of Mannesmann, Klaus 
Esser, was awarded on a wholly gratuitous basis for past performance after Esser's exit was decided 
and agreed, and independently from his negotiated bonus package – a scenario that Delaware courts 
have found to constitute waste of corporate assets.
65  Further, the Delaware court that issued the 
relevant decision in the Disney litigation was the Court of Chancery, a court of equity and perhaps the 
                                                   
61   Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 Am. J. Comp. L. 453 (2007). 
62   Whereas civil remedies like those found in corporate law are primarily remedial or coercive, criminal 
penalties have the primary purpose of punishing and deterring wrongful conduct. See e.g., In re American 
Biomaterials Corp., 954 F.2d 919 (3
rd Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 
656 (2
nd Cir. 1989); Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020 (Del. Ch. 2006).  As 
one would expect, this is a position also held in Germany. With regard to German position on the 
distinction between criminal and civil law, see CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT vol. 1, § 1, margin no. 2 (4
th 
ed. 2006) ("A provision does not belong to the criminal law because it regulates against violations of 
prescriptions or prohibitions – many provisions of civil and administrative law also do that – but because 
such violations are sanctioned by rules on punishment or deterrence." Author's translation). 
63   See In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 2005 WL 2056651, at 133 et seq. (Del. Ch. 
2005). 
64   German Federal High Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Docket No. 470/04 (Dec. 21, 2005), margin no. 27. 
65   In re The Walt Disney Company, at 32. Earlier decisions of the Delaware courts also indicate that award 
for past services are often treated as lacking consideration and thus invalid as a waste of corporate assets.  
See Fidanque v. Am. Maracaibo, 92 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1952) and Lewis v. Hett, C.A. No. 6752 (Del. 
Ch. Sept. 4, 1984), as well as In re Walt Disney, at 32. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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nation's most famously business savvy court,
66 whilst the division of the German High Federal Court 
that heard the Mannesmann appeal was the Criminal Division (not the 2
nd Civil Division, which deals 
with corporate law matters and handed down, for example, the Holzmüller decision discussed above), 
which is not accustomed to balancing business interests in the corporate area.  A criminal court 
applying criminal law has no reason whatsoever to consider the exigencies of corporate business 
operations. 
These  very meaningful  differences  render the two decisions  themselves  beyond  any  useful 
comparison.  A specialized business court's decision under corporate law evaluating  whether  the 
negotiation and approval of a compensation contract was grossly negligent simply has very little in 
common with a criminal court's decision under criminal law evaluating whether a gratuitous payment 
made to an exiting director was an abuse of trust.  What could remain,  however, would be  the 
possibility that  these cases each  function  as  the  procedural remedy of choice in their respective 
jurisdiction for the  discipline of such  management  actions.  Indeed the author asks  whether  "the 
difference is coincidental, or symptomatic of the way in which the two jurisdictions are likely to react 
to cases of this nature."
67  The answer he provides is that because shareholder suits are more difficult 
to bring in Germany, the public prosecutor filed the criminal complaint against the Mannesmann 
directors,
68 which indicates shareholder remedies in Germany taking a different route from like cases 
in Delaware. This is also an interesting idea, but finds little basis in the facts.   
Whilst the Delaware courts do regularly hear shareholder challenges to the award of director 
compensation,
69  on the other side of the Atlantic,  the Mannesmann decision was major news in 
Germany exactly because a case of this type had never been tried
70 – hardly a "standard remedy" of the 
German legal system.  Moreover, unlike the  position of Delaware courts  applying  the demand 
                                                   
66   See e.g. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 20.11 (2002) ("In particular, the Delaware Court of Chancery, which has a 
long tradition of resolving complex business disputes in a timely, efficient and fair manner . . . .") and 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion , 67 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 287, 323 (1994) (". . . judges (at least in Delaware) have some expertise in providing legal 
advice to corporate boards."). 
67   See Gevurtz, supra note 61, at 485 et seq. 
68   See id. at 490 (". . . the criminal prosecution in Mannesmann illustrates what can happen in a high profile 
transaction, perceived by the public as outrageous, in the absence of a viable opportunity for civil 
adjudication . . . ."). 
69   See the cases discussed in BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 66, at § 4.19. 
70   German legal scholarship is led by highly respected, multivolume commentaries on individual laws and 
codes.  An examination of the lengthy comments on §   2 66 of the German Criminal Code 
(Strafgesetzbuch) reveals no case comparable to Mannesmann AG.  See THOMAS FISCHER, BECK'SCHE 
KURZKOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH, vol. 10  margin no. 54 (55
th ed. 2008); K RISTIAN KÜHL, 
LACKNER & KÜHL STGB § 266 (27
th ed. 2007). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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requirement in Delaware,
71 German courts have specifically refused to grant protection of the business 
judgement rule to supervisory board decisions refusing to pursue an action against a board member, 
explaining that evaluating the merits of a legal claim is – far from a business judgment – what courts 
themselves do and thus courts are competent to evaluate the claim de novo.
72  Thus an action regarding 
compensation would have far less chance of being stopped by the board in Germany than in Delaware, 
and in fact the demand requirement led to the Disney shareholders' action in 1996 bouncing back and 
forth between the courts for nearly 10 years until it finally reached its conclusion in the 2006 decision 
discussed above.
73  Moreover, unlike the Delaware law, the G erman Stock Corporation Act 
specifically provides a standard  against which  the adequacy of executive compensation must be 
measured,
74 which is another reason why compensation cases  could take a corporate rather than a 
criminal route.  Consequentially, although it is well known that the United States if far friendlier to 
shareholders litigation than is Germany, this is not reflected in the two court decisions.  In addition, 
even though the broader topic the author seeks to highlight, i.e., that socially democratic Germany is 
much less sanguine on high executive compensation than the economically utilitarian United States, is 
certainly true, the comparison of two decisions with very different fact patterns on the basis of laws 
with different functions by courts with different purposes and tenors  does nothing to support it.  
Comparisons  of "incomparables"  used  to draw  systematic  conclusions  could potentially distract 
attention away from comparative work that focuses on the actual causes of the diverging treatment of 
compensation.  As Zweigert & Kötz note, "[i]ncomparables cannot usefully be compared, and in law 
the only things which are comparable are those which fulfil the same function."
75 
                                                   
71   See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (1984). 
72   See ARAG v. Garmenbeck, German Federal Law Reporter on Civil Cases (BGHZ), vol. 135, p. 244 
(1997) ("the supervisory board may not invoke a 'decision-making prerogative' to restrict the scope of the 
court’s review with regard to this part of its decision-making. In examining whether a claim for damages 
exists and the merits thereof, the supervisory board does nothing other than anyone else who evaluates – 
for himself or for another – whether a claim exists and whether it may be successfully prosecuted in court.  
The substance and correctness of such an evaluation of the merits of judicial prosecution of a claim may, 
in cases of a dispute, generally be fully tested in a court, given that such an evaluation does not regard 
business dealings but rather solely regards an area of knowledge for which we may always consider 
positing a limited freedom for discretion." Author's translation). 
73   The Disney proceedings began in 1996 with the shareholders filing a complaint directly with the court 
rather than requesting that the directors pursue the action.  In the first round of action, the directors then 
sued to dismiss the case, and the Court of Chancery complied, following which the Supreme Court 
reversed in part and remanded to the Court of Chancery for further determinations.  As a sampling of the 
10 decisions in this long procedural history, see In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 11, Del. Ch., 
C.A. No. 15452, (Mar. 13, 1997); In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998); 
In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
74   The overall compensation of a managing director must be "in an appropriate relationship to the duties of 
the director and the state of the company."  § 87(1) AktG. 
75   ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 34. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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B. Recognize Functions and Relationships within Systems 
It is the rare case that seeks to compare two elements of a legal system that are both formally 
and functionally different.  However, it is quite common that the comparatist does not cast her 
analytical net wide enough, and thus fails to understand all functional elements that interact with a law 
or right in a foreign legal system.  This is one of the problems that has plagued development law and 
led to developing countries rejecting incompatible "transplants" from foreign legal systems.  As 
Professors  Daniel B erkowitz, K atharina P istor and  Jean-Francois R ichard explain: " Extensive 
comparative research prior to the adoption of a foreign legal system is indicative for an informed 
choice."
76 
Such extensive comparative research would  reveal " a system of functional constellations; its 
concepts  [would] denote the tasks that a given life situation assigns law  – indeed, assigns all laws 
resting on the same social and economic conditions."
77  The research would from the outset renounce 
the conviction  that certain legal institutions are  essentially necessary, and instead  employ an "anti-
metaphysical focus  . . .  [ that] understand[s] institutions through their relation to problems."
78  The 
relationship between the problems posed by similar underlying conditions and the solutions devised to 
address them is central to the analysis.  In  The Anatomy of Corporate Law, Kraakman and his 
colleagues observe that, "[i]t would perhaps be more accurate to call our approach 'economic' rather 
than 'functional' . . . . the exigencies of commercial activity a nd organization present practical 
problems that have a rough similarity in developed market economies throughout the world . . . 
corporate law everywhere must necessarily address these problems . . . forces of logic, competition, 
interest group pressure, i mitation, and compatibility tend to lead different jurisdictions to choose 
roughly similar solutions to these problems."
79 However, not only the legal provisions themselves, but 
also the means of enforcing them are included in such comparative research.  In analyzing governance 
under the company law of a given jurisdiction, Professors Lucian Arye Bebchuk and  Mark J. Roe 
argue that "[w]hat counts are all elements of a corporate legal system that bear on corporate decisions 
and the distribution of value: not just general principles, but also all the particular rules implementing 
them; not just substantive rules, but also procedural rules, judicial practices, institutional and 
procedural infrastructure, and enforcement capabilities."
80  The foregoing quotations  from leading 
                                                   
76   Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 163, 180 (2003). 
77   ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 46, defining the method of comparative law. 
78   Michaels, supra note 19, at 360. 
79   ANATOMY, supra note 17, at 4, discussing their approach to the "anatomy of corporate law." 
80   Lucian Arye Bebchuk  & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127, 155 (1999), describing what they include in their analysis of legal 
systems. Draft: February 12, 2008 
 
 
18 
 
© 2008 David C. Donald 
 
 
corporate law comparatists display a general agreement that in comparative law, the relative functions 
of a given rule or structure must be understood in the complete context of the legal system and broader 
societal framework as solutions to problems that may well arise also in other jurisdictions.  Although 
the functional approach of comparative law is not without its dangers,
81 it is generally accepted. 
Berkowitz, Pistor and  Richard explain how  law  development  projects have  had little success 
since the 19
th Century in large part because of a failure to perform extensive comparative research on 
the constellation of values and  functions within the  recipient  society before transplanting  a foreign 
legal  tool.  Using the term "demand" as shorthand for the desire  of a recipient society  to  actually 
enforce a transplanted rule, they explain: 
[C]ountries that receive their formal legal order from another country have to come to 
grips with what was often a substantial mismatch between the preexisting and t he 
imported legal order. They may be unfamiliar with dispute settlement through adversarial 
litigation rather than mediation and negotiation, or with the rigidity of legal rights 
independent of kinship relations or norms of social obligations. Moreover, the social, 
economic and institutional context often differs remarkably between origin and transplant 
country, creating fundamentally different conditions for effectuating the imported legal 
order in the latter.
82 
Our basic argument is that for law to be effective, a demand for law must exist so that the 
law on the books will actually be used in practice and legal intermediaries responsible for 
developing the law are responsive to this demand. If the transplant adapted the law to 
local conditions . . . then we would expect that the law would be used. Because the law 
would be used, a strong public demand for institutions to enforce this law would follow. . 
. . However, if the law was not adapted to local conditions . . . then we would expect that 
initial demand for using these laws to be weak. . . . Countries that receive the law in this 
fashion are thus subject to the "transplant effect": their legal order would function less 
effectively than origins or transplants that either adapted the law to local conditions 
and/or had a population that was familiar with the transplanted law.
83 
Understanding the law in context is a prerequisite to transplanting laws.  Because the "donor" 
countries fail to perform sufficient comparative analyses on either their own legal systems or those of 
the recipient countries, the transplant fails.  T h at efforts at transplanting legal systems from the 
colonization of the 19
th Century  to contemporary  development  law projects  have yielded very poor 
results shows that the comparative analyses, where performed, were not exhaustive enough.  As 
                                                   
81   With referenced to the use, critique and eventual rejection of functionalism in Sociology, Michaels' 
explains that functions should not be understood to express an essential telos, whether understood as the 
intention of a transcendent creator (Aristotle) or a necessary evolution (Compte) (see Michaels, supra 
note  19, at  345  et seq.), for not every function within a social system should be understood as 
indispensible, given that living societies contain contingent, antiquated and unnecessary elements (Robert 
Merton) (Id. at 352 et seq.).  All these dangers point to the fact that the functional method is strongest 
when used to understand, compare and critique laws and legal systems, but "is not only a bad tool for 
legal unification, but even provides powerful arguments for maintaining differences" (Id. at 377). 
82   Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, supra note 76, at 170 et seq. 
83   Id. at 167 et seq. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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indicated above, these analyzes must examine a great number of components of the legal system and 
of society and attempt to grasp at least the primary ways in which the functions of these components 
interact with and complement each other. The complex and changing nature of this web of functional 
relationships tends to evoke organic metaphors like "transplant".    Employing another organic 
metaphor, yet blaming the recipient rather than the foreign element being introduced (inappropriate 
earth for a healthy crop rather than  inappropriate  organ for the  healthy body), Professors Bernard 
Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova reflect on the lack of sufficient background study that 
went into recommending mass privatizations for Russia in the 1990's: 
We have learned that Western-style capitalism is more fragile than we thought. It will not 
emerge - certainly not quickly, perhaps not at all - if seeds are simply scattered widely 
through mass privatization, to grow in the thin soil of an institutionally impoverished 
country. Instead, the institutions that control theft in its myriad forms, especially self-
dealing by managers and controlling shareholders, are an essential fertilizer. The task of 
creating fertile soil in which privatized companies can take root is not a simple one. . . . 
Russia needs a serious, top-down effort to control corruption, organized crime, and self-
dealing; adopt a rational tax system; reduce the broad administrative discretion that 
invites corruption; shrink the bloated bureaucracy; enforce existing rules that limit self-
dealing; remove the principal loopholes in those rules; and improve financial reporting by 
major firms . . . . No one of these steps is sufficient by itself, but each will help and 
progress on any one can reinforce progress on others.
84 
A comparative analysis must therefore grasp not only the immediate function of rights, laws, and 
organizational forms within the specific legal system, but also the manner in which the legal system 
interacts with the society, its habits and mores.  The affinity between comparative law and sociology 
thus goes not only to the use of the functional method of analysis, but also to the interdependence of 
the two objects of study. 
C. Understand the Historical Setting of the Legal System 
To this breadth of systematic and social analysis must be added a temporal axis of comparative 
study.  Accurate knowledge of historical facts and trends influencing a legal system and its operation 
are very often crucial to a comparison.  Major events such as wars, revolutions, and economic booms 
or collapses are not "legal" in nature but have an impact on the development of economies and legal 
systems.  The number of historical and political influences that go into a major change in the law is 
often so great that even a detailed historical analysis of the process can only be a summary.
85  The 
                                                   
84   Bernard Black, Reinier  Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova,  Russian Privatization and Corporate 
Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1797 et seq. (2000). 
85   See e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE  COMMISSION A ND  MODERN  FINANCE 1  et seq. (3
rd ed.  2003) and Roberta Romano,  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 (2004) for 
unusually detailed and insightful analyses of the relationship between historical events and the creation of 
law. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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Origin Theorists have come under criticism from a number of scholars exactly for failing to factor 
history into their analytical equations.  Roe, for example, has subjected the argument of the Origin 
Theorists that civil law stunted the development of stock markets in  Continental  Europe while 
common law stimulated such development in the United States and the United Kingdom to a criticism 
that is, or approaches, a complete refutation.  Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard also show how historical 
causes have had a more meaningful impact on the success of legal systems than has the origin of a 
given system in the common law.   Both of these  critiques, which are discussed in following, 
demonstrate how history must be factored into any  comparative  analysis of a legal system or the 
latter's effects on social development. 
Berkowitz, P istor and  Richard challenge the link between legal origin and successful legal 
systems by demonstrating that legal institutions forced on countries through colonial  conquest or 
uninformed development assistance have a high probability of failure regardless of their origin.
86  On 
the other hand, systems that a country itself develops and the complementary elements of which the 
culture appreciates have a high probability of success regardless of their origin.
87  The suitability of the 
transplanted law thus has a greater impact on its future development than does a fragile and diluted 
link to  Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis.  Among developing countries, any difference in the rate of 
success between those with common law and  those  with civil law colonial backgrounds could be 
traced to the differing policies of colonial management.  The British, influenced perhaps by their less 
rationalist approach to culture or perhaps by the unpleasant experience in North America, attempted to 
leave space for local customs and institutions,
88 while the French,  perhaps following their more 
rationalist cultural heritage or riding the wave of enthusiasm for social engineering that carried them 
during  the Revolution,  sought to  remake conquered societies by introducing their own  customs and 
institutions, including French law, quite pervasively.
89  This difference was unlikely to be a common 
law/civil law divergence, as the civil law country of Holland applied its own law only to its own 
citizens in its colonies, and left the natives to their own customs.
90 
                                                   
86   "We provide statistical evidence showing that the  'transplant effect' is a more important predictor of 
effective legal institutions than the supply of a particular legal family. " Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, 
supra note 76, at 168 et seq. 
87   "Internal development can take advantage of new solutions economic agents develop in response to new 
challenges and existing constraints. Lawmakers can build on domestic knowledge and expertise and can 
take full advantage of complementarities between new and old institutional arrangements. This is most 
explicit for case law, where new legal rules are generated from litigated cases. But legislatures can also 
take advantage of social knowledge about perceived problems and possible solutions through survey 
instruments or law commissions staffed with experts." Id. at 170 et seq. 
88   See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 220. 
89   See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 113. 
90   Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, supra note 76, at 176. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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Roe focuses on the assertion that common law countries have developed more active capital 
markets than civil law countries due to the superior investor protection that derives from common law 
courts.  The Origin Theorists attribute this argument to a statement by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. 
that courts can flexibly apply rules to situations that are difficult to foresee in advance.
91 It should be 
noted, however, that in  another context Coffee explains that investment bankers began to sit  as 
"independent" directors  on the boards of US  companies, and effective shareholder monitoring thus 
began, exactly because US courts could be bribed and European investors needed assurances against 
the extraction of rents by management.
92  Thus a dogmatic application of common law as the source of 
effective investor protection can  in no way be attributed to Coffee.  Roe's critique of the Origin 
Theorists focuses on the highly industrialized countries that currently have active capital markets, and 
looks at the development of their markets during the 20
th Century against the backdrop of the political 
events they experienced.  Among the other evidence he offers, Roe shows that the percentage of GDP 
represented by stock markets was high in Continental Europe in 1913 (Belgium = 99%, France = 78% 
and Germany = 44%, compared to the United States = 39%), plummeted through World Wars I and II 
and their aftermath (Belgium = 32%, France = 28% and Germany = 35%, compared to the United 
States = 61% in 1960), and gradually returned to or exceeded its pre-1914 level by 1999, one decade 
after the end of the Cold War (Belgium = 82%, France = 117% and Germany = 67%, compared to the 
United States = 152%).
93  As Roe explains, the political events of the 20
th Century, which were most 
intensely experienced in Continental Europe, disproportionately affected countries in that area, which 
were primarily countries of "civil law origin": 
The first political economy channel has military occupation weakening institutions 
overall. When it came time to rebuild, the polity rebuilt human institutions in early 
                                                   
91   La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny,  supra note  31, at 9  ("In the area of investor 
expropriation, also known as self-dealing, the judges apply what Coffee calls a 'smell test,' and try to sniff 
out whether even unprecedented conduct by the insiders is unfair to outside investors. The expansion of 
legal precedents to additional violations of fiduciary duty, and the fear of such expansion, limit the 
expropriation by the insiders in common law countries."). 
92   "[T]he derivative suit had been recognized by the Supreme Court as a legal mechanism to protect 
minority shareholders, and the law of fiduciary duties generally required any corporate official who 
engaged in a self-dealing transaction with his firm to prove its "intrinsic fairness." But once the investor 
had committed his capital, he might discover that the corporation had migrated to another, more 
permissive jurisdiction . . . . Or, a judge would simply be bribed to accept some pretext for clearly 
predatory misbehavior. . . . Litigation was simply not the answer for the foreign investor. . . .  One means 
to this end was pioneered by J.P. Morgan & Co., namely, placing a partner of the firm on the client's 
board."  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 28 et seq. (2001). This is a technique that has 
historically been used in Germany. See JEREMY EDWARDS AND KLAUS FISCHER, BANKS, FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENTS IN GERMANY 199 et seq. (1994). For example, as following pages of data on the topic, the 
authors observe, "on average, bank representatives accounted for 20% of the total supervisory board 
membership of the 75 AGs among the largest 100 on which banks had seats." Id. at 210.  
93   Roe, supra note 38, at 488, Table 3. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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decades, waiting until later to rebuild stock markets. The second channel ties destruction 
to postwar domestic politics. Stunned voters were averse to risk, labor was powerful, and 
savings were meager. Those background political conditions were not market-friendly. 
The third channel is postwar international politics. The program in many nations was 
fighting communism, inducing most Western European and East Asian governments to 
befriend international communism's most likely domestic allies. A fourth channel is that 
destroyed nations do not immediately need large pools of capital from financial markets. 
Banks are adept at allocating capital to known technologies, while securities markets are 
more adept at allocating capital to new and untried technologies. After World War II, 
reconstruction was largely a known task for which banks were well suited, perhaps better 
suited than volatile equity markets, and which fit with a polity that preferred steady and 
low-risk reconstruction.
94 
Countries in Continental Europe were occupied and partially destroyed by invading armies during the 
two World Wars, their surviving populations lost some or all of their property, and understandably 
became risk averse. The aftermath demanded investment in the conservative activity of reconstruction 
rather than speculative investments, and the main political aim was to keep Communism at bay, which 
meant appeasing labour and not ostensibly favouring capital.  As Roe observes, banks were well suited 
to allocating capital to the kind of projects that rose out of these historical events, and as law permitted 
"universal banking",
95 these institutions were  not only able to accompany their customers into more 
normal times with financing, but also to take equity stakes  in them  and seat outside "financial 
directors" on their supervisory boards, exercising a significant influence
96 that could have guided them 
towards  further  bank financing.  Although the absence of a Glass-Steagall Act did m ean that  law 
facilitated this arrangement,  but  it was not the  "origin" that counted but the  content. Beyond these 
historical arguments, when one adds that Switzerland and Luxembourg, both civil law countries, host 
two of the world's most active stock markets,
97 the legal origin argument appears quite weak.  In 
addition, capital flight from a troubled Europe in the 1930's not only weakened Continental markets, 
but strengthened those in the United States.
98 
Roe, Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard make it very clear that comparative law must understand 
and factor in the historical events and developments that affect  the  legal systems being studied.  
Moreover, a recent response by the Origin Theorists shows just how deep an understanding of culture 
                                                   
94   Roe, supra note 38, at 502. 
95   See EDWARDS & FISCHER, supra note 92, at 97 et seq. 
96   See id. at 213 et seq. 
97   Roe, supra note 38, at 488, Table 3; Luxembourg's domestic market capitalization of about €60 billion is 
substantially more than double its GDP, making its capital market a much more active segment of the 
economy than in the United States.  See  Luxembourg Stock Exchange,  Fact Book 2007, p. 65 and 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Statistics on Luxembourg. 
98   ERIC HELLEINE, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE 
1990S 39 (1996). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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and history is necessary.  In a 2007 paper, the Origin Theorists adjusted their argument to assert that 
"common law" and "civil law" work in a culture to promote planning or laissez faire: 
In this paper, we adopt a broad conception of legal origin as a style of social control of 
economic life (and maybe of other aspects of life as well). In strong form (later to be 
supplemented by a variety of caveats), we argue that common law stands for the strategy 
of social control that seeks to support private market outcomes, whereas civil law seeks to 
replace such outcomes with state-desired allocations. In words of one legal scholar, civil 
law is “policy implementing”, while common law is “dispute resolving”. . . . These broad 
ideas and strategies were incorporated into specific legal rules, but also into the 
organization of the legal system, as w ell as the human capital and beliefs of its 
participants. When common and civil law were transplanted into much of the world 
through conquest and colonization, the rules, but also human capital and legal ideologies, 
were transplanted as well.
99     
This attempt to co-opt the socio-political criticism offered by Roe and others would go to the extent of 
compressing the significant differences in historical development between French and British thought 
into the type of legal system used by each.  Along these l ines, the difference between, say,  the 
rationalism of René Descartes and the empiricism of Thomas Hobbes would have been the result of 
their respective legal systems,
100 or at least would have been transmitted to French and British colonies 
only through the  transplant of such legal systems.  While law is important, and some cultures have 
been better known for their law than for their philosophy, art or scientific and military 
accomplishments, it would be a rare thing for a civilization to be summed up in the origin of its law.  
Here, again, the hands-off domestic policies of  (civil law)  Switzerland's local democracy and the 
minimalist colonial management of (civil law) Holland, as well as the economic micro-management of 
(common law) Britain's post war economy
101 do not fit well into the Origin Theorists' mould.  The 
gaps in the arguments and adjusted arguments of the Origin Theorists show just how necessary it is to 
investigate a jurisdiction's history and social composition before formulating theories of causality. 
                                                   
99   Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer,  "The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins" 3 et seq. (November 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028081. 
100   The peculiarity of reversing the causal relationship in such manner is displayed in the solid method of the 
eminent intellectual historian, Prof. Peter Gay, who analyzes the  legal writings of Montesquieu for the 
tension between influences from the philosophical positions of rationalism and empiricism rather than 
taking the reverse path proposed by the Origin Theorists.  See PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE 
SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 326 (1996).  
101   See TONY JUDT, P OSTWAR: A H ISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 367 (2005) (". . . the British Labour 
movement, whose core doctrine and program ever since 1918 rested on an ineradicable faith in the virtues 
of state ownership . . . . The example of the UK's British Motor Corporation, a helpless guinea pig for 
government experiments in centralized resource allocation . . . ."). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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D. Be Aware of and Counter Prejudicial Perspectives 
Zweigert & Kötz argue that the negative side of the functional method is that the comparitist 
must radically free herself from her own legal and doctrinal prejudices.
102  Perhaps because no one can 
ever completely free himself of prejudices, writings evidencing harsh judgements on foreign law are 
not hard to find in comparative law literature.  One of America's classic texts on comparative law 
sneers so obviously at the "civil law tradition" that it can make even the US reader uncomfortable.  
Take, for example, the following passages analysing the work of legal scholars in civil law countries: 
"The assumption of legal science that it scientifically derives concepts and classes from 
the study of natural l egal data on the one hand, and the generally authoritarian and 
uncritical nature of the process of legal education on the other, tends to produce the 
attitude that definitions of concepts and classes express scientific truth. A definition is not 
seen as something conventional . . . it becomes a truth, the embodiment of reality. . . . 
Legal scientists are more interested in developing and elaborating a theoretical scientific 
structure than they are in solving concrete problems. . . . Nor is the legal scientist 
interested in the ends of law, in such ultimate values as justice. . . they built ideologically 
loaded concepts into a systematic conceptual legal structure that is still taught in the 
faculties of law . . . . In this way European systematic jurisprudence embodies and 
perpetuates nineteenth-century liberalism, locking in a selected set of assumptions and 
values and locking out all others.
103 
This depiction of the bookish civil law professor building sky castles while ignoring justice seems, at 
some points, to  refer just  to the  19
th Century  Pandectics, whom  many  Germans of the period also 
found to be overly abstract and socially conservative.
104  However, in addition to the statement that the 
system of legal science is "still taught in the faculties of law," t he  analysis  moves on in the next 
chapter to deconstruct the introduction of a current, elementary textbook in Civil Law.  The analysis 
teases out inexactness in  the introductory  simplifications
105 and points to statements that contain an 
ideological perspective,
106 as if to show that the ideological tunnel vision of civil law scholars is still 
closing young minds off from the truth.
107  In fact, the explicatory criticism is so harsh that Merryman 
and Pérez-Perdomo seek to spare the author of the civil law book the embarrassment of having her 
                                                   
102   ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 35. 
103   MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 1, at 63 et seq. 
104   See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 142. 
105   For example, in this introduction to the nature of law, a first year law student would read: "The legal 
norm . . . is . . . a command addressed to the individual by which a determined conduct . . . is imposed on 
him," but the comparatists beg to differ, explaining: "Actually, not all norms command; the text is 
inaccurate."  MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 1, at 70.   
106   The first year law student of civil law would read "subjective right is the power of the individual that is 
derived from the norm," but the comparatists find this is an "ideologically loaded fundamental notion," as 
"In private law, this is the foundation of a legal system in which private, individual rights . . . exist." Id. 
107   See Id. at 69 et seq. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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name mentioned, referring to the text only as "a respected elementary work (which shall remain 
anonymous) on private law."
108 
This exposé of civil law scholarship shows strong cultural prejudice, and displays the kinds of 
contradictions that prejudice tends to  bring with it.  For example,  the text explains that  civil law 
scholars are not interested "in solving concrete problems," but 35 pages later states that because they 
"are not paid enough for [their academic work] to live well,"  "aspirants to academic positions 
customarily embark on an additional legal career."
109  A positive spin on this state of affairs would be 
that the legal scholar, who may also be a  partner in a law firm, an arbitrator, or a director in a 
corporation, can bring his practical skills to bear in the classroom.  However, for these authors, the 
civil law scholar is both divorced from reality and an odd-jobber moonlighting from his poorly paid 
post.  The assertion that civil legal scholars are not interested in "such ultimate values as justice" is 
also  troublesome, a s it would seem to be refuted by the  civil law  origins of the concept of 
unconscionability in contracts,
110 as well as by the sociological projects of legal scholars like Niklaus 
Luhmann.
111  Indeed, the very existence of "equity", from which notions resembling unconscionability 
first developed in the common law, give evidence of the overly formalistic nature of an early common 
law that was more interested in formal perfection of the writs than in achieving equitable justice.
112  
Coming from a legal tradition in which decisions like  Lochner v. New York
113  prohibited most 
"paternalistic" interference with unequal  bargaining power  right up until the Executive Branch 
declared its preparations for war on the Judiciary in 1937,
114  the description of civil law as 
perpetuating 19
th Century liberalism also seems more than a little one-sided.  A comparative analysis 
of such liberalism stressing its uniform grip on both the common and the civil law, with an analysis of 
the diverging ideological approaches used to adapt law to an evolving understanding of the contracting 
subject would seem more appropriate in a sophisticated, comparative study. 
Interestingly enough, the Origin Theorists also address 19
th Century civil law development with 
the diametrically opposed assertion that civil law sought to manage and control economic activity 
rather than perpetuate a conservative, laissez-faire liberalism.  They argue: "In England . . . common 
                                                   
108   See Id. at 69. 
109   See Id. at 108 et seq. 
110   In times when a common law court would refuse to inquire into the adequacy of consideration (Sturlyn v. 
Albany, 78 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1587)), the Austrian Civil Code of 1811 allowed dissolution of a contract 
if the consideration promised by the two parties was substantially disproportional.  See ZWEIGERT & 
KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 320.   
111   See e.g., NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT (1994). 
112   See JILL E. MARTIN, HANBURY & MARTIN MODERN EQUITY 5 et. seq. (17
th ed. 2005). 
113   Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
114   See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR 325 et seq. (1999). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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law evolved to protect private property against the crown. . . . In France and Germany, by contrast, 
parliamentary power was weaker. Commercial Codes were adopted only in the nineteenth century by 
the two great state builders, Napoleon and Bismarck, to enable the state to better regulate economic 
activity."
115  The historical assertions made in this statement are problematic, and they  also seem to 
display a particular Anglo-American prejudice that was common in the 1990's following the victory in 
the Cold War.  First, historical research by  Professors Daniel Klerman and Paul Mahoney tends to 
refute the asserted role of common law courts as  comparatively strong  guardians of property.
116 
Second, the argument that the French and German commercial codes were 19
th Century tools of state 
control is weak, and ideologically about one century in advance.  France's 1807 Commercial Code was 
only a partial amendment of royal decrees on commerce dating back to the late 17
th century,
117 which 
were  essentially codifications of  much the same common mercantile customs  that  were used in 
Britain, both having derived from the law developed by European merchants during the Middle 
Ages.
118  The authors may have intended to refer to the French civil code, but as discussed above, far 
from being a tool of state socialism, this Code Napoleon enacted a 19
th Century laissez-faire liberalism 
with individualistic notions of property and contract.
119  The German Commercial Code, while also 
promoting the same freedom of individual property and contract, was primarily designed to harmonize 
the local laws and codes pre-existing in various German states, principalities and dukedoms in order to 
facilitate trade in the newly unifying Germany.
120  If harmonization of commercial law is seen as state 
control, then the Uniform Commercial Code and UNITRAL are both projects seeking such control. 
What then, is the authors' prejudicial perspective?  Their comparison was written in the United 
States in 2000, at the close of the decade following the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe.  That 
victory is seen as one of free enterprise and faith in markets, as expressed in the policies of leaders like 
                                                   
115   La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 58 Journal of Financial Economics 2 (2000). 
116   "By the early modern era, French judges probably enjoyed greater independence than their English 
counterparts because a French judgeship was considered a form of heritable property. Normally, French 
kings neither chose their judges nor had the power to remove them. In contrast, English judges served at 
the pleasure of the crown, although the power to remove was seldom used." Daniel Klerman and Paul 
Mahoney, "Legal Origin?", USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-3, at 4 et seq., available from 
SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968706. See also MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 1, at 16 
("Before the French Revolution, judicial offices were regarded as property . . . . judges were an 
aristocratic group who supported the landed aristocracy . . . ."). 
117   CH. LYON-CAEN & L. RENAULT, DROIT COMMERCIAL 7 et. seq. (3rd ed. 1922). 
118   Id. at 5 et. seq. For a brief discussion of how the medieval law merchant was used by British merchants, 
see e.g., Paul Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 Ga. L. 
Rev. 873, 880 et seq. (2000). 
119   MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 1, at 93; ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 92. 
120   As in the United States, this process started with a uniform law on negotiable instruments, and gradually 
spread to a uniform commercial code.   See NORBERT HORN, H ANDELSGESETZBUCH, Introduction VI, 
margin nos. 22 et seq. (2
nd ed. 1995). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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Ronald Reagan and Margret Thatcher, over state planning and domination of the economy, as 
expressed in the monolithic structure of the Soviet Union.  The market was seen to create a much more 
efficient allocation of resources than the Continental European dirigisme championed most strongly by 
France.  Professor Tony Judt has epigraphically captured the difference between the free market 
English style and the French statist style during this period: "In contrast to Mrs. Thatcher and her heirs 
. . . the French were cautious about selling off public utilities . . . . In markets as in gardens, the French 
were suspicious of unplanned growth. They preferred to retain a certain capacity to intervene."
121  At 
the time the Origin Theorists authored their comparison, the dichotomy between a private and flexible 
Anglo-American world and a statist and rigid Continental Europe had a significant amount of truth to 
it.  However, their references to the timing, nature and purposes of the French and German commercial 
codes are inaccurate, and the distortions seem to display a projection of positions held at the close of 
the 20
th Century backward into the 19
th Century.   
In following, this  paper will try to offer a  framework  for an analysis of company law in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States that can help avoid the pitfalls discussed above. 
III. COMPARE ONLY COMPARABLES: WHAT IS "COMPANY LAW"? 
A. Defining Company Law Functionally 
"Company law" or "corporate law"
122 in all jurisdictions is generally understood as a body of 
law enabling the creation of an entity with "five core structural characteristics": "(1) legal personality, 
(2) limited liability, (3) transferable shares, (4) centralized management under a board structure, and 
(5) shared ownership by contributors of capital."
123  If a law other than a "company" law were to 
                                                   
121   JUDT, supra note 101, at 554. 
122   This paper uses the terms "company" law and  "corporate" law  indistinguishably. On the one hand, 
"corporate law" is a US term and "company" law is the preferred term in the United Kingdom, as well as 
in the English language versions of EU legislation.  From a German perspective, the term "corporate" law 
might be more accurate for this paper, as the object of study is stock corporations that may well be large 
enough to be listed on a stock exchange, an area of study that German scholars might call "law of capital 
collecting companies" (Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht), as opposed to "company law" (Gesellschaftsrecht), 
which would likely include various forms of partnerships and limited liability companies (Gesellschaften 
mit beschrankter Haftung), as well as stock corporations ( Aktiengesellschaften).  The German 
understanding of the term "company law" might be rendered as "corporations and other business 
organizations."  Here, both "company law" and "corporate law" will refer to the law governing entities 
with the five, listed characteristics. 
123   ANATOMY, supra note 17, at 5 (2004).  These characteristics are not a recent invention.  For similar lists 
of core characteristics, at least with respect to US law, see ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986) 
and  HENRY  WINTHROP  BALLANTINE, B ALLANTINE ON  CORPORATIONS  1  (1946).  For an historical 
discussion of the development of these characteristics, see Mahoney, supra note 118 (focusing on legal 
personality and limited liability); Franklin A. Gevurtz,  The Historical and Political Origins of the 
Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89 (2004) (focusing on central management under a 
board), and Ron Harris, "The Formation of the East India Company as a Deal between Entrepreneurs and 
Outside," Working Paper, Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley (July 2004) (discussing the early 
operation of shareholders meetings in the owner/investor governance of the company).  Although limited Draft: February 12, 2008 
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regulate one of these "core characteristics" of the corporate entity, it would require treatment in a study 
of company law.  This is unproblematic when another law is expressly linked to the company law.  
Labour co-determination in Germany provides a good example.  The sections of the Aktiengesetz that 
refer to number, qualifications and appointment of members of the supervisory board expressly refer 
to the provisions of the various laws providing for co-determination in Germany.
124  The inclusion of 
co-determination laws in any study of German company law is thus beyond question. 
  Difficulties arise, however, when a law's function closely complements the corporation law in 
the jurisdiction in question, but the law is not expressly linked to the company law.  If such laws are 
excluded from treatment, any picture of the system of regulation will be incomplete.  If different mixes 
of topical laws govern the same area in different jurisdictions, a comparison that does not take this 
difference into account could be distorted.  For example, if we compared the German company law 
rule requiring disclosure of an interest i n a stock corporation that exceeds 25 % of its capital, 
expressed in § 20(1) of the Aktiengesetz, exclusively with the DGCL and the case law related to that 
statute, which states no such requirement, we would have to conclude that German company law 
creates greater transparency.  However, if we add to the mix a US federal law, the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),
125  particularly §   13(d) thereof  and the rules issued under it 
requiring disclosure of any holding exceeding 5 % of the capital of a "registered" company,
126 we tend 
                                                                                                                                                               
liability is considered to be one of the most valuable characteristics of a corporation, it should be noted 
that both Germany and the UK offer companies with unlimited liability.  The German limited partnership 
by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien – KgaA) and the English "unlimited company" both offer 
the possibility of an entity that issues shares to investors but leaves at least one of their owners with 
unlimited liabitlity. 
124   See §§ 95–104 AktG.  Co-determination in German companies is regulated by three major laws, one of 
which – the Law on Co-Determination of Employees in the Supervisory Boards and Management Boards 
of Enterprises Engaged in the Mining Iron and Steel Industries of 21 May 1951 ( Montan-
Mitbestimmungsgesetz) – is no longer relevant. The most important law today is the Co-Determination 
Act of 1976 (Mitbestimmungsgesetz, or "MitbestG"), which applies to all GmbHs and AGs with more 
than 2,000 employees (see § 1 MitbestG), and requires that one-half of the supervisory board comprise 
representatives of the employees and their unions ( see  § 7 MitbestG).  See Johannes Semler, in 
MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 96, margin no. 9  et seq.  (Bruno Kropff & Johannes 
Semler, eds., 2
nd ed. 2000). Another important piece of legislation, the Works Constitution Act of 1952 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), requires that a company have a supervisory board and that one-third of the 
board members be appointed by employees if the corporation employs more than 500 persons. 
125   The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(a) (2000).   
126   Rule 13d-1 under the Exchange Act requires that any person who acquires directly or indirectly more than 
5 % of either the "voting power" or the "investment power" of any class of equity security registered 
under § 12 Exchange Act must file details on such acquisition (on a form called a "Schedule 13D") with 
the SEC within 10 days after the acquisition. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a).  Securities must be registered 
under § 12 of the Exchange Act if either (i) they are listed on a national securities exchange (§ 12(a) 
Exchange Act) or (ii) the issuer of the securities has more than 500 shareholders and total assets 
exceeding $ 10 million (§ 12(g) Exchange Act in connection with Exchange Act Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.12g-1).  In addition to securities registered under § 12 Exchange Act, Rule 13d-1 also applies to 
"any equity security of any insurance company which would have been required to be so registered except Draft: February 12, 2008 
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to reach the opposite conclusion, and German law appears less extensive.  Yet when the requirements 
of § 21 of the German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, or "WpHG"), which applies 
to listed companies, are also added to the comparison,
127 we see that the obligations of Delaware and 
German public companies are quite similar in this respect.  Because the rules governing companies 
may be differently distributed in different topical laws within different countries, knowledge of the 
applicable topical laws, including their nature and the range of their application, is necessary. 
Moreover, each of the five "core" characteristics listed above may be closely tied to other areas 
of law.  One purpose of legal personality and limited liability is to demarcate the assets to which 
creditors may take recourse in collecting debts of the corporation,
128 and this position is integrally tied 
to the rights creditors hold in insolvency proceedings over the company's assets.  The inclusion of 
bankruptcy law in the study of company law is, however, still debated.  Professors Henry Hansmann 
and Reinier R. Kraakman have argued that "bodies of law designed to serve objectives that are largely 
unrelated to the core characteristics of the corporate form . . . do not fall within the scope of corporate 
law."
129  Following this view, the lawmakers legislative purpose would determine whether a given law 
be included within a study of corporate law.  However, as discussed above, the functional method of 
comparative law should not limit itself to intention, but rather to the systemic role played by the given 
law within the legal system and the society.  The intentional design of the topical law considered for 
inclusion would then not be the best criterion for decision.  For example, German labour laws express 
a legislative intention to have employees treated fairly by corporations, but as one means to this end 
the law serves the  function of  assigning employee representatives to the  supervisory board.    US 
securities laws express a legislative intention to protect investors regardless of who or what is selling 
the relevant securities, but as one means to this end  such laws have the  function  of,  inter alia, 
regulating the information a corporation offering securities to the public must disclose.  The principles 
of agency law that are central to any discussion of corporate governance were also in no way devised 
with the intention of regulating the centralized management of a corporation. 
                                                                                                                                                               
for the exemption contained in section 12(g)(2)(G) of the Act, or any equity security issued by a closed-
end investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-
1(i). 
127   § 21(1) of the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) published on September 9, 1998 Federal 
Law Reporter (Bundesgesetzblatt – BGBl) vol. I p. 2708), as last amended by Art. 1 of the Law  of July 
16, 2007, BGBl vol. I p. 1330, requires that any person who through acquisition, disposal, or in another 
manner reaches, exceeds or falls below one of the thresholds of 3%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 30%, 50% or 75% of 
the voting rights of a listed company must within four calendar days provide written notice of this to the 
issuer and to the Federal Agency for the Supervision of Financial Services. 
128   ANATOMY, supra note 17, at 9, and Hansman & Kraakman (2000), at 393. 
129   ANATOMY, supra note 17, at 17 (emphasis added). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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In a different context, Professor  John Armour  has  asked whether  EU  member states could 
successfully use their bankruptcy laws to control the flow of regulatory competition opened by  the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) following Centros.
130  He argues convincingly that 
"[c]orporate insolvency law supplies rules which govern companies experiencing financial distress, 
and so it is appropriate to consider it as being within the scope of a functional account of 'company 
law'.  In particular, there may be complementarities between insolvency law and other aspects of a 
country's corporate governance regime."
131  Viewed from the perspective that Armour is considering, 
that of a corporate promoter or incorporator, complementarities would exist between a corporate law 
statute and an insolvency law if the latter would have a material impact on the choice of jurisdiction in 
which to incorporate.  Such an "effects" test is essentially a functionality test seen from a practical 
rather than a theoretical vantage point. It would demand that provisions of other laws be considered 
together with the jurisdiction's company law  – regardless of whether the legislative purpose of such 
law focuses on corporations – if the law affects or functionally complements the corporate law statute.  
Slightly reformulating Hansmann's and Kraakman's criterion, all rules, laws and organizational forms 
that have the function of regulating the corporation, its activities, and the rights of persons vis-à-vis the 
corporation with a close relation to the core characteristics of the corporate form would be potential 
candidates for inclusion in a company law analysis. 
Along these lines, tax law, which is one of the most important considerations when planning the 
incorporation of a company or subsidiary, would not come within a study of company law because it 
does not have a close relation to a core characteristic of companies.  On the other hand,  rules on 
fraudulent conveyances would be part of "company law", as they serve a capital maintenance function 
(closely related to the limited liability and investor ownership characteristics of corporations) in the 
United States while the same function is served by the legal capital rules of German and UK company 
law.  As this example makes clear, it can reasonably be assumed that the topical laws seen as having 
corporate law functions  and thus included in a functional definition of company law  will not be 
identical in each jurisdiction. 
B. Germany 
In Germany, the Aktiengesetz provides a comprehensive regulation of stock corporations that is 
mandatory unless provided otherwise.
132  Tracking the core characteristics  of the stock corporation 
listed  above, the  Aktiengesetz  provides for the creation of an entity with  legal personality, limited 
                                                   
130   See Part IV.B.2, infra. 
131   John Armour, "Who Should Make  Corporate Law? EU Legislation versus Regulatory Competition," 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 307 (June 2005), at 
38. 
132   § 23(5) AktG, discussed in detail in Part III.B.3. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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liability and transferable shares,
133  having a centralized management under a two-tier board 
structure
134 that is subject in certain respects to the shareholders.
135  The Aktiengesetz also incorporates 
by reference provisions of the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch – "HGB") on the preparation of 
the annual financial statements, including the specification of reserves and distributable profits,
136 
provides a right to demand a special audit,
137 and requires the financial statements to be made 
available to the shareholders for their approval.
138  Going well beyond the range of coverage that 
would be expected by an American lawyer, the Aktiengesetz contains provisions on the disclosure of 
equity holdings,
139  and on  the solicitation of proxies by banks holding shares in custody,
140 
incorporates the  Co-Determination Act to place  labour representatives on the supervisory board,
141 
specifies the rights, duties and required financial statements of companies operating in corporate 
groups,
142 and requires listed companies to adopt a governance code on a "comply or explain" basis.
143  
As will be discussed in Part IV, many of these special provisions come from EU directives that were 
incorporated into the Aktiengesetz over the years.  Regardless of its jurisdictional origin, however, the 
resulting law is broad, comprehensive and mandatory.   
German courts have also created doctrine beyond the statutory law through a significant body of 
decisions on topics such as  pre-incorporation liability,  equitable subordination of loans made by 
shareholders to the company and fiduciary duties of management.
144  Some of these decisions were 
actually handed down with reference to the Limited Liability Companies Act (Gesetz betreffend die 
Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung – GmbHG) rather than the Aktiengesetz and are applied to 
                                                   
133   See §§ 1-53a AktG. 
134   See §§ 76-116 AktG. Under the Aktiengesetz, a stock corporation has a two-tier board.   The two levels 
are the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), provided for in §§ 95-116 AktG, and the management board 
(Vorstand), provided for in §§ 76-94 AktG.  The shareholders elect all or some (if co-determination 
applies) of the supervisory directors (§ 101(1) AktG), and the supervisory board in turn appoints the 
managing directors (§ 84(1) AktG), who have direct responsibility for managing the company (§ 76(1) 
AktG).  For discussions of this structure, see Theodore Baums, "Company Law Reform in Germany," 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Institute for Banking Law, Working Paper No. 100 (2002), 
available at  http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/baums/, and Klaus Hopt,  The German Two-Tier Board 
(Aufsichtsrat): A German View on Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 
(Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch, eds., 1997).   
135   See §§ 118-147. 
136   § 150 AktG. 
137   §§ 142-146. 
138   § 175 AktG. 
139   § 20 AktG. 
140   § 128 AktG. 
141   § 101 AktG. 
142   See §§ 291-328 AktG. 
143   § 161 AktG. 
144   See  e.g., the High Federal Court's creation of a German business judgment rule in the  ARAG v. 
Garmenbeck supra note 72. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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stock corporations by analogy.    One exception to the inclusive tendency of the  Aktiengesetz is the 
hiving off of rules on mergers between stock corporations in a special law, the "Transformation (or 
Reorganization) Act" ( Umwandlungsgesetz  – UmwG).
145  Like Delaware law, b ut unlike the UK 
Companies Act, the  Aktiengesetz does not contain extensive provisions on accounting, which were 
moved to the Commercial Code in 1985.
146 
Although the  Aktiengesetz  itself includes provisions that other jurisdictions might attribute to 
areas o utside of corporate law proper – such as on the disclosure of holdings and the behavior of 
custodian banks in the proxy solicitation process – most studies of German company law would also 
include, in addition to the MitbestG and the UmwG, a number of rules from the Securities Trading Act 
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz  – WpHG)
147  and the Takeover Act ( Wertpapiererwerbs- und 
Übernahmegesetz  – WpÜG)
148  in any comprehensive treatment of company law proper, especially 
when discussing listed companies.  As the converse of the principle lex specialis derogat legi generali, 
a German court will also look to the more general rules on company forms contained in the Limited 
Liability Companies Act, the Commercial Code and the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB) 
if a given situation is not expressly  governed  in the specifically applicable  Aktiengesetz.
149  As 
companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange would be governed by the exchange rules, such 
rules might also be taken into account, although they tend to be less detailed and extensive than their 
counterparts in London or New York.  One reason the Frankfurt listing rules tend to be light is the 
applicability of the German Corporate Governance Code ( Deutscher Corporate Governance 
Kodex),
150 which the Aktiengesetz does not require listed companies to adopt, but rather to declare in 
the notes to their financial statements whether than have adopted the code, and if they have not, to 
explain their decision.
151   
                                                   
145   Umwandlungsgesetz (UmwG)  of October 28, 1994, as last amended by the Law of April 19, 2007, 
Federal Law Reporter (Bundesgesetzblatt – BGBl) vol. I, p. 542. 
146   This was done in the context of implementing three EC directives on individual and group accounts. See 
The Law of 19 December 1985, BGBl. Vol. I, p. 2355. 
147   See, e.g., Semler, supra note 124, at Intro. margin no. 3, and KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 
32 (4
th ed 2002).  
148   See e.g., FRIEDRICH KÜBLER & H EINZ-DIETER ASSMANN, G ESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 506 et seq. (6th ed. 
2006). 
149   For example, most of the rules on pre-incorporation liability for an AG are derived from cases regarding 
GmbH's, which in turn may depend on general principles of company membership found in the BGB's 
provisions on civil law companies (partnerships).  See KÜBLER & ASSMANN, supra note 148, at 376 et 
seq. 
150   The Kodex is currently updated to June 2007, and is available at  http://www.corporate-governance-
code.de/index-e.html. 
151   See § 161 AktG. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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Thus, the complete picture of what we understand as "company law" in Germany is rather 
broad, but easily defined.  It includes a central, detailed statute and a number of laws specifically 
incorporated by reference to cover accounting, mergers and  co-determination, laws and rules on 
takeovers and securities regulation, as well as applicable exchange rules and a Governance Code. 
C. The United States 
In the United States, corporate law statutes are state law.  The statute of the state in which a 
company is incorporated governs its existence and its "internal affairs,"
152 and US states generally 
allow corporations incorporated in other states to do business in their state as "foreign" corporations 
subject to minimal requirements, such as designating an agent for service of process.
153  Today, most 
major US corporations, including more than half of publicly listed companies, are incorporated under 
the law of the State of Delaware.
154  This paper will therefore use Delaware law as a proxy for the 50 
corporation statutes of the US states. 
The DGCL provides for each of the five, core characteristics of a business corporation.  It 
provides for the creation of an entity with  legal personality,
155 limited liability,
156 management by a 
centralized board
157 and transferable shares.
158  The aspect of shared ownership by investors is implicit 
in the company's existence as an entity that must issue stock,
159 which must be paid for,
160 and which 
represents a property interest in the corporation  in the form of  a "chose in action."
161  Although 
shareholders rarely use this power, §   141 DGCL  also  gives shareholders  the right to  eliminate 
centralized management by vesting executive control in a body other than the board of directors, such 
as a council including all shareholders.
162  T he greatest difference between the DGCL and the 
Aktiengesetz is that the Delaware law is almost completely composed of optional, default terms that 
                                                   
152   See EUGENE F. SCOLES et al., CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 23.2 (3
rd ed. 2000).  See Part III.C.1 for a detailed 
definition of "internal affairs." 
153   See  FRANKLIN  A. G EVURTZ, C ORPORATION  LAW 36 (2000) Although states do not require local 
incorporation as a requisite for doing business, the US Supreme Court has held that such a request would 
not impermissibly burden the interstate commerce whose regulation lies solely within the jurisdiction of 
the federal government.  See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931). 
154   According to the 2006 Annual Report of the State of Delaware's Division of Corporations, "Delaware is 
the corporate home to 61 percent of the Fortune 500 companies and half of all U.S. firms traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ." 
155   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 108. 
156   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6). 
157   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141. 
158   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 201-202. 
159   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(a)(4). 
160   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 152. 
161   See Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 67 A.2d 50, 54 (Del.Ch. 1949). 
162   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a): "The . . . corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board . . . except as may be provided otherwise in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." Draft: February 12, 2008 
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shareholders may modify, supplement or eliminate in the company's certificate of incorporation.
163  On 
this point it resembles the UK Companies Act.  Delaware corporate law also comprises a large body of 
decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery on such matters as fiduciary duties, 
which are not specified in the statute.
164  The regulation of corporate groups, for example, which the 
Aktiengesetz expressly regulates, would be governed by fiduciary duties imposed on majority 
shareholders.
165   
The Delaware statute contains no provisions on disclosure, accounting or audits, but does have 
rules to govern  mergers
166 and takeovers.
167  Given the thin and relatively optional character of the 
DGCL, it is not surprising that corporate law is generally considered to include substantial elements of 
securities regulation.
168  As will be discussed in more detail in  Part IV of this paper, including 
"securities regulation" means looking to the requirements of some or all of the federal laws grouped 
under Title 15 of the US Code, which includes not only the Exchange Act, but also the Securities Act 
of 1933 (the "Securities Act")
169 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (the "Trust Indenture Act"),
170 
among others.  Beyond these securities laws and the extensive body of rules that the SEC has issued 
under the authority they delegate, a listed company would also have to comply with the rules of the 
relevant exchange, which can be quite extensive.  As mentioned above, it is also common to include 
basic principles of revocable or fraudulent transfers from bankruptcy law in studies of US corporate 
                                                   
163   See Katharina Pistor, "Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies," Working 
Paper N° 30/2005, ECGI Working Paper Series in Law 9 (March 2005). 
164   For the two-year 1999 and 2000, Robert B. Thompson and Randall Thomas found that approximately 
78 % of Delaware Chancery Court cases addressed fiduciary duty issues.  See Robert B. Thompson & 
Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 133, 165 (2004).   It should also be noted that the use of cases as weighty authority is one 
area in which Common Law and Civil Law are certainly on a convergence path in many European 
countries.  In conversations and experience during the period between 1992 and 2005, the author has 
received confirmation again and again that case precedent is the soundest authority used in Italy and 
Germany to discern the meaning of a given statutory provision. 
165   For example, see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).  An excellent discussion of the 
fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders is  Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling 
Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785 (2005). 
166   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 251-266. 
167   See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203. 
168   See e.g., BALLANTINE, supra note 123, at 858-886; CLARK, supra note 123, at 293-340 and 719-749, and 
GEVURTZ,  supra note  123, at 537-629. Gevurtz notes that "federal securities laws have become a 
significant component of corporation law." Id. at 39.  It should also be noted that the US securities laws 
apply not only to companies whose securities (including debt securities) are listed on a stock exchange, 
but also to large companies with more than 500 shareholders.  See supra note 126.  
169   The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 77a-77aa (2000).  
170   The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2000). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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law.
171  The latter serve to supplement very permissive capital maintenance rules found in the DGCL 
and all other US company law statutes. 
The enabling nature of the DGCL, which is composed of non-mandatory "default" rules, would 
allow a company, in its certificate of incorporation, to comprehensively govern every imaginable right, 
duty and circumstance,  making the range of "company law" rather limited.  However, once the 
company  is large enough to trigger application of the securities laws, such laws begin to regulate 
annual meetings and accounting practices, among other things.  When the company is listed, both the 
securities laws and the  relevant set of exchange rules would impose yet another layer of mandatory 
regulation, governing the composition of the board of directors and the type of securities that may be 
issued. The composition of the concept "company law" in the United States thus changes dramatically 
depending on the proximity of a corporation to the capital markets. 
D. The United Kingdom 
As a jurisdiction with a common law system that has significantly influenced US law, and as a 
member state of the European Union that, like Germany, must implement EU directives and obey EU 
regulations and ECJ decisions, the company law of the United Kingdom takes a middle position 
between Delaware and Germany.  The United Kingdom, which  had  some of  the oldest rules on 
corporations, dating back to the  17
th Century,  now has the newest  company law  of the three 
jurisdictions examined.  Both the core statute and many of the outlying rules serving a corporate law 
function were substantially amended in 2006.  The Companies Act 2006 substantially amended the 
1985 version of that law and restated a significant body of case law on the duties of directors into the 
statute itself,
172 thus providing norms that Delaware and German law  primarily  express  through 
judicial decisions.
173  The Companies Act 2006  provides for the creation of all types of companies 
(public or private  limited by shares or by guarantee, as well as unlimited)
174 and offers rules for a 
corporate entity with the five, core characteristics discussed in our functional definition of "company 
                                                   
171   See  MELVIN  ARON  EISENBERG, C ORPORATIONS AND  OTHER  BUSINESS  ORGANIZATIONS: C ASES AND 
MATERIALS 858 et seq. (Concise 9
th ed. 2005), and CLARK, supra note 123, at 40-52. Dean Clark also 
includes bankruptcy provisions on equitable subordination of creditor claims in his treatment of corporate 
law.  See Id., at 52-71. 
172   See Chapter 2 Companies Act 2006, generally. Sec. 170(3) Companies Act provides that: "The general 
duties are based on certain common law rules and equitable principles as they apply in relation to 
directors and have effect in place of those rules and principles as regards the duties owed to a company by 
a director." 
173   As discussed above, the Aktiengesetz does provide a standard of care for managing and supervisory 
directors (§§ 93 and 116 AktG), prohibits managing directors from competing with the company (§ 88 
AktG), and imposes a duty of confidentiality on all directors (§§ 93 and 116 AktG), but the detailed 
parameters of the duty of loyalty (Treupflicht) have been worked out by the courts. 
174   See secs. 3 et seq. Companies Act 2006. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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law".  A company limited by shares  is a "body corporate",
175 with limited liability,
176  transferable 
shares,
177 centralized management under a board,
178 and shared ownership by contributors of capital.
179 
The 2006 Act removed a number of rules, such as regarding the  mandatory  disclosure of 
significant  shareholdings
180  and share dealings by directors
181  from the Companies Act and placed 
them in newly issued rules of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA).  This resembles earlier 
decisions to hive out rules from the Act, such as when insolvency rules were removed from a pre-1985 
version of the Act and placed in the Insolvency Act 1986.
182  As mentioned, other matters, such as 
detailed rules on director's duties, were added to the Act, and it remains the largest and most detailed 
of the three laws being examined here.  Like the Aktiengesetz, the Companies Act provides detailed 
rules on  the constitution and maintenance of capital
183  and mandatory disclosure
184  (both from EU 
law), but like the DGCL the Companies Act is flexible, and allows such matters as the  method of 
appointing directors
185  and the operation of the board
186  to be freely structured in the company's 
articles.  In contrast to the other laws, the Companies Act provides extensive and detailed rules on 
accounting,
187 and  contains annexed  Model Articles  that govern a significant extent of a company's 
internal management affairs.
188  The Model Articles are prescribed by the Secretary of State,
189 and 
drafted by the Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (previously the Department 
of Trade and Industry) (BERR).
190 
Beyond the Companies Act and its related statutory instruments, company law in the United 
Kingdom contains basically  the same capital market elements as in Germany, given that they  both 
derive from EU directives, plus the insider dealing provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.  The 
fact that rules on company insolvency, directors' dealings, and shareholder disclosures were originally 
located in the Companies Act argues for including such  laws and rules under the rubric "company 
                                                   
175   Sec. 16(2) Companies Act 2006. 
176   Sec. 9(2)(c) Companies Act 2006. 
177   Secs. 10, 544 Companies Act 2006. 
178   Sec. 154(2) Companies Act 2006. 
179   Sec. 8 Companies Act 2006. 
180   Previously secs. 198 et seq. Companies Act 1985. 
181   Previously secs. 323 et seq. Companies Act 1985. 
182   See PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 47 (7
th ed. 2003). 
183   See e.g., Parts 17 & 18 Companies Act 2006. 
184   See e.g., secs. 414 et seq. Companies Act 2006. 
185   See sec. 19 Draft Model Articles for Public Companies (DTI 2007). 
186   See secs. 6 et seq. Draft Model Articles for Public Companies (DTI 2007). 
187   See e.g., Part 15 Companies Act 2006. 
188   See Companies Act 2006, Schedule 3, Draft Model Articles for Public Companies.  
189   Sec. 19(1) Companies Act 2006. 
190   The draft Model Articles are posted on the BERR website, http://www.berr.gov.uk/index.html. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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law".  The FSA's Disclosure and Transparency Rules thus constitute a central element of UK company 
law.
191  The FSA's Listing Rules also contain substantial elements of company law for listed 
companies, such as  requirements  that shareholders  approve significant transactions and  mandatory 
restrictions on directors' dealings in their company's securities.
192    Insider trading is disciplined by 
certain provisions of the Criminal Justice Act of 1993,
193 which should thus also be considered  a 
functional component of company law.  Unlike either the United States or  Germany, takeovers 
involving listed companies in the United Kingdom are regulated by a code adopted by a private panel 
endowed with regulatory authority.
194  As mentioned above, UK company law should be understood to 
contain certain elements of the Insolvency Act 1986, particularly the doctrine of "wrongful trading,"
195 
which can serve as an additional tool for capital maintenance.
196 
Leaving aside the very significant area of accounting rules (which are within the Companies Act 
2006 and incorporated by reference into the Aktiengesetz), consider the laws falling under the rubric 
"company law" in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States (represented by Delaware) to 
be those in the table below: 
 
                                                   
191   See FSA, Disclosure and Transparency Rules (Jan. 2008). 
192   See FSA, Listing Rules, LR 9 (The Model Code, nos. 3 et seq.) and LR 10 (Jan. 2008). 
193   See Part V, Criminal Justice Act 1993. 
194   See secs. 942 et seq. Companies Act 2006 and The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code 
(8
th ed., updated to Jan. 2008). 
195   See Chapter X, Insolvency Act 1986. 
196   See ANATOMY, supra note 17, at 17; Armour, supra note 131, at 44. 
Functional Components of Company Law 
  Germany  United Kingdom  Delaware 
Main statute  Aktiengesetz  Companies Act 2006  General Corporation Law 
Linked statute  Co-Determination Act     
Linked statute  Transformation Act     
Upper-level 
regulations 
Applicable EU regulations  Applicable EU regulations  Exchange Act and Rules 
(federal) 
Related area  Takeover Act and Regulation  Takeover Code (linked rules)  (as above) 
Related area  Securities Trading Act and 
Rules 
FSA Disclosure and Transparency 
Rules under FSMA 
(as above) 
Individual rules    Criminal Justice Act 1993   
Individual rules    Insolvency Act 1986  Fraudulent Conveyance 
Rules (state) Bankruptcy 
Rules (federal) 
Related area  Listing Rules  Listing Rules  Listing Rules 
Related area  EU Regulations & Advice  EU Regulations & Advice   Draft: February 12, 2008 
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IV. KNOW SYSTEMIC FUNCTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS: THE JURISDICTIONAL INTERACTION OF 
COMPANY LAW 
A.  The Whole and Its Parts 
Functions are by nature relational,
197 and a correct understanding of legal functions thus requires 
that the entire system of relationships from which their relational value derives be taken into account. 
This Part will examine the most salient systemic relationships for legal functions: the jurisdictions that 
issue legal rules, the areas they address and their respective powers.  Part V will build on this analysis 
by  examining how  the systemic unity of  these jurisdictions  acts as an environment of causal 
interaction to shape law's development over time.
198  Phrased in a different way, this Part looks at the 
system components and the legal rules of their interaction, while Part V will examine the actual force 
that these components have exercised on each other in recent history.  
Each of the three jurisdictions examined in this paper  is a  subunit of a larger jurisdiction.  
Germany and the United Kingdom belong to the European Union and Delaware belongs to the United 
States.
199  Because both the upper- and the lower-tier jurisdictions enact legislation that is or functions 
as company law, it is necessary to understand the nature of the rules coming from each jurisdiction and 
their respective standing vis-à-vis each other.  The rule giving bodies
200 affecting the governance of 
public companies in each of our jurisdictions are found at the primary, nation or state  level (i.e., 
Germany or Delaware), at an upper, supranational or national level (i.e., the European Union or the 
United States), and at the level of a private or quasi-public organization (e.g., the New York Stock 
Exchange or the UK Takeover Panel).  There are also a growing number of cooperative plans between 
the securities regulators of the European Union and the United States, such as on  the recognition of 
accounting principles
201 and the regulation of derivatives,
202 which could eventually lead to treaty or 
treaty-like obligations creating yet another layer of jurisdictional interaction. 
This  Part  will  restrict itself to  defining  the legal relationships of the relevant jurisdictions to 
each other and  analyzing  the specific content of the rules issued by each.  As discussed in Part II, 
                                                   
197   See NIKLAS LUHMANN, ZWECKBEGRIFF UND SYSTEMRATIONALITÄT 349 (1968). 
198   Id. at 194. 
199   Although Germany itself is a federation of states and the United Kingdom unites England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, this aspect is much less important because with very few exceptions 
company law is uniform at the national level. 
200   The word "jurisdiction" would be used here very loosely, as it would also include securities exchanges.  
The agreement between an issuer and the securities exchange on which its shares are listed is a contract, 
and the exchange has "regulatory" power only over a very narrow group of persons, particularly its 
members and participants and its listed companies. 
201   See Press Release, "Developing Cross-Atlantic financial markets: CESR and the SEC launch a work plan 
focused on financial reporting" (Aug. 2, 2006). 
202   See CESR-CFTC Common Work Program to Facilitate Transatlantic Derivatives Business (June 28, 
2005), available at www.cesr.eu. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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socio-political and cultural factors are also important elements of the functional system comprising 
German, UK and US company law.  Although this paper will make occasional reference to existing 
histories and socio-economic analyses of  these factors  it offers an  approach  to comparing these 
company laws, not a full comparison.  Because  each of the jurisdictions here discussed is a highly 
developed, Western culture with comparable social values and structures,
203 the real differences that 
may exist at the present time – other than cultural attitudes towards executives and labour – currently 
have less of an impact on the shape of the law than do constitutional and treaty relationships between 
jurisdictions and the arrangement of rules in mandatory norms or default options.  Given the ample 
discussion  in the economic and legal literature of the  effects  of  an economy having corporate 
ownership rights  dispersed among many small shareholders or  concentrated in the hands of 
blockholders,
204 this paper will revisit that issue.  
B.  The European Union and Its Member States 
1. Pursuant to the EC Treaty 
Germany was a founding member of the European Economic Community (ECC) in 1957,
205 and 
the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973.
206  Through the Treaty on European Union signed in 
Maastricht, Denmark in 1992, the EEC and the other connected European communities were 
transformed into the European Union.
207 Even though this paper will use the term "EU law" following 
convention,
208  it is  perhaps  useful to note that because the  European Community is the lawmaking 
portion of the European Union,
209 the Community's relationship to the member states is most relevant 
                                                   
203   On this point, greatly differing social and moral structures could make a significant difference with regard 
to the nature of securities regulation.  For example, see footnote 84 and the accompanying text for 
lamentations of dishonesty in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet police state.  On the other 
extreme, a contemporary society with certain types of religious principles might well condemn securities 
trading, as did British and American society in the 17
th and 18
th Centuries.  See STUART BANNER, ANGLO-
AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860 (1998) at 14 et seq. 
(Britain) and 122 et seq. (United States). 
204   See e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, 54 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 471 (1999); FABRIZIO BARCA & MARCO BECHT, THE CONTROL OF 
CORPORATE EUROPE (2001); and John C. Coffee, Dispersed Ownership, supra note 92, at 34 et seq. 
205   JUDT, supra note 101, at 303 
206   Id. at 308.  
207   CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 6, at 15. 
208   It is common to use the term "EU Law" even when "EC Law" is more legally accurate.  As Prof. Eilís 
Ferran explains when making this observation with reference to the directives adopted in the area of 
securities regulation, "[t]he strict technical position is that securities laws are made within the legal 
framework of the European Community (EC, formerly European Economic Community or EEC), which 
is a Community within the common structure of the European Union.  The EU, as such, has a limited 
role." EILÍS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 7 (2004). The same applies to the company 
law directives.  The common practice to refer to these directives as "EU" law comes from the fact that the 
European Community is an integral part ("Pillar I") of the European Union. 
209   See Art. 5, Treaty on European Union, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. 5 (C 325) (2002) (EU Treaty) (specifying the 
institutions of the European Community as exercising powers under the EC Treaty and the EU Treaty) Draft: February 12, 2008 
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for an exact understanding of jurisdictional interaction.  This latter relationship varies depending on 
the area being discussed.  Within areas where the Community has been delegated competence that is 
not concurrent, the ECJ has interpreted the EC Treaty to mean that EU law is supreme over that of the 
member states.
210   T he German Constitutional Court ( Bundesverfassungsgericht) has, however, 
expressly reserved national, sovereign power, which it has nevertheless pledged not to exercise so long 
as the Community remains within its delegated powers and does not violate basic rights guaranteed in 
the German Constitution.
211  Within those areas where the European Community has not been given 
exclusive competence, the relationship between the Community and the member states is governed by 
the  relationship of "subsidiarity"  provided for in  Article 5 of the EC Treaty, which includes the 
imperative that "the Community shall take action . . . only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community."
212  In Articles 43 
through 48 of the EC Treaty, the Community is given the express duty to guarantee the freedom of a 
citizen or company from one member state to establish him-, her, or itself in any other member state, 
but the promulgation of company law beyond a certain level of safeguarding harmonization is not an 
express Community function.   T he company law area should  therefore  be thought of as one of 
"concurrent jurisdiction,"
213 to which the principle of subsidiarity could apply.  Article 44(2)(g) EC 
Treaty  expressly  instructs the European Council to adopt directives to coordinate only "to  the 
necessary extent the safeguards . . . required by Member States of companies . . . with a view to 
making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community."
214   This express, yet limited 
delegation of authority means that the Community's exercise of power is evaluated primarily for any 
                                                                                                                                                               
and Art. 249 EC Treaty (directing the European Parliament, Council and Commission to make regulations 
and issue directives.); see also Manfred Zuleeg, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EU VERTRAG, at vol. 1, p. 574. 
210   Case 26/62, NV. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, 12 ("the Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albe it within 
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.").  For 
a good discussion in German, see Zuleeg, supra note 209, at 582 et seq. 
211   See most recently the Decision of the Constitutional Court of June 7, 2000, 2 BvL 1/97, available at the 
website of the German Constitutional Court at http://www.bverfg.de/cgi-bin/link.pl?entscheidungen.  An 
older decision (reprinted in English) expressing a similar line of reasoning on sovereignty is Brunner v. 
The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
212   Art. 5, EC Treaty.  Judt wryly calls the difficult concept of "subsidiarity" "a sort of Occam's razor for 
eurocrats." JUDT, supra note 101, at 715. 
213   see Zuleeg, supra note 209 at 623 et seq. 
214   See  VANESSA EDWARDS, EC C OMPANY LAW 3 - 14 (1999), and  STEFAN GRUNDMANN, E UROPÄISCHES 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 48, 69-72 (2004). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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abuse of such delegation rather than by application of the principle of subsidiarity, which would add 
little to the analysis.
215 
A "directive" as referred to in Article 44(2)(g) and defined in Article 5 EC Treaty is binding as 
to the result to be achieved, and member states must carry its substance into their national law, but it 
leaves  them free to choose the  form and method of implementation.
216  O nce a directive has been 
adopted, however, it works to pre-empt conflicting national legislation.  The ECJ made this point clear 
in its Inspire Art decision,
217 where it concluded that the Eleventh Company Law Directive's list of 
required and optional disclosures for branches established in other member states is "exhaustive", and 
that any disclosure requirements imposed by a member state (in that case, The Netherlands) are pre-
empted.
218    The  harmonization  program under  Article 44  goes hand in hand with the regulatory 
competition discussed in Part V, and harmonization of company law was originally seen as a quid pro 
quo for  allowing companies from other member states to operate in the host country. ECJ  Justice 
Timmerman has observed that the harmonization program  conducted on the basis of Article 44 was 
thus seen as "an entrance fee Member States accepted to pay for market integration."
219   
2. The company law directives  
Ten of the company law directives  adopted beginning i n 1968  harmonized  company law on 
many key aspects of forming and operating public corporations,
220 with only minor attention given to 
private companies.    The First Company Law Directive, adopted in 1968, imposed a harmonized 
system of register disclosure for companies to publish facts regarding their incorporation, legal capital 
                                                   
215   See GRUNDMANN, supra note 214, at 45, with further citations, and the discussion of Art. 44 EC Treaty in 
Troberg & Tiedge, in KOMM. ZUM EU VERTRAG, at vol. 1, p. 1535 et seq. 
216   A "directive" is an instrument proposed by the European Commission and issued by the European 
Council with the consultation or approval or notification of the European Parliament, and is defined as an 
instrument that is "binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods." Art. 249, Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. 33 (C 325) (2002), (EC Treaty). See CRAIG & 
DE BÚRCA, supra note 6, at 85 et seq. EU company law has been harmonized almost exclusively through 
directives enacted under Article 44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty, which provides that, "[i]n order to attain 
freedom of establishment . . . the Council . . . shall act by means of directives . . .  coordinating to the 
necessary extent the safeguards . . . required by Member States of companies . . . with a view to making 
such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community."  See EDWARDS, supra note 214, at 3 et seq. and 
GRUNDMANN, supra note  214, at 69 et seq.  Articles 43-48 of the EC Treaty guarantee freedom of 
establishment, and thus "require the removal of restrictions on the right of individuals and companies to 
maintain a permanent or settled place of business in a Member State."  CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 6, 
at 791. 
217   Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam and Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR I-10155. 
218   See Inspire Art, [2003] ECR I-10155, Par. 65-71. 
219   Christiaan Timmermans, Harmonization in the Future Company Law in Europe, in Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy 
Wymeersch, eds., CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 623, 628 (2003);  Stefan Grundmann, The 
Structure of European Company Law: From Crisis to Boom, 5 EBOR 601, 605 et seq. (2004). 
220   See GRUNDMANN, supra note 214, at 48 et seq. and EDWARDS, supra note 214, at 1 et seq. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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and financial results, as well as to specify those persons authorized to represent the company in 
dealings with third parties.
221  The Second Company Law Directive, adopted in 1976, provided 
harmonized rules for the incorporation of public companies and the maintenance of their capital, 
including a procedure for auditing the value of in-kind contributions to capital, restrictions on dividend 
distributions and share repurchases, a prohibition of "financial assistance", mandatory preemptive 
rights, and a required shareholder vote for certain changes in the company's capital.
222  Even 
considered alone and taking into account that the Second Directive was somewhat pared down through 
2006 amendments, it is obvious that these two Directives regulate core corporate characteristics.  They 
provide rules on the creation and actual representation of the corporation as a legal person, the capital 
maintenance requirements that are by many considered a quid pro quo for its limited liability, the 
nature of certain rights attaching to its shares, and the rights of shareholders with respect to changes in 
the company capital.  The remaining company law directives  adopted before the mid-1980's 
harmonize accounting,
223 or address specific company actions or topics, such as mergers and 
divisions,
224 the establishment of branches in other member states,
225 or guarantee that the existence of 
                                                   
221   See the First Council Directive (68/151/EEC) of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for 
the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent throughout the Community, 1968 O.J. (L 65) 8; see also a consolidated version as amended 
thorough January 1, 1995, available at www.eurlex.eu (hereinafter the "First Company Law Directive").  
222   See  the  Consolidated version of Second Council Directive of 13  December 1976 on coordination of 
safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member 
States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of 
the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, 
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent (77/91/EEC) as amended thorough November 20, 2006 
(hereinafter the "Second Company Law Directive"). 
223   Accounting measures include:  Fourth Council Directive (78/660/EEC) of 25 July 1978 based on Article 
54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11; 
Seventh Council Directive (83/349/EEC) of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on 
consolidated accounts, 1983, O.J. (L 193) 1; Eighth Council Directive (84/253/EEC) of 10 April 1984 
based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the approval of persons responsible for carrying out the 
statutory audits of accounting documents, 1984 O.J. (L 126) 20; as well as the more recent Regulation No 
1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the application of 
international accounting standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1.  For a thorough discussion of these measures, see 
GRUNDMANN, supra note 214, at §§ 14-16 and EDWARDS, supra note 214, at chapters V-VII.  
224   See Third Council Directive (78/855/EEC) of 9 October 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty 
concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, 1977 O.J. (L 295) 36; see also consolidated 
version as amended thorough January 1, 1995 at  www.eurlex.eu; and Sixth Council Directive 
82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of 
public limited liability companies, 1982 O.J. (L 378) 47.  
225   Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 1989 concerning disclosure requirements in 
respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of 
another State, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 36 (hereinafter the "Eleventh Company Law Directive").  This Directive 
is discussed at length in the European Court of Justice's decision in Inspire Art, [2003] ECR I-10155. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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a single-shareholder company will be respected throughout the Union.
226  Following long and difficult 
negotiations among the member states, the European Union finally adopted longstanding proposals for 
a directive regulating takeovers
227 and a regulation/directive package enabling the creation of a  
"European company" ("Societas Europaea" – "SE"), which is a porous framework of EU law filled in 
by the  national  company law of its member state of incorporation and seat.
228  The company law 
directives and regulations outlined above prescribe mandatory minimum rules, but the SE Regulation 
introduces a certain amount of flexibility into national law.  The Regulation allows shareholders to 
choose either a single-tier or a two-tier management board structure in settling up a Societas 
Europae,
229 and to specify a percentage of less than 10% of the shareholders to call a shareholders' 
meeting.
230  Germany and  the United Kingdom have implemented all of the EU directives into their 
company law, and the SE Regulation is both directly binding as law and tied into national law with 
special, national legislation d irecting how the gaps in the loose, supranational framework are to be 
filled in.
231  More recent company law directives facilitate cross-border mergers
232 and harmonize a 
number of shareholder rights with respect to receiving notice of an annual meeting, casting votes at the 
meeting, and granting a proxy for such votes.
233  Although no directive has  directly  set  out to 
harmonize  directors' duties of care and loyalty, the many  ex ante rules in the directives referred to 
above, such as those  restricting distributions to shareholders,  prescribing procedural  conduct f or 
mergers,  and limiting defenses against takeovers, a s well as  delineating how accounts should be 
prepared and signed, have a significant effect on management behavior.  Such rules should be factored 
in  when comparing the development of fiduciary duties in Delaware  and EU member states.  A 
growing body of ECJ decisions, which will be discussed at length in Part V, also has had an extremely 
important impact on company law. 
                                                   
226   Twelfth Council  Company Law Directive of 21 December 1989 on single-member private limited-
liability companies, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 40. 
227   Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, 
2004 O.J. (L 142) 12. 
228   See Council Regulation 2157/2001, of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) 2001 
O.J. (L 294) 1 (hereinafter the "SE Regulation") and Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 
supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to  the involvement of employees 2001 
O.J. (L 294) 22 (hereinafter the "SE Directive"). 
229   Art. 38(b), SE Regulation. 
230   Art. 55(1) SE Regulation. 
231   For Germany, see The European Company Implementation Act (Gesetz zur Einführung der Europäischen 
Gesellschaft), BGBl. vol. I, p. 3675 (Dec. 22, 2004). Although national law will fill in gaps in the 
Regulation, it is important to remember that many of the gaps have been left in areas already harmonized 
by earlier EU directives. 
232   See Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-
border mergers of limited liability companies, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1. 
233   See Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise 
of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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EU law regulates every aspect of the capital markets through a general framework directives, 
directly applicable regulations and detailed "interpretive" directives.  The areas covered include public 
offerings of securities,
234 the disclosure that listed companies must make to the market,
235 i nsider 
trading and market manipulation,
236 as well as the activities or brokers and trading facilities
237 and the 
operation of investment funds.
238  As mentioned above,
239 the shape of these capital market rules is 
often influenced by IOSCO, and thus also often resembles that of similar rules adopted in the United 
States, and EU-US work programs and agreements provide for cooperative efforts in certain regulatory 
activity and mutual recognition of specified disclosure  frameworks.    One important element of 
securities regulation that has not been harmonized at the EU level is the standard for civil liability in 
cases of securities fraud.
240 
3. EU implementing regulations 
The, detailed  EU  rules  implementing general directives  are  adopted pursuant to  a  four-level 
approach devised in 2001 by an expert committee under the direction of Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy 
in its, “Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities 
Markets.”
241  This Report set forth "four levels", which are: 
•  Level 1: general principles, directives that member states implement; 
•  Level 2 : detailed, implementing legislation adopted by the European Commission, in 
consultation with the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR); 
•  Level 3: interpretive regulations developed by CESR; and 
                                                   
234   See Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending 
Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64. 
235   See Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 
(hereinafter the "Transparency Directive"). 
236   Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider 
dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (hereinafter the "Market Abuse 
Directive"). 
237   See Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21. April 2004 on markets in 
financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 
145) 1.  The content of this directive clearly falls outside of what is usefully considered as "company law" 
and will not be discussed in this paper. 
238   At the time of this writing, the EU framework for the regulation of undertakings for collective investment 
in transferable securities (UCITS) is undergoing substantial modification. See the White Paper and other 
documents available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/index_en.htm. 
239   See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
240   See  Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Tröger, "Issuer Choice in Europe," ECGI Law Working Paper 
N°.90/2007 (October 2007), at 12 et seq., on SSRN at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1032281. 
241   The text of the Report is available at  http://europa.eu.int.  For a detailed analysis of this four-level 
procedure, see FERRAN, supra note 208, at 61-126. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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•  Level 4: Commission polices for compliance. 
Pursuant to this procedure, the Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation Directive, for example, has 
been fleshed out  both  by detailed implementing legislation
242 and CESR implementing measures.
243 
Similarly, the Prospectus Directive has been  supplemented  with a very detailed Prospectus 
Regulation,
244 which operates something like  the instructions in the US  Regulation S - K  on the 
information to be provided in disclosure documents,
245 and obviates detailed national legislation on the 
content of prospectuses.  In fact, the German Securities Prospectus Act defines the required, minimum 
content of a prospectus under German law with a brief reference to the EU Prospectus Regulation.
246  
The FSA's disclosure and transparency rules referred to in the previous section are to a great extent 
taken without change from this EU legislation.  As discussed in Part V, the Transparency Directive 
includes provisions on applicable law that  could have a significant impact on national securities 
markets by allowing the home member state of an issuer to regulate the disclosure requirements of a 
company, even if it is listed in another member state.
247 
4. The Europeanization of national law 
The growth of EU activity in the area of securities regulation is passing much of the legislative 
volume  of rules in this area  from the member states to the supranational entity.  The  hierarchical 
relationship between the European Union and its member states and the density of the EU measures in 
the areas of company law and capital markets  also  mean that member state law  has,  to a  very 
significant extent, been shaped by EU law.  For a US observer, the "marbling" of national law with 
                                                   
242   Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004 on implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market practices, the definition of inside 
information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification 
of managers' transactions and the notification of suspicious transactions, 2004 O.J. (L 162) 70; and 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003 of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards exemptions for buy-back programmes and 
stabilisation of financial instruments, 2003 O.J. (L 336) 33; as well as Commission Directive 
2003/125/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council as regards the fair presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of 
conflicts of interest, 2003 O.J. (L 339) 73. 
243   CESR, "Additional Level 2 Implementing Measures for Market Abuse Directive," CESR/03-213b (Aug. 
2003). 
244   Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses as well as the 
format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of 
advertisements, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1. 
245   See 17 C.F.R. Part 229. 
246   See §   7 of the German Securities Prospectus Act ( Gesetz über die Erstellung, Billigung und 
Veröffentlichung des Prospekts, der beim öffentlichen Angebot von Wertpapieren oder bei der Zulassung 
von Wertpapieren zum Handel an einem organisierten Markt zu veröffentlichen ist  –  
Wertpapierprospektgesetz or WpPG). 
247   See Transparency Directive, at Art. 3. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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supranational elements will appear quite different than the two-tiered state/federal structure that 
prevails in the United States. As will be discussed in further detail in Part V, the ECJ also guides 
national law that has not already been harmonized or supplanted  pursuant to its reading of the EC 
Treaty, thus creating an additional supranational impact on local law. 
An awareness of the pervasive  presence  of EU law in both  the  German and the U K legal 
systems should give warning to those who would argue a strong form of legal origin influence. The 
respective bodies of company law have both been "Europeanized" and exist alongside a large body of 
EU securities law.  Although EU law has not yet focused on private limited companies – and thus ECJ 
decisions have addressed conflicts in national law regarding this business form – the Aktiengesetz and 
the Companies Act 2006 contain a very large number of  substantially identical provisions that 
implement EU law.  In public companies, the appointment of directors and their management of the 
company in areas other than those regulated by directives has been left to national law, and thus in this 
important area of the law divergences do exist and continue to arise, although reason and pressure for 
international best practices by institutional investors have led to significant uniformity in this area as 
well. 
C. Within Germany and the United Kingdom 
Although company law is national law in both Germany and the United Kingdom, each of these 
countries contains sub-jurisdictions and regulatory bodies to which power must be delegated or with 
which jurisdiction must be shared.  Thus the Companies Act  2006  makes special allowances for 
divergence in the case of the law of Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the adoption of rules for the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange occurs partly in cooperation with the state (Land) of Hesse, where the city 
of Frankfurt am Main is located.   
1. Germany 
Germany is a federation, but the Länder do not adopt company or securities laws of their own, 
and thus there is no competition for charters within Germany.  The  Aktiengesetz  is also quite 
inflexible, and leaves little room for individualized company structures.  Section 23(5) AktG provides 
that the company charter may deviate from the provisions of the law only where expressly provided 
for in the law, and such express grants are not generously provided.  As Prof. Karsten Schmidt notes, 
pursuant to German corporate law, "the constitution-like, prescribed structure of the stock corporation 
may be altered only slightly by the articles of incorporation, given that – contrary to limited liability 
companies and partnerships  – the stock corporation is governed by  the principle that the form of Draft: February 12, 2008 
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constitutional documents is strictly prescribed."
248  Indeed, Prof. Hans-Joachim Mertens quipped in an 
essay written shortly after German reunification  that a future economic historian would have great 
difficulty in discerning whether the Aktiengesetz, with its strictly prescribed structure, originated in the 
capitalist or in the communist half of Germany.
249  
Securities exchanges do exist in many German Länder and their rules are adopted in a semi-
public manner in connection with the  Land.  As mentioned above,  Germany's largest securities 
exchange, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, is in the Land of Hesse.  Pursuant to § 32 of the German 
Exchange Act,
250 the federal government  has  issued an exchange admission regulation providing 
guidelines on the procedure to be used and requirements to be met when admitting securities to listing 
on a German exchange.
251  A governing body of the exchange, the "exchange council" (Börsenrat) on 
which representatives of listed companies and market participants are seated is responsible for drafting 
the exchange rules.
252  These rules must be approved by the supervisory authority of the Land, which 
in Hesse is the Commerce Ministry.
253  As the Exchange Rules are issued pursuant to the German 
Exchange Act and under the supervision of the local state authority, they take on the character of a 
public law charter (öffentlich-rechtliche Satzung).
254  This gives listed companies additional options to 
                                                   
248   SCHMIDT, supra note 147, at 771 (italics in original) (Author's translation).  For an interesting discussion 
of mandatory corporate law in Continental Europe,  see Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate 
Law between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697 
(2005). 
249   Hans-Joachim Mertens, Satzungs- und Organisationsautonomie im Aktien- und Konzernrecht, 3 ZGR 426 
(1994 ). 
250   This section requires that the regulation contain "provisions necessary to protect the public and for 
orderly exchange trading, regarding: 1. admission requirements, and in particular: a) requirements for the 
issuer regarding its legal form, its size and the duration of its existence; b) requirements for the securities 
to be admitted regarding their legal basis, negotiability,  face value, and printed format; c) the minimum 
amount of the issue; d) the requirement that the application for admission include all shares of the same 
class or all debt securities of the same issue; 2. the language and the content of the prospectus, in 
particular the securities to be admitted and the issuer, its capital, business activity, assets and liabilities, 
financial position, management and supervisory bodies, its recent development and prospects, any lockup 
agreements between the issuer and its shareholders, including any understandings and measures designed 
to secure performance on the agreement, as well as the persons or companies that take responsibility for 
the contents of the prospectus; 3. the date on which the prospectus is to be published; and 4. the 
admissions procedure."  § 32(1) German Exchange Act, author's translation. 
251   See Exchange Admission Regulation, supra note 202. 
252   §§ 9 and 13 German Exchange Act. 
253   § 13(5)  German  Exchange Act.  For a discussion of the approval process  see Peter Foelsch, in 
BANKRECHT UND BANKPRAXIS, margin nos. 7/171, 7/183 (Thorwald Hellner & Stephan Steuer, eds., 
updated to 2007).  
254   Id. at 7/182. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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challenge disputed exchange actions, such  the delisting of a company under circumstances not 
expressly provided for in the exchange admission regulation.
255   
Although German exchange rules are drafted by private parties who can expect the sympathetic 
cooperation of the commerce ministry in their local Land, they coexist with an extensive body of EU 
securities regulation and the national laws implementing the latter, and must conform to the national 
regulation on admission to an exchange.  As a result, the listing requirements of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, for example, have little room to use their local freedom even though they are considerably 
lighter than both their UK and US counterparts.  It is difficult to say whether their open-endedness 
expresses a business-friendly accommodation for listed companies or is simply the result of the heavy 
blanket of national and EU law resting on German companies, although the latter is most likely.  The 
Frankfurt rules go to disclosures and accounting, with standards for certain exchange segments being 
somewhat stricter than required by law.  For example, a company the shares of which are admitted to 
the premium market segment referred to as "prime standard" must publish reports, including financial 
statements on a quarterly, rather than merely semiannual basis, as required by the federal, Exchange 
Admission Regulation (Börsenzulassungs-Verordnung).
256  Such requirements are very light compared 
to their UK and US counterparts, and in no way regulate the composition of the boards or their actions.  
The latter t opics are rather addressed by the C orporate  Governance  Code referred to above, 
compliance with which must be declared (or non-compliance disclosed and explained) in the notes to a 
listed company's financial statements.
257  The Code contains requirements that are very comparable to 
the corporate governance standards found in the NYSE Listed Company Manual, such as the creation 
of an audit committee on the supervisory board, with a chair who is an accounting expert and not a 
former manager,
258  disapproval of the general practice of managing directors migrating into the 
supervisory board,
259  recommendation that supervising directors of public corporations sit on the 
boards no more than five, separate companies (the Aktiengesetz sets the limit at 10),
260 a general policy 
of one share/one vote,
261 and a shareholder-friendly calling and holding of the annual meeting.
262 
                                                   
255   See Manfred Wolf, Der Ausschluß vom Neuen Markt und die Aufnahme von Ausschlußgründen in das 
Regelwerk Neuer Markt, 38 WM 1785 (2001), for an excellent analysis of the contract law problems 
arising in the unilateral amendment of this type of contact. 
256   See Rules of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, §§ 62 and 63, available at the website of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, http://www.deutsche-boerse.com, and Exchange Admission Regulation, §§ 53-62. 
257   See § 161 AktG. 
258   German Corporate Governance Code, at 5.3.2. 
259   Id. at 5.4.4. 
260   See Id. at 5.4.5, and § 100(2)(1) AktG for the statutory rule. 
261   German Corporate Governance Code, at § 2.1.2. 
262   Id. at § 2.3. Draft: February 12, 2008 
 
 
49 
 
© 2008 David C. Donald 
 
 
Particularly with regard to takeovers and securities trading, German law also delegates authority 
to the German Financial Services Supervisory Agency ( Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin) to adopt regulations.  As CESR has increasingly issued more 
and more detailed EU legislation, the national substance of the BaFin regulations has become less 
significant.  As a result, given that the Frankfurt listing rules are comparatively light and the Kodex, 
aside some best practice recommendations largely repeats the requirements of the Aktiengesetz, there 
is very little jurisdictional interaction within Germany.  Nearly all company law is national law.   
2. The United Kingdom 
Although the United Kingdom is composed of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland – 
with each having a certain degree of autonomy and slight differences in laws that affect companies – 
there is no regulatory competition between the component states of the United Kingdom.  The 
Companies Act 2006  applies equally to each state, but  makes numerous references to the slight 
differences existing in the  laws of the  various states, such as with  respect to  variations in the 
requirements for registering charges against the company, which is closely linked to principles of local 
property law,
263 or the requirements for entering into contracts that bind the company, which is closely 
linked to principles of local contract law.
264  The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) 
makes  fewer, but similar, adjustments for differences in  such areas as  criminal law and related 
authorities, which display differences in the various UK component states.
265  Most  significant 
"jurisdictional" interaction in the area of company law occurs between the UK Parliament and the 
bodies, primarily the  Secretary of State, the  FSA and the  Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the 
"Takeover Panel"), to which it delegates specific powers. 
The Secretary has significant delegated authority under the Act, particularly in connection with 
the constitution of companies, such as prescribing model articles of association,
266 and receives power 
to issue other statutory instruments affecting a number of different rights.
267  Through the Companies 
Act 2006, t he  Takeover Panel receives the powers to issue rules for the regulation of takeovers in 
accordance with the EU Takeover Directive,
268 to enjoin persons  from acting in violation of the 
rules,
269 to order the production of documents,
270 and to conduct hearings on the alleged violation of its 
                                                   
263   See Part 25 Companies Act 2006. 
264   See secs. 43 et seq. Companies Act 2006. 
265   See e.g., sec. 176 FSMA 2000 regarding the issuance of warrants. 
266   See sec. 19 Companies Act 2006. 
267   See  e.g. sec.  71(4) Companies Act 2006, giving the Secretary the power to issue rules regulating 
challenges to company names. 
268   See sec. 943 Companies Act 2006. 
269   See sec. 946 Companies Act 2006. 
270   See sec. 947 Companies Act 2006. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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rules.
271  The historical position of the Takeover Panel as a body composed of representatives of the 
industry meant that the type of person who was able to shape the UK takeover rules (e.g., institutional 
investors in the City of London) has been quite different than the type of persons who could lobby the 
US Congress in Washington to shape the US takeover rules (e.g., corporate management).
272  Because 
different  rule-giving bodies  represent different constituencies and have different procedures for 
drafting and issuing their rules, the constituencies  that can exercise influence on those bodies is 
different.  This displays how an understanding of relevant jurisdictions and  their powers is a 
prerequisite to an understanding of the type of forces acting to cause historical development, which is 
outlined in the following Part V.  As the Takeover Panel has recently been brought formally under the 
law through Companies Act 2006, it will be interesting to see whether its rules and decisions move at 
all in the direction of the more industry-friendly US counterparts. 
The  FSMA  both created the FSA and  delegated power to  it, including the power to grant 
authorization to pursue a regulated financial activity.
273  Its rules address matters ranging from the 
disclosure of inside information and  of shareholdings,
274  to the listing standards for  UK securities 
exchanges,
275  i.e.  the  London Stock Exchange (LSE).  The LSE's own rules primarily regulate its 
members rather than listed companies.
276  Unlike Germany, local government is not involved in the 
FSA's rule-making process.  The FSA Listing Rules provide an extensive set of initial and continuing 
obligations for listed companies that not only specify financial criteria and regulate disclosure, but also 
provide guidelines on how specific types of transactions are to be approved
277 and the manner in which 
                                                   
271   See sec. 951 Companies Act 2006. 
272   See the very instructive discussion by  John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for 
Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 1727 (2007).  This analysis shows how the nature of a rule-giving body can channel certain types of 
constituency influence into its rules.  It builds on ideas found in Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra 
note 85, which focuses on the rule-giver's state of mind in accepting or rejecting solutions offered by 
various constituencies.  A more recent paper looks at the motives and available funds that constituencies 
such as corporate management can use to influence rule-giving bodies.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika 
Neeman,  "Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics" (November 2007). Harvard Law and 
Economics Discussion Paper No. 603 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030355.  A 
combination of jurisdictional analysis (Armour & Skeel), situational analysis (Romano), and analysis of 
motive and opportunity for influence (Bebchuk & Neeman) should be able to offer a legal history that 
explicates the complete dynamics of legal change.  
273   See sec. 20 FSMA 2000. 
274   See FSA Disclosure and Transparency Rules, DTR 2 and 5 (Jan. 2008). 
275   The FSA is the "competent authority" under EU law for supervising and regulating the securities 
exchanges. See sec. 72 FSMA 2000. 
276   See http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/products/membershiptrading/rulesreg. 
277   Transactions requiring shareholder approval include stock and stock option plans for management. See 
FSA Listing Rules, Rule 9.4 (Jan. 2008). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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company  directors may buy and sell the company's stock.
278  Thus, similarly to the regulatory 
composition in the United States, the shift from a non-listed to a public UK company brings with it a 
substantial increase in regulation.  Unlike the United States, however, because the bulk of the listing 
rules come from the FSA rather than the exchange, it would be next to impossible for another UK 
exchange to compete for listing applicants by offering less regulation, although  a "race-to-the-top" 
strategy based on  stricter standards should be possible.  Moreover, as discussed in Part V, the EU 
Transparency Directive's applicable law provisions allow competition between the shares of issuers 
from different home member states on the same exchange, altering the traditional rule according to 
which the marketplace controls the regulation of securities sold on the market.   
D. The United States and Its States 
The bodies with power to issue rules governing public companies in the United States are the 
states (e.g., the State of Delaware), the federal government (which enacted, e.g., the Exchange Act and 
the Securities Act) and the securities exchange on which a given company's shares are listed (e.g., the 
New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market both issue  their own listing standards).
279 
The rules issued by each of these bodies tend to overlap and supplement each other. 
1.  The Constitutional position of the US federal government 
Federal law focuses on disclosure in the contexts of securities offerings,
280 takeovers,
281 annual 
and quarterly reporting,
282 and the solicitation of proxies
283 for the annual meetings of shareholders, as 
well as combating fraud in connection with such activities.
284  In the area of company law proper, the 
federal government could constitutionally supplant state law, but has traditionally chosen not to do so.   
Pursuant to Article VI, clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution, known as the "Supremacy Clause", 
the laws of the federal government preempt the laws of a state.
285  Preemption is not uniformly present 
in all cases.  The federal preemption power runs on a sliding scale, beginning with those cases where 
exclusive powers of the federal government are specified in the Constitution, and gradually decreasing 
                                                   
278   Transactions requiring shareholder approval include stock and stock option plans for management.  See 
FSA Listing Rules, Rule 9.2.7 (Jan. 2008). 
279   The initial and continued listing standards of the NYSE are set forth in the  NYSE LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL, which is available in a continuously updated form at www.nyse.com. The initial and continued 
listing standards of the Nasdaq Stock Market are set forth in the NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES (Rules 
4000--7100), which are available in a continuously updated form at www.nasdaq.com.  
280   See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2000). 
281   See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000). 
282   See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2000). 
283   See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000). 
284   See 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) and 78j(b) (2000). 
285   U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  For an informative historical analysis of the US federalist structure,  see 
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:  Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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through cases in which the Supreme Court has found there is a presumption in favor of preemption, to 
where the legal position is neutral, to cases where there is a presumption against preemption, and 
finishing with those cases in which the states have a constitutional immunity from preemption.
286  
Because the Constitution, in a provision known as the  "Commerce  Clause",
287  vests the federal 
Congress with the power to regulate commerce among the states, interstate commercial activity is a 
field where the argument for preemption is at its strongest.
288  Congress based its enactment of the 
various securities laws  discussed above on the commerce clause,
289 and there is little doubt that 
Congress could replace the state corporate laws with a federal statute.
290  For example, although most 
US states have some form of law providing for disclosures in connection with the sale of securities 
(often referred to as "blue sky laws"), Congress in 1996 provided that these laws shall not apply to any 
securities listed on a national exchange.
291  The preempted state law was simply displaced.  The same 
result could be achieved through the  adoption of a federal company law, although this has not been 
seriously considered since the beginning of the  1920's,
292 and in the mean time a "tradition" has 
developed according to which corporations are understood as "creatures of the state,"
293 and corporate 
law is understood as an area in which there is a "longstanding prevalence of state regulation."
294 Thus, 
                                                   
286   This sliding scale analysis is borrowed from Prof. Mark V. Tushnet, who uses it in a discussion of the 
foreign policy area, with the caveat that the five-point scale is "sufficient" for "the present purposes," 
which of course indicates that finer distinctions might be appropriate in different circumstances.  See 
Mark V. Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11, 19 (2000). 
287   U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 8, cl. 3.  
288   See Prof. Tushnet's discussion of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Tushnet, supra note 
286, at 19 et seq. 
289   See LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PARADES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 98 et 
seq. (5
th ed. 2004, supplemented to 2007). 
290   See e.g., Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1159, 
1169 (2005) ("There was no real question given the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause that 
the SEC could seek legislation that would supplant the states in corporate law for a specified category of 
corporations and that the federal law would preempt or exist concurrently with state law. The federal 
securities laws did exactly this with respect to state disclosure and fraud remedies during the New Deal"), 
and Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. R EV. 588, 596 ("Congress's authority over 
interstate commerce means that the internal affairs "doctrine" is just an informal arrangement, not a  hard 
limit on federal lawmaking"). 
291   See the National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996 (the "NSMIA", Pub.L.No. 104-290, 112 
Stat. 3416). The  "blue sky" laws have become progressively less important as federal law has either 
expressly or tacitly pre-empted their application. Along these lines, the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 (the "SLUSA", Pub.L.No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227) also removed a significant 
amount of activity from the state jurisdictions by pre-empting state class actions for specified types of 
securities fraud.  See LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES (5
th ed. 2004), at 28 et seq. and 1189 
et seq. 
292   See William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 619, 653 (2006). 
293   Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (refusing to apply the federal securities laws to 
matters of internal corporate management), citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). 
294   CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 70 (1987). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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"except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stock 
holders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation,"
295 as states are understood to 
have "broad latitude" in regulating such "internal affairs."
296  Internal affairs would generally include 
the formation and governance of a corporation and the rights and duties of its owners and managers.
297  
For the reasons outlined, the federal government avoids encroaching on this area.  
2.  Federal laws 
Federal laws and the extensive body of rules issued pursuant to them mostly require registration 
of companies, disclosure of financial and other information about the company and management, and 
make only minimal incursions into the internal affairs of the companies regulated.
298  Controversies 
arise, however, in connection with border areas where there is uncertainty as to whether the field has 
been preempted by federal law,
299 or when a federal remedy could be applied to an action taken under 
the state corporate law.  For example, when a shareholder raised a federal challenge against a "short-
form" merger that  under Delaware law  did not require shareholder approval, the Supreme Court 
rejected  it because the m atter was  "internal" and d id not exhibit the characteristics,  such as 
misrepresentation or fraud, that the federal law was enacted to combat.
300  Federal/state conflicts also 
                                                   
295   Cort, 422 U.S. at 84. 
296   CTS, 481 U.S. at 78, citing the decision of the Appeals Court's decision in the same case, Dynamics Corp. 
of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7
th Cir. 1986). 
297   The concept of "internal affairs" comes from the area of conflicts of law.  R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
CONFLICTS OF LAW §302, Comment a (1971) defines "internal affairs" as referring to "the relations inter 
se  of the corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers or agents. . . . involv[ing] primarily a 
corporation's relationship to its shareholders [and] includ[ing] steps taken in the course of the original 
incorporation, the election or appointment of directors and officers, the adoption of by-laws, the issuance 
of corporate shares, preemptive rights, the holding of directors' and shareholders' meetings, methods of 
voting including any requirement for cumulative voting, shareholders' rights to examine corporate 
records, charter and by-law amendments, mergers, consolidations and reorganizations and the 
reclassification of shares. Matters which may also affect the interests of the corporation's creditors include 
the issuance of bonds, the declaration and payment of dividends, loans by the corporation to directors, 
officers and shareholders, and the purchase and redemption by the corporation of outstanding shares of its 
own stock."  
298   In the original Exchange Act, incursions into the management of the corporation were limited to such 
requirements as disclosure of the shareholdings of managers and 10% stockholders, and the disgorgement 
of profits that such insiders made through short term dealings (within a period of six months) in the 
company's shares.  See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78p(b) (2000).  An exception to the limitation to disclosure rules 
was found in the Investment Company Act, which included a requirement that a specified percentage of 
independent or unaffiliated directors be seated on the board.  See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (2000). 
299   See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (invalidating a state statute that imposed a waiting period 
of the consummation of takeover offers that was deemed to frustrate the balance achieved in the § 14 of 
the Exchange Act).  On the question of "field preemption" as applied to corporate and securities law, see 
Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States 
and Europe, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 495, 500 et seq. (2003). 
300   Green, 430 U.S. 462 (The court found that, absent an allegation of misrepresentation or fraud – which are 
the key elements of Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act – the federal rule could not be used to invalidate 
a merger effected properly under state law).  For an excellent discussion of this case, see Donald C. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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arise when the SEC oversteps its authority under the Exchange Act in regulating an "internal" matter 
(such as the type of voting rights embodied in shares), which is usually provided for in state corporate 
laws.
301  No legal controversy arises, however, when the federal government expressly enters internal 
corporate affairs, as it did with §§ 301 and 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA),
302 which 
regulated  the composition of  corporate  boards  by requiring independent audit committees  and  their 
internal procedures by prohibiting most loans to directors.  Thus by tradition, but not by law, the states 
control most of the internal affairs of corporations. 
An important difference between US and EU company law arises because the US Congress may 
not – unlike the European Union – command the states to implement specified policies.
303 As a result, 
laws like the DGCL  are essentially different from  their counterparts in Germany and the United 
Kingdom because they are not marbled with elements of federal law; rather, state law and federal law 
occupy separate realms.  For example, sec. 441 Companies Act 2006 requires companies to deliver 
their annual accounts for each financial year to the companies registrar.  This requirement is found in 
UK law because an EU directive,
304 which had to be carried into national law, required it.
305  The same 
EU law requirement is found in German law
306 and will be found in a substantially similar form in the 
various company laws of  all EU member states because national legislatures must comply with an 
obligation to implement the supranational directive.  Because the US federal government cannot issue 
instructions to a state legislature, US federal laws, such as the Exchange Act, operate on a plane 
separate from that occupied by the state company law statutes.  These two parallel systems manoeuvre 
around each other, and at times leave gaps or collide.  The closest thing to an instruction to implement 
                                                                                                                                                               
Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: The SEC's Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 
Wash. U. L. Q. 449 (2001). 
301   See The Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 905 F.2d 406 (1990). (The court 
found that the SEC's attempt to guarantee that all listed stock carried proportional voting rights exceeded 
the agency's authority under § 14 of the Exchange Act.) 
302   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (SOA). 
303   In 1997, the US Supreme Court reaffirmed that, "[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives 
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their 
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program."  Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 932; 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997). 
304   The First Company Law Directive. 
305   See Arts. 2(1)(f) and 3(1) and (2) of the First Company Law Directive. 
306   Germany implemented the First Company Law Directive in 1969 with The Law Implementing the First 
Directive of the European Council on the Coordination of Company Law (Gesetz zur Durchführung der 
Ersten Richtlinie des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften zur Koordinierung des 
Gesellschaftsrechts) of August 15, 1969, BGBl vol.  I, p. 1146. The required filing was previously 
specified in §§ 177 and 178 AktG, but has since been moved for housekeeping purposes into §§ 325-329 
of the HGB, which apply to all stock corporations. The Commercial Code also provides for the creation 
of the register in which the filing must be made. See UWE HÜFFER, AKTIENGESETZ 881 (7
th ed. 2006), and 
GÜNTER HENN, HANDBUCH DES AKTIENRECHTS 589 (7
th ed. 2002). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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as used in the European Union is found in legislative orders via the SEC to the national securities 
exchanges to issue listing  specific listing  rules, as discussed below,  and explains why listing rules 
serve a harmonizing function that is not found in state company law with the exception, perhaps, of 
the Model Business Corporation Act (the "Model Act").
307  
The Model Act might be thought of as a voluntary form of European-style harmonization.  The 
American Bar Association's Section of Business Law (the "ABA") continuously updates and improves 
the Model Act, and publishes drafts for discussion in the ABA publication, The Business Lawyer.  
State legislatures are free to adopt the provisions with or without change.  In 2000, it was reported that 
35 states had substantially adopted the Model Act,
308 although the laws of such states is less used by 
large public companies than is the law of Delaware.   As a result, corporate law in the United States is 
essentially  divided into three camps: the majority of the states follows the Model Act, a few states, 
such as Oklahoma, follow the DGCL, and some large states like California and New York, which can 
afford their own  drafting committees,  choose to follow neither Delaware nor the Model Act.
309  
Federal law has not been directly implemented into any of these corporate statutes.   
Because US corporate law statutes offer creditors few safeguards against shareholders paying 
out the corporate capital to themselves, US company law reaches out in various directions to cobble 
together creditor rights.  Some protections are found in federal law and others in harmonized, model 
laws.  Federal law bankruptcy provisions on both fraudulent conveyances and equitable subordination 
are used to address cases in which shareholders unfairly  vote themselves preferential treatment.
310  
Rules on fraudulent conveyances are also used to limit  such  payouts,
311  and such rules have been 
drafted in  a  model act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law 
(NCCUSL),
312 which like the Model Business Corporation Act has been offered to the states for their 
                                                   
307   The Model Act is drafted by the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association. The process 
of updating and adopting the Model Act will be discussed in more detail in Part III.A.2.  The Model Act 
has been adopted in substance in 35 of the 50 US states.  See Richard A. Booth, A Chronology of the 
Evolution of the MBCA, 56 BUS. LAW. 63, 66 (2000). 
308   See Id. 
309   See JONATHAN R. MACEY, MACEY ON CORPORATION LAW (2002), for a discussion of the states that have 
followed a specific provision of the DGCL or the Model Act. 
310   See David A. Skeel & Georg Krause-Wilmar, Recharacterization and the Nonhindrance of Creditors, 7 
EBOR 259 (2006).  
311   See e.g., Moody v. Security Pacific Credit Business, Inc. 971 F.2d 1056 (1992) and US v. Tabor Court 
Realty, 803 F.2d 1288 (1986). 
312   The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which was drafted by NCCUSL in 1984, revised a Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act that had existed since 1918.  The 1984 version has been adopted by 42 states. 
See the NCCUSL website, at http://www.nccusl.org. Draft: February 12, 2008 
 
 
56 
 
© 2008 David C. Donald 
 
 
voluntary adoption.  This process has significantly harmonized the shape of such rules in the United 
States.
313 
3.  Exchange Rules 
The initial and continued l isting requirements  of national securities exchanges  are merely 
contractual in nature,
314 and would be invalid if they violated either state or federal law.
315 Pursuant to 
the Exchange Act, national securities exchanges are "self  regulatory organizations" ("SROs"), and 
their rules, including the listing standards, are subject to the approval of the SEC,
316 which supervises 
their adoption according to a procedure provided for in § 19 Exchange Act.
317 In accordance with this 
procedure, the SEC supervises all significant rule changes of national exchanges and may instruct the 
exchanges to adopt specific rules.  Because the SEC operates under power delegated to it through the 
Exchange Act, it may not instruct a securities exchange to adopt a rule in an area not covered by such 
delegated power.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found in 1990 that an SEC rule that 
would have required exchanges to maintain a one share/one vote policy was beyond the agency's 
statutory authority because, in the court's opinion, voting rights were part of internal corporate 
governance and beyond the disclosure focus of the Exchange Act.
318  This decision, although certainly 
binding, is generally not considered to demarcate the limits of the SEC's delegated power with great 
authority, and as Professor Joel Seligman has observed, the court's decision not only ignores the SEC's 
plenary power under the Exchange Act to change or abrogate exchange rules,
319 but also fails to 
explain how, if exchanges can adopt rules that go well beyond disclosure, and the SEC has unlimited 
                                                   
313   The NCCUSL website shows 45 states that have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which it 
released in 1984 by  revising a 1918 Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, and that New York State 
introduced the act in 2007. 
314   Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 131 (1973). 
315   See  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  CONTRACTS  § 178 (2005) and  JOHN  D. C ALAMARI  & J OSEPH  M. 
PERILLO, T HE LAW OF CONTRACTS 495 (4
th ed. 1998). Aside from the invalidity under contract law, 
§ 19(b)(3)(C) Exchange Act provides that a "rule change of a self-regulatory organization which has 
taken effect . . . may be enforced by such organization to the extent it is not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this title, the rules and regulations thereunder, and applicable Federal and State law." 
316   See § 19(b) Exchange Act and LOSS & SELIGMAN (2004), at 776. 
317   The procedure by which national securities exchanges may adopt rules is provided for in §  19(b) 
Exchange Act.  According to this provision an exchange must file copies of any proposed rule change 
with the SEC, stating the proposed rule's basis and purpose. The SEC then provides notice of the proposal 
and gives interested persons an opportunity to comment.  Usually within 35 days, the SEC will then order 
the rule change or institute proceedings to determine whether the proposal should be disapproved.  Under 
certain circumstances rules may enter into effect immediately without the waiting period. No rule 
proposal can become effective without SEC approval.  See LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 289, 
at 776 et seq. 
318   See Business Roundtable, 905 F. 2d at 411-413. 
319   See § 19(b)(3)(C) Exchange Act ("the Commission summarily may abrogate the change in the rules of the 
self-regulatory organization . . . and require that the proposed rule change be refilled.") Draft: February 12, 2008 
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power over this process, the SEC's own affirmative capacity can be limited to disclosure rules.
320  The 
expansion of the Exchange Act into "internal" matters through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may lead 
future courts to reach different conclusions regarding the scope of the SEC's power in such matters. 
4. Within Delaware 
In accordance with the above, if a company is listed, the composition and behaviour of its board 
will to a certain extent be governed by federal rules, and even if it is not listed but must register with 
the SEC, the conduct of its general meetings and the disclosure required from directors and major 
shareholders will be governed by the same body of rules.  Because the DGCL offers a flexible set of 
default terms, what remains mandatory  with Delaware law are the constitution of the company and 
matters falling under the rubric "internal affairs", particularly the duties of care and loyalty owed by 
directors and controlling shareholders to the company and the minority shareholders.  Professor 
Jeffrey Gordon has aptly described laws like the DGCL as containing "four sorts of mandatory rules . . 
. : procedural, power allocating, economic transformative, and fiduciary standards setting."
321  These 
categories would include such matters as (procedural) establishing a mandatory procedure for calling 
shareholder meetings, ( allocating) giving shareholders the right to elect and remove directors, 
(transformative) requiring a shareholder vote on transactions that would change the nature of the 
corporation, and ( fiduciary) duties of care and loyalty applied by courts to "to restrain insiders in 
exercising their discretionary power over the corporation and its shareholders in contingencies not 
specifically foreseeable and thus over which the parties could not contract."
322  The elaboration of this 
last category, fiduciary duties, has been the most important contribution of the Delaware courts, 
particularly through decisions handed down during the second half of 20
th Century.
323  Allocation of 
power and the opportunity to vote on major decisions that would affect the nature of the company are 
provided for in the DGCL, but may be shaped significantly in the certificate of incorporation.  The 
way in which a matter is put up for a vote will be governed by federal proxy rules if the company is 
registered with the SEC or by a combination of minimalist rules and fiduciary standards under 
Delaware law if it is not. 
                                                   
320   LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 289, at 778 et seq. 
321   Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1591 (1989).  
322   Id. at 1593. 
323   In the case of Delaware, it is thought that the courts' introduction of stricter fiduciary duties was a 
reaction to the critical stance taken by former SEC Chairman William Cary in 1974, when he accused the 
state of leading a "race to the bottom" (see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
on Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974)).  In a landmark decision of 1977, Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), the Delaware Supreme Court imposed strict fiduciary duties on the management of 
a parent company in a cash out merger with a subsidiary.  See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 292, at 
680. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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There is no interaction between Delaware and a lower, local body or a securities exchange.  As 
explained above,  national securities exchanges adopt their rules in coordination with the SEC.  
Although the DGCL does refer to a "Secretary of State," this office has neither the authority to issue 
statutory instruments nor any significant role in checking the adequacy of a company's request for 
incorporation.  Fraudulent conveyance rules, if applied, would be taken from the law of the State of 
Delaware or another state, depending on the law applicable to the transaction, or from federal 
Bankruptcy Law. 
 
V. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN US AND EU COMPANY LAW 
A. Internal and External Influences within the System 
Part IV examined the jurisdictional relationships that define legal functions.  The analysis was 
static in that it looked at the rule-giving bodies in each jurisdiction, the areas their respective powers 
cover, and the relative supremacy of each body.  This Part V will examine how the interaction of these 
jurisdictional  components has contributed to evolution of  company law in  the  US and EU  legal 
systems over time.  Actions in one jurisdiction cause reactions in other jurisdictions within the system.  
For example, if the upper level in a legal system orders a sub-unit to desist from regulating an entity 
based in another  sub-unit, this opens the field to competition between the entity forms from the 
various sub-units.  On the other hand, if the upper level imposes its own rules on such entities, the 
uniformity of rules within the  overall  system excludes  sub-unit competition.  In this way,  the 
development of the system as a whole depends on the forces exercised on each system component.  
The  legal  nature of the jurisdictions and their sub-units as described in Part IV sets the  legally 
permissible  boundaries for this interaction (e.g., the US federal government will never command a 
state to implement a federal directive).  Here, the interaction itself will be examined with reference – 
but not detailed study – of the exogenous influences that set this system development into motion. 
The problem comparisons discussed in Part II.C neglected the importance of  some historical 
influences while over-emphasizing others.  In the example from the Origin Theorists, the presence of 
strong capital markets in the United States and the United Kingdom at the close of the 20
th Century is 
attributed to the presence of common law while the presence of weak capital markets in Continental 
Europe is attributed to the presence of civil law.  This theory was seen to have ignored: (i) the strong 
capital markets in Continental Europe before 1914, (ii) the destructive effects of two world wars on 
Continental Europe, (iii) the political effects of the Cold War on Continental Europe,  (iv) the 
stimulating effect of capital flight on US markets, and (v) the fact that differences between (rationalist) 
French culture and (empiricist) British culture run much deeper and wider than differences in the legal 
systems.  When a carefully researched understanding of relevant historical events is seen in the context Draft: February 12, 2008 
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of the legally p ossible jurisdictional actions and reactions,
324 the historical dimension of legal 
development can be more fully understood. 
This Part will discuss the main pressures working to form the development of company law in 
the United States and Europe  by examining jurisdictional interaction on the historical axis.  Major 
political events  earlier during the century, such as the world wars and the Cold War, as discussed 
carefully by Roe in his critique of the Origin Theorists, will be referred to only parenthetically, and 
emphasis will be placed on the influence of jurisdictional interactions  – regulatory competition, 
planned harmonization, and market-led convergence  –  which during recent decades have exercised 
great influence.  As this paper attempts to offer a framework for comparing the company laws of 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Delaware, it will try to isolate similarities and differences in the 
systematic interaction of  the  jurisdictions  within the European Union and the United States as 
discussed in the foregoing Part IV. 
B. US Corporate Law: the Forces of Regulatory Competition 
1. A history of gradual growth 
As c orporate law in the United States  developed  in an essentially British society  (which 
excluded the native North Americans) after the close of the colonial period, it did not suffer anything 
like  transplant effects, and  the distance between  the United States  and Europe also kept the United 
States mostly free of foreign invasion, the imposition of foreign law and the destruction of property 
through warfare.
325  Corporate law developed side-by-side with the US economy, at first gradually and 
then rapidly towards the turn of the century.  Early corporations were specially chartered by state 
governments and often provided  services  on a monopoly basis  that  a government itself might have 
traditionally provided.
326  The first enabling statute for business corporations, entitled a law "relative 
to incorporations for Manufacturing purposes," was enacted by the State of New York in 1811,
327 and 
similar enabling statutes gradually replaced special chartering as a basis for incorporation.  From a 
comparative point of view, it is particularly meaningful that at the very outset of corporate activity, the 
US Supreme Court  held corporate charters to be constitutionally protected contracts vested  with 
                                                   
324   The importance of the legal framework of course depends on the nature of the historical event.  Reactions 
to economic boom or bust will likely be kept within the constitutionally permissible framework whist 
reactions to war and revolution might very well sweep such framework aside. 
325   The major exception to this peaceful growth was the US Civil War between 1861 and 1865, which left the 
US South largely destroyed and under the administration of an occupation army. The great 
industrialization and growth in financial markets at the eve of the 20
th Century mostly bypassed this area. 
See KENNEDY, supra note 114, at 18. 
326   See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 130 (3
rd ed. 2005). 
327   See Id. at 134 Draft: February 12, 2008 
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protection from arbitrary state interference, thus ensuring private corporations a strong position under 
the law.
328 
The development of corporation law during the latter half of the 19
th Century was marked by 
increasing flexibility and liberalization,  with a growing latitude for management decisions.
329  The 
gradual changes in attitudes towards corporations and business were accompanied by positive attitudes 
towards securities dealing,  which  gradually overcame opinions  that sought to restrict  speculation in 
securities as  an unproductive activity giving rise to deceit.
330  It will be remembered that a US 
corporation's "internal affairs" are governed by the laws of the state of its incorporation regardless of 
where it bases its center of administration.  In the late 1890's a number of states began to compete for 
tax revenue by fashioning their corporate laws to attract promoters planning to incorporate new 
companies and managers who might decide to reincorporate an existing company  in a different 
state.
331  The State of Delaware joined this race after the future US president, Woodrow Wilson, who 
was then governor of the  leading corporate charter state,  New Jersey, amended the New Jersey 
corporate statute to make it less business friendly,
332 which resulted in many New Jersey corporations 
reincorporating in Delaware, and began Delaware's climb towards  the top  of  the corporate law 
market.
333  This "regulatory competition" for corporate charters has been  a primary engine of 
development for corporate law until today.  The debate on whether such competition creates the best 
law for society, whether it is a race to the "bottom"
334 or the "top",
335 is still ongoing. 
2.  A systemic balance of state and federal law 
Regardless of which direction regulatory competition leads, it is a fact of system dynamics that 
the more corporate law that is enacted by an authority with jurisdiction over the entire territory (here, 
the federal government), the less matters the territorial sub-units (here, the states) will have on which 
they can distinguish themselves and compete.  An increase in the amount of corporate law found at the 
federal  level  thus leads to a decrease in competition among  laws at  the state  level.  As discussed 
above, the federal government has largely avoided regulating corporate "internal affairs".  Congress 
has historically entered the field of company law only after economic and political shocks convinced a 
significant portion of the national population that state law had failed to prevent insiders from 
                                                   
328   See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819). 
329   See FRIEDMAN, supra note 326, at 395 et seq. and Bratton & McCahery, supra note 292, at 627 et seq. 
330   See BANNER, supra note 203, at 198 et seq. 
331   See FRIEDMAN, supra note 326, at 399.  
332   Bratton & McCahery, supra note 292, at 629. 
333   Bratton & McCahery, supra note 292, at 626 et seq. 
334   See Cary, supra note 323. 
335   See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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deceiving outside investors.  Thus intervention of the federal government has not eliminated the 
"equilibrium" of regulatory competition between the states because it has restrained itself from 
straying too far from mere disclosure rules, and reacted only when its hand was forced by events.
336   
During the period of the great "trusts", such as Standard Oil, and their abuses that marked the 
end of the 19
th century, the federal government seriously considered replacing the state corporate 
statutes with federal law, but the project eventually lost momentum in light of more active antitrust 
prosecution.
337  After the stock market crash of 1929 and the severe economic depression that 
followed, the federal government entered the securities field in force with the Securities Act, the 
Exchange Act (which created the SEC), the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
338 the Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
339  In 
2002, following the revelation of serious accounting misrepresentations by major corporations such as 
Enron and WorldCom, and the collapse of the stock markets, the federal government enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  This Act sought to reinforce the existing system of disclosure by decreasing 
conflicts of interest, increasing accountability, and  adding new types of  disclosures.  Conflicts of 
interest were reduced by strictly controlling the services that auditors could provide to the companies 
they audit,
340 by inserting an audit committee composed of independent directors into the boards of 
listed companies,
341 and by flatly outlawing company loans to directors.
342  These were  clear 
incursions into the internal affairs of the regulated companies, but were incursions related to the 
overall disclosure system.  Disclosures were improved by imposing internal checks on the creation of 
disclosure documents (i.e., accounts) and the persons who were responsible for their preparation.  
Accountability was increased by requiring chief operating officers and chief financial officers to 
personally sign required disclosures and attest to the accuracy and completeness of their contents 
subject to civil and criminal liability.
343   
With regard to the federal element in the regulatory competition system, it will be remembered 
that bankruptcy law, certain provisions of which serve capital maintenance functions, is federal law,
344 
                                                   
336   Bratton & McCahery, supra note 292, at 619 et seq. 
337   Lawrence E. Mitchell, "The Creation of American Corporate Capitalism:  The First Public Response – 
The Seeds  of a Legislative Solution," pp. 13  et seq. (2004), available from SSRN a t 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=586184. 
338   The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79-79z-6 (2000). 
339   The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (2000). 
340   §§ 201-202 SOA. 
341   § 301 SOA. 
342   § 402 SOA. 
343   §§ 302 and 904 SOA. 
344   Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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and fraudulent conveyances are regulated by a state law usually modeled on the NCCUSL's Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act.    Nevertheless, even when one  takes into account the federal elements 
discussed above, the degree of freedom left to the state corporate statute is still significantly higher 
than what is left to EU member states.  For listed companies, however, the detailed, mandatory listing 
requirements may bring the respective amounts of breathing room more or less into alignment. 
The initial and continued listing requirements of  US  securities exchanges  are indeed quite 
extensive, and before the 1930's, they attempted to serve the investor protection function later 
performed by the securities laws and federal rules.
345 They cover a broad range of matters, from the 
"internal" composition of a company's board
346 and transactions that must be put to the shareholders 
for approval,
347 to the "external" provision of information to the public,
348 to minimum requirements 
for total assets and the required public dispersion of the company's shares.
349  These requirements are 
contractual conditions to a company's listing on a given exchange, and a serious violation of these 
conditions can lead to a company being expelled from the market through involuntary de-listing.
350  
These requirements thus tend to be pervasive and mandatory, and thus further reduce the range of 
possible competition between the laws of individual states. 
3.  Outreach statutes and foreign corporations 
The relationships among the US states in the area of company law offer interesting opportunities 
for comparison with similar relationships in the European Union.  Because US state law in this area 
exists in the shadow of federal power to regulate interstate commerce, the states in their dealings with 
each other may not enter an area preempted by federal law or unduly impede interstate activity.
351  
Courts have sought a balance between a state's reserved and traditional  powers to police business 
within its borders and its obligations under the Constitution.  This tension arises in the problem of 
"foreign" and "pseudo-foreign" corporations.  The term "foreign corporation" is used to denote a 
company established and existing under the laws of a jurisdiction, whether that of a foreign country or 
                                                   
345   See Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 92, at 34 et seq. (giving a comparative analysis 
of the shareholder protection provided by the securities exchanges and describing their function in the 
history of shareholder protection), and Robert B. Thompson,  Collaborative Corporate Governance: 
Listing Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 972 (2003) (noting 
that NYSE rules against watered stock had been in force for members since 1869). 
346   See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 279, at para. 303A.01 et seq. 
347   See Id. at para. 312.03. 
348   See Id. at para. 202.00 et seq. 
349   See Id. at para. 101.01. For an analysis of the NYSE listing process and requirements, see Michael 
Gruson, Andrew B. Jánszky, Jonathan M. Weld, Issuance and Listing of Securities by Foreign Banks and 
the U.S. Securities Laws, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner, eds. 4
th 
ed. 2005). 
350   See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 279, at para. 8. 
351   See Edgar, 457 U.S. 624 and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Draft: February 12, 2008 
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another state of the United States, other than the state in which it is doing business.
352  Although the 
term "pseudo-foreign" corporation is not found in statutes, the legal literature uses it to designate a 
corporation that although incorporated elsewhere, has most of its shareholders and business activity in 
the host state.  Most states require merely that a foreign corporation register with the state and provide 
an in-state agent who can be served with process papers if a judicial action is filed against the foreign 
corporation.
353 Some states, however, apply significant parts of their own corporate statutes to pseudo-
foreign corporations.  For example, California applies rules regarding the election of directors 
(including by cumulative voting), their duties, and the participation of shareholders in the company to 
any corporation that is not listed on a national stock exchange if over half of its shareholders of record 
have California addresses and the company's payroll is mainly paid in the state.
354  New York requires 
the same type of foreign corporations (i.e., unlisted companies with significant operations in the state) 
to provide information to shareholders and applies New York law to actions against and liability of 
company directors.
355 
The power that states have to impose such requirements on corporations formed under the law 
of another state has not been clearly defined,
356 but is considered to be extensive. A state may 
completely ban foreign corporations from operating within state territory,
357 but may not deprive such 
corporations of their constitutional rights or interfere with interstate commerce (thus foreign 
corporations retain the right to do business through state territory).
358  There is no authoritative federal 
court decision on whether a state may regulate the internal affairs of a corporation in the manner done 
by the laws of California and New York, although there has been considerable speculation on the 
matter.
359  Aside from a finding that such statutes interfere with interstate commerce or are preempted 
                                                   
352   See e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 371(a) and § 1.40(10) RMBCA. 
353   See e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 371(b) and § 15.03(a) RMBCA. 
354   § 2115 California Corporations Code. 
355   §§ 1315-1320 New York Business Corporation Law. 
356   See remarks of Prof. John C. Coffee, Jr., John C. Coffee, Jr., in John C. Coffee, Jr., et al. Symposium: The 
Direction of Corporate Law: The Scholar's Perspective, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 103 (1999).  One of the 
most detailed analyses of this state-to-state relationship has been written in German.  See STEFAN KLEIN, 
DIE RECHTSSTELLUNG AUSWÄRTIGER GESELLSCHAFTEN IM DEUTSCHEN UND US-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT 
(2004). 
357   See FLETCHER (2005), at § 8386, and 36 AM. JUR. 2
D FOREIGN CORPORATIONS § 182 (2001), and also see 
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931) and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, 
Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 279 (1961). 
358   See e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 56 S.Ct. 611 (1936); Furst v. Brewster, 282 
U.S. 493, 51 S.Ct. 295 (1931); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460, 49 S.Ct. 204 (1929); 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORP. Foreign Corporations § 8388 (2005); and 36 AM. J UR. 2
D  
F OREIGN CORPORATIONS § 192 (2001). 
359   See  Richard M. Buxbaum,  The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in 
Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L R EV. 29 (1987); Willis L.M. Reese & Edmund M. Kaufman, The Law 
Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Colum. L. Rev. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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by an expanding federal regulation of corporations,
360 there is little constitutional basis for challenging 
the statutes.  First, a principal constitutional tool for guaranteeing  the citizens of one state certain 
freedoms and rights in another state, the "privileges and immunities clause" of the US Constitution,
361 
has been held not to apply to corporations.
362  Second, no federal decision has authoritatively applied 
another potentially applicable constitutional provision, the "full faith and credit clause,"
363 to guarantee 
that the structure of internal affairs governance of a corporation created in one state be respected in 
such form in another state.
364  It is important for this question that pseudo-foreign corporation laws of 
the type used in California have already existed without significant challenge for about 50 years, 
making it unlikely that they would be struck down on any ground other than federal preemption – if 
federal rules on internal affairs continue to expand as they have in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and in the 
very unlikely event that they would apply to unlisted companies.  Given that state courts do not have 
ultimate authority in matters of federal constitutional law, the predictable assertions of authority that 
have been made by the Delaware and California courts should not be given undue weight on this 
issue.
365 
Therefore, although cases addressing possible conflicts between  federal  and state law have 
stressed that because corporations are "creatures of the states," state law should be given considerable 
deference in questions of internal affairs,
366 this does not necessarily mean that such deference must be 
given in equal degree if there is a conflict between two  states with regard to "foreign" corporations 
                                                                                                                                                               
1118 (1958); Donald C. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A 
Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1987), and KLEIN (2004), 
at 360 et seq.  
360   On this question, see Langevoort, The Supreme Court, supra note 359, at 110 et seq. 
361   U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States."). 
362   See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839), discussed in GEVURTZ, supra note 153, at 37-38, and 
Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 US 181, 8 S Ct 7 (1888). 
363   U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State."). 
364   For a thorough, recent discussion (in German), see KLEIN (2004), at 383 et seq. and for older treatment by 
US scholars,  see  Buxbaum,  supra note  359, at 43  et seq. and Reese & Kaufman,  supra note  359, 
generally. 
365   See Draper v. Paul N. Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A.2d 859, 665-66 (1993) (In a case involving a 
Delaware corporation doing business primarily in California, it was necessary to decide whether 
California or Delaware law controlled the standard for dismissing a derivative suit filed by a shareholder, 
and the Delaware Supreme Court found that the matter was governed by Delaware law, asserting that 
application of the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by constitutional principles, except in "the rarest 
situations.")  The courts of California, on the other hand, have approved imposing their cumulative voting 
provisions on pseudo-foreign corporations (Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 
216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1982)), and applied conflicting, Californian rules on shareholder information 
rights to Delaware corporations (Valtz v. Penta Investment Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983)). 
366   See CTS, 481 U.S. at 86, and Green, 430 U.S. at 479. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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that base their operations in the host state.  This has led the states to adopt provisions on "foreign" 
corporations that vary in the requirements that they impose on such companies.  As will become clear 
in Part V.B, US states have a considerably freer hand than their EU member state counterparts under 
the decisions of the ECJ in regulating the presence of "foreign" corporations doing business on their 
soil.
367  Nevertheless, given the degree to which company law has – and is still being – harmonized 
throughout the European Union, the "threat", if any,  that  foreign companies  pose  to host member 
states is probably smaller than what might be imagined in the United States. 
4.  A foreseeable future of stable development 
In the United States, the comparatist can look back on a 200 year history of company law that 
has not been significantly interrupted by war or tumultuous ideological turnarounds.  The long-term 
trend  has been  for authority to  gradually  pass from the states to the federal g overnment.  States, 
originally held back by various cultural, economic and political forces, entered the fray to compete for 
franchise revenues by  loosening their grip on companies until abuses  and market breakdowns 
provoked federal action, such as the "trust busting" at the turn of the 20
th Century, the enactment of the 
securities laws in the 1930's, the various amendments and rules added to the latter over the decades, 
and most recently the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  Professors William W. Bratton and Joseph A. 
McCahery see "no political incentives that might encourage federal micromanagement of the charter 
market."  They observe:  "Failing that, corporate federalism remains robust, so long as the federal 
government and stock exchanges continue to refrain from allocating to themselves so much subject 
matter as to cause Delaware's customers to question the efficacy of their rent payments."
368  Along 
these lines, t he  future shape of US company law will  likely  be decided by  a combination of  the 
stability of the securities markets and the popular weight of the respective arguments for and against 
state chartering.  Those arguments may well be led in person or by the intellectual successors of Prof. 
Lucien A. Bebchuk in one corner and Prof. Roberta Romano in the other.  Romano has convincingly 
argued that market forces lead the way to higher quality law: 
[T]he diffusion of corporate law reform initiatives across the states  [leads to] . . . 
experimental variation regarding the statutory form thought to be best suited for handling 
a particular problem, followed by a majority of states eventually settling upon one format. 
. . . The dynamic production of corporation laws exemplifies how federalism's delegation 
of a body of law to the states can create an effective laboratory for experimentation and 
innovation. . . . Innovation enhances revenues from charter fees and the local corporate 
bar's income from servicing local clients.
369 
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Nevertheless, Bebchuk has countered that  such market forces are driven by the interests of the 
constituencies in control of corporations, not by the general good:  
[There is a] divergence between the interests of managers and controlling shareholders 
and the interests of public shareholders. . . . managers may well seek, and states in turn 
may well provide, rules that . . . serve the private interests of managers and controlling 
shareholders. . . . states seeking to attract incorporations have an incentive to focus on the 
interests of shareholders and managers, they will tend to ignore the interests  of other 
parties. As a result, state competition may well produce undesirable rules whenever 
significant externalities are present.
370 
This argument is unlikely to be settled in the near future.  The  comparative view  from Europe, 
however, is  relatively clear.  It is safe to say that the manner in which the  US  states  and federal 
government have engaged in and reacted to diversity in company law among the individual states and 
the need to develop uniform r ules has been and will continue to be  markedly different  from the 
process in Europe.  
C. Company Law in Europe: Integration by Chance and by Choice 
1.  Historical influences preceding EU market integration 
In 1811, as New York was adopting the first US corporate law statute, the Duke of Wellington 
was in Portugal fighting armies allied with Napoleon Bonaparte, who controlled most of Continental 
Europe.
371  As would be the case for many wars to come, the financing for the military campaigns 
waged from Brittany to Moscow was arranged in London, and it was at this time that the Rothschild 
brothers began their banking career by channeling currency to the Duke of Wellington and transferring 
subsidy payments from London to Britain's various European allies.
372  Thus, although Britain was 
deeply involved in a number of major conflicts that had a much lesser effect on the United States, 
these conflicts tended to strengthen its centrality as a corporate and financial center.  Indeed, in a first 
of many transactions to come, the Rothschild brothers arranged a Sterling denominated bond issue for 
war torn Prussia in 1818, creating what Prof. Niall Ferguson calls a "watershed in the history of the 
European capital market . . . . [a] deliberate Anglicisation of a foreign loan . . . a new departure for the 
international capital market."
373    Such developments solidified and further developed corporate and 
financial structures that had been originally devised in the British overseas trading companies like the 
Massachusetts Bay Company and the  East India Company,
374 and thus neither British  markets nor 
                                                   
370   Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1509 (1992). 
371   Richard Holmes, "Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of," in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MILITARY 
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British company law was affected by the kind of devastating shocks that Roe describes in his article 
discussed in Part II.C, above. 
Germany had a very different experience.  Following the French occupation referred to above, 
the gradual unification of the German states, which was greatly accelerated and completed by Otto von 
Bismarck in 1871,
375 roughly coincided with the adoption of the first German Stock Corporation Act 
in 1870,
376 which was an enabling statue rather than a system of concessions.
377  Prof. Alfred Chandler 
has compared this period to a similar industrial expansion and search for corporate vehicles that could 
amass large quantities of capital taking  place in the United States.
378  Thereafter, however, any 
comparison with either the United States or the United Kingdom is impossible.  No country 
experienced greater swings of events, legislation and ideology in the 20
th Century than Germany.  In 
1914, German stock markets boasted more listed companies than the United States.
379  Yet during a 
mere thirty years from 1919 to 1949, the German state abruptly jolted through five forms of 
government: from a monarchy to a democracy to a Nazi dictatorship,
380 and then split into two separate 
governments, one democratic and the other communist.
381  As Nazi i deology came to dominate 
Germany, legal scholars advocated the idea of having a strong leader (a Führer) on company boards, 
and the position of a Chairman/CEO who could override the will of his board was introduced into the 
Aktiengesetz in 1937.
382  Following the Second World War, US and British occupation forces  also 
advocated changes to German company law in the image of their own laws, such as by introducing 
registered shares,
383  and when occupation was finished, Germany set out to create one of the most 
labour-friendly company laws in history.
384  Following the Cold War, Germany essentially adopted an 
                                                   
375   See LOTHAR GALL, BISMARCK, DER WEIßE REVOLUTIONÄR 449 et seq. (2001). 
376   This was the first German corporate statute mainly because Germany as a state was just coming into 
existence.  The first corporate statute in Germany was the Prussian statute, which existed since 1848.  See 
THEODOR  BAUMS ( ed.),  GESETZ ÜBER DIE  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT FÜR DIE  KÖNIGLICH  PREUßISCHEN 
STAATEN VOM 9. NOVEMBER 1843 (1981). 
377   See Semler, supra note 124, at Intro., margin no. 21. 
378   ALFRED CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 428 et seq. (1990). 
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FINANCIAL SYSTEM 425, 426 (Jan Pieter Krahnen & Reinhard H. Schmidt, eds. 2003). 
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entire framework of securities and takeover legislation
385 and amended its corporate law significantly 
as recommended by a panel of experts to bring it in line with international best practice,
386 which was 
often quite similar to US practice.  Extreme currents of history no longer buffet Germany, and it is 
reasonable to assume that in the foreseeable future the development of German company law will be 
influenced most by the integration of the European and world markets and actions taken through or 
together with the European Union. 
2. Market integration from harmonization to competition 
Part IV.A explained  in some detail  how European  directives  shaped the company laws 
legislation of the member states beginning in  1968.  This program has substantially harmonized the 
laws governing public companies and created a system of securities laws that is nearly identical across 
the Union.  About the time that this drive to harmonization was beginning to wane, a new preference 
for home country rule and subsidiarity came upon Europe,
387 partly from the judicial initiative of the 
ECJ,
388 and partly in connection with the politics of introducing majority rule through  the Single 
European Act.
389 The harmonization process stopped.  However, a series of ECJ decisions beginning 
in 1999 and decided on the basis of the right of establishment guaranteed companies in Articles 43 and 
48 of the EC Treaty made deep cuts into the national company laws of the member states, including 
Germany.  As the substance of public companies, particularly the creation and maintenance of their 
capital, has been harmonized, the relevant cases arose in respect of private companies.   
                                                                                                                                                               
384   The  Law on Co-Determination of Employees in the Supervisory Boards and Management Boards of 
Enterprises Engaged in the Mining Iron and Steel Industries was adopted in 1951, the Works Constitution 
Act was adopted in 1952 and the Co-Determination Act of 1976 was adopted in that year.  See a brief 
discussion of co-determination in Part III.A, above. 
385   The Securities Trading Act was adopted in 1994, the Securities Prospectus Act was adopted in 1998, the 
Takeover Act was adopted in 2001, and the Exchange Act was thoroughly reformed in 2002. 
386   See  THEODOR  BAUMS, ed., B ERICHT DER  REGIERUNGSKOMMISSION  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE: 
UNTERNEHMENSFÜHRUNG, U NTERNEHMENSKONTROLLE, M ODERNISIERUNG DES AKTIENRECHTS (REPORT 
OF THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE) (2001).  
387   See Timmermans, supra note 219, at 626 et seq. and Grundmann, supra note 219, at 617, arguing that the 
principle of home rule is essentially disclosure or information-oriented in nature. 
388   A major breakthrough in the philosophy of home country rule came in the famous  Cassis de Dijon 
movement of goods case, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
[1979] ECR 649. 
389   The "Single European Act" was a political commitment signed in 1986 to create a single, integrated 
European market ("an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured") by 1992.  Among other things, it introduced voting by qualified majority 
on a number of matters that had  required unanimity and were consequently deadlocked, addressed 
increased cooperation as a monetary union, and gave more power to the European Parliament.  See CRAIG 
& DE BÚRCA, supra note 6, at 12 et seq. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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In Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen,
390 the ECJ found that Denmark must allow a 
UK private limited company freely to establish itself in its territory, even if Danish citizens used the 
company for the sole purpose of evading Denmark's stricter laws on capital adequacy and conducted 
none of the company's business in the United Kingdom.
391  In Überseering BV v Nordic Construction 
Company Baumanagement GmbH,
392 the ECJ found Germany's conflict of laws rules as they had been 
applied to a Dutch company to impede freedom of establishment.  Unlike the United States, which 
applies the "incorporation theory,"
393 meaning that the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by 
the laws of its state of incorporation, Germany has traditionally applied the "real seat" (or siège réel) 
theory, meaning that the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the laws of the state where it 
has its center of administration.
394  The application of the real seat theory to a Dutch company whose 
shares came to be owned by Germans and which was operated in Germany, resulted in the German 
courts applying German law to the company, finding that it was not properly constituted and registered 
as a German corporation, and then denying it the legal capacity to sue in a court of law.
395  The ECJ, 
following its decision in Centros, found that denying a company duly formed in another member state 
legal capacity to be party to legal proceedings was "tantamount to an outright negation of the freedom 
of establishment conferred on companies by Articles 43 and 48" of the EC Treaty.
396  The Court 
rejected Germany's argument that application of its own company law to pseudo-foreign corporations 
was justified because it enhanced legal certainty, and the protection of creditors and minority 
shareholders.
397  It is unclear whether the  Überseering  decision has changed Germany's conflict of 
laws rules for corporations, the substantive law that results from their application, or both.
398  The seat 
theory will remain for companies incorporated outside of the European Union unless a friendship 
treaty applies,
399 or legislation currently being discussed in Germany to adopt the incorporation theory 
                                                   
390   Case No. C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-01459. 
391   Centros, [1999] ECR I-01459, at par. 39. 
392   Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH, [2002] ECR 
I-09919. 
393   SCOLES et. al., supra note 152, at § 23.2. 
394   See  Wulf-Henning Roth,  From Centros to Ueberseering: Free Movement of Companies, Private 
International Law, and Community Law, 52 ICLQ 175, 180-81 (2003), and SCOLES et. al., supra note 
152, at § 23.1.  According to Prof. Roth, the "center of administration" as understood in Germany is "the 
location where the internal management decisions are transformed into the day-to-day activities of a 
company." Id. at 181, citing the decision of the German High Federal Court reported in the German 
Federal Law Reporter on Civil Cases (BGHZ), vol. 97, p. 269, at 272. 
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also applies to non-EU companies.  In its next, major decision in this area, Kamer van Koophandel en 
Fabrieken voor Amsterdam and Inspire Art Ltd,
400 the ECJ held that a Dutch outreach statute against 
pseudo-foreign corporations was inconsistent with the EC Treaty.  The statute required the branches of 
companies incorporated abroad to make disclosures beyond those provided for in the Eleventh 
Company Law directive, and imposed unlimited liability as a penalty for a failure to comply with 
these and other requirements, such as a minimum capital requirement.
401  From the perspective of a 
comparative analysis with US federalism, the Inspire Art decision is interesting in that it is based both 
on freedom of establishment (which is not guaranteed for companies by the US Constitution),
402 and 
the theory that member state action has been expressly preempted by an EU directive,
403 which is the 
strongest theory for invalidating state law under the US Constitution. 
Under the ECJ decisions in the cases such as Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art, member 
state laws will be unlawful if they burden the freedom of establishment of a company formed under 
the laws of another member state, unless the laws of the host state remain with the criteria set forth in 
Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, which require that the law 
be: 
•  applied in a non-discriminatory manner,  
•  justified by imperative requirements in the public interest,  
•  suitable for securing  the attainment of the objective which they pursue, and  
•  not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.
404 
The vertical impact of these decisions is to apply a clear principle of supremacy of EU law over 
member state national company law, and the horizontal impact is to create standards that a member 
state may use in assessing the permissibility of the impact of its company law and related legislation 
may have  on companies formed under the law of another member state.  One clear rule from the 
decisions is that although member states may protect themselves from fraudulent actions by foreign 
companies, the deliberate use of a system of company law that relies on disclosure, especially one 
                                                                                                                                                               
399   For example, the friendship and commerce treaty between the United States and Germany provides in 
Article VII that "[n]ationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded, within the territories of the 
other Party, national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial 
and other activity for gain, whether in a dependent or an independent capacity, and whether directly or by 
agent or through the medium of any form of lawful juridical entity. for the recognition of companies and 
their right to enter and trade in the jurisdiction."  Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 
14, 1956, U.S.- Germany, art. VII, 7 U.S.T. 1839. 
400   Inspire Art [2003] ECR I-10155. 
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found in the First and Eleventh Company Law Directives, rather than legal capital, to protect creditors 
does not constitute such fraudulent action.
405 
3. A curious twist for EU securities law 
Especially from a comparative point of view, EU securities law currently offers an interesting 
chance for observation.  A securities exchange is essentially an organized market with specific rules 
for entry, and these rules apply only to persons participating in or listed on the market.  This "market 
oriented" logic  is the foundation for the theory on the "bonding" function of dual listing
406 and has 
traditionally governed rules for applying securities law.
407  The applicability of a nation's securities 
laws is usually determined by a trader's or a vendor's entrance into that nation's territory or market.  
The US Regulation S,
408 for example, takes the rational step to remove sales of securities from US 
supervision if no offers or sales are made to persons in the United States and the US market is not 
conditioned for sales of the securities through "directed selling efforts" in the United States.
409  Unlike 
the rules governing a corporation's "internal affairs"  – which under the incorporation theory are 
derived from the state of incorporation and travel with the corporation wherever it goes – the rules 
applicable to the sale of securities had been derived from the place of sale.  However, in an interesting 
twist that locks securities law and company law together, the EU Transparency Directive has turned 
this traditional rule around with respect at least to disclosure rules.  Under the title "Integration of 
securities markets," Article 3 of that Directive provides: 
1.  The home Member State may make an issuer subject to requirements more stringent 
than those laid down in this Directive. The home Member State may also make a holder 
of shares . . .  subject to requirements more stringent than those laid down in  this 
Directive. 
2.  A host Member State may not . . .  as regards the admission of securities to a regulated 
market  in its territory, impose disclosure requirements more stringent  than those laid 
down in this Directive or in Article 6 of [the Market Abuse Directive].
410 
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For EU issuers of equity securities, the "home member state" is the state of its registered office,
411 
which would be the state of incorporation.  As a result, EU issuers will carry  any disclosure 
obligations exceeding the EU floor with them regardless of the market on which their securities are 
traded.  This reverses the traditional choice of law rule for securities regulation, advances the need to 
consider a venue for listing to the time of incorporating the company, and adds an element that will be 
taken into consideration in regulatory competition between member states.  As Prof. Eilís Ferran has 
observed, this regime removes competition with  respect to home state issuers because they will be 
locked into any higher standard of disclosure, but could exactly for this reason create a flight to re-
incorporate in states where securities regulators have the strongest reputations.
412  Depending on 
whether private remedies seeking civil liability in connection with securities fraud are codified within 
securities laws themselves or in general remedies for misrepresentation or fraud, differences in such 
remedies (potential plaintiffs or defendants, standards of culpability, or matters of proof and causation) 
could reinforce or counteract this migratory pressure.  Following a detailed survey of EU securities 
legislation in connection with provisions on applicable law, Professors Luca Enriques and Tobias H. 
Tröger conclude that considerable latitude for regulatory arbitrage exists in Europe "with regard to the 
regime of private liability for false statements in disclosure documents, the public administration and 
enforcement of securities laws in general, and less densely harmonized takeover law."
413  Regulatory 
competition in European securities law could thus contribute more to future competition for company 
charters than the differences in corporate law statutes. 
This type of competition may also add diversity to markets.  Under the Transparency Directive a 
company incorporated in Germany and listed on the London Stock Exchange will under UK law be 
subjected to rules no stricter than the those provided for by the European Community, but if Germany 
were to impose stricter rules on its own companies, the stock of the German company could compete 
against that of the UK companies on the UK market.  This could potentially have an effect similar to 
market segments, such as the LSE's "Main Market" and AIM (Alternative Investment Market),
414 or 
Frankfurt's "prime standard."
415  By allowing securities to fly different national flags that can legally 
signal stricter governance, securities regulation and stock exchange rules in Europe could – rather than 
levelling regulatory competition as in the United States – actually increase it.  This would offer new 
possibilities for states to compete in the charter market while all but eliminating competition between 
national exchanges. 
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4. A future for regulatory competition of corporate law in Europe? 
By rolling back the member state regulation of foreign corporations affecting freedom of 
establishment, the ECJ opened the gates to significant regulatory competition  of company law.  
Indeed,  as discussed above,  scholarly speculation  in recent years has  focused  only  on  whether the 
motivational and legal conditions for regulatory competition exist in Europe,
416 not on the legality of 
the competition itself.  Disclosure and securities fraud regimes could provide such a motive.  For the 
private companies addressed by the recent ECJ decisions,  however, as  Prof.  Theodor Baums,  a 
member of the European Commission’s advisory group of non-governmental  experts on corporate 
governance and company law, has  observed,  even though the Commission is moving away  from 
harmonized regulation,
417 the proposed creation of a European Private Company "could well take the 
form of a regulation so as to create a true organizational form that can be used in all member state."
418 
The existence of such an entity under EU law would greatly reduce incentives for state competition 
among private companies.  For public companies, a European task force set out in 2007 to create a 
"European Model Company Law Act" comparable to the US Model Business Corporation Act.
419 Such 
a model act would offer member states a chance voluntarily to harmonize that part of company law 
which has not already been shaped by directives and the decisions of the ECJ.  Especially for the 
newer and smaller member states, this type of pre-packaged legal expertise could prove extremely 
attractive.
420  Given the currently foreseeable range of  technical  possibilities in company law,  the 
pressure of internationally active investors to seek ever-increasing uniformity in securities regulation, 
the possible introduction of an EPC, and the creation of a European Model Company Act, the space 
for competitive signaling will likely become even smaller than it is now.  However, as it has in the 
past, competition can always still arise in connection with unforeseen innovations, and the possibility 
of flagged securities competing on a single exchange  – thus replicating the work done by market 
segments with different listing standards  – is  a very interesting development.  None of these 
possibilities should be excluded by the comparatist examining company law in the European Union. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to provide guidance in approaching comparative company law.  It 
identifies some common errors that occur in comparative law, offers some guidelines to help avoid 
such errors, and provides a framework for entering into studies of the company laws of three major 
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(March 2007), at 9 et seq. 
418   Id. at 16.  
419   See Theodor Baums, The European Model Company Law Act Project, [available currently in German as 
ILF Working Paper no. 75, January 2008] (2008). 
420   Id. at [5]. Draft: February 12, 2008 
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jurisdictions.  Part I discusses some of the problems that can arise in comparative law and offers a few 
points of caution.  These approach coordinates aspire to be useful for practical, theoretical and applied 
(legislative) comparative law.  Part II  presents some  relatively famous,  concrete examples of 
comparative analysis gone astray, and the debate they generated, in order to demonstrate the utility of 
heeding  the a pproach coordinates.  It further explains how "anecdotal" comparisons, simplified or 
deductive comparisons and comparisons with strong prejudices yield little knowledge about the legal 
systems they analyze.  Part III provides an example of using functional definition to demarcate the 
area to be compared, here, "company law", offering an "effects test" to determine whether a given 
provision of law should be considered as functionally part of the rules that govern  the core 
characteristics of companies.  It does this by presenting the relevant company law statutes and related 
topical laws of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, using Delaware as a proxy for 
the 50 states.  Part IV analyzes the field of functions that comprises "company law" in the United 
States and the European Union.  It selects as the predominant factor for consideration the jurisdictions, 
sub-jurisdictions and rule-making entities  that have legislative  or rule-making competence  in the 
relevant territorial unit, analyzes the extent of their power, presents the type of law (rules) they enact 
(issue), and discusses the concrete manner in which the laws and rules of the jurisdictions and sub-
jurisdictions  can  legally  interact.  Part V looks at the way these  jurisdictions  do  interact  on  the 
temporal axis of history, that is, their actual influence on each other, which in the relevant jurisdictions 
currently takes the form of regulatory competition and legislative harmonization.  An understanding of 
the type of historical development a  particular jurisdiction has experienced and is currently living 
clarifies not only possible causal connections between legislative changes and changes in legal 
systems, but gives a better insight into how the respective countries and jurisdictions can be usefully 
compared.  This Part concludes with the finding that a mild form of regulatory competition can be 
expected to characterize the development of company law in the United States and that a judicially led 
opening of competition may be tempered by an increasing uniformity in company vehicles, although 
the future competition of various national securities on a single securities market presents interesting 
possibilities in Europe. 
This paper  would give an explanatory framework that can be filled in with more detailed 
analysis.  The potential influence of certain constituencies on the bodies responsible for certain types 
of rules in each jurisdiction and the effects of linking an ever-greater number of sub-jurisdictions 
within inter- or supranational frameworks are examples of such detailed analysis.  Economic, 
historical and political  studies, in particular, would have to accompany any conclusions worked out 
within the framework presented.  This paper offers an "approach" to comparative company law that 
can also serve as an "introduction" to comparing the company laws of the United Kingdom, the United Draft: February 12, 2008 
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States and Germany.  As is the task of scholarship generally, it hopes to clear the way for future 
progress in the field.  As information on foreign law is sometimes rather difficult to find, it also 
attempts to provide as much detailed information as possible in its analysis of US, German and UK 
law. I 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
1  Andreas Cahn     Verwaltungsbefugnisse der Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht im Übernahmerecht und 
Rechtsschutz Betroffener 
(publ. in: ZHR 167 [2003], 262 ff.) 
 
2  Axel Nawrath     Rahmenbedingungen für den Finanzplatz Deutschland: Ziele 
und Aufgaben der Politik, insbesondere des 
Bundesministeriums der Finanzen 
 
3  Michael Senger    Die Begrenzung von qualifizierten Beteiligungen nach § 12 
     Abs. 1 KWG 
    (publ. in: WM 2003, 1697-1705) 
 
4  Georg Dreyling    Bedeutung internationaler Gremien für die Fortentwicklung 
     des Finanzplatzes Deutschland 
 
5  Matthias Berger    Das Vierte Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz – Schwerpunkt  
          Börsen- und Wertpapierrecht 
 
6  Felicitas Linden    Die europäische Wertpapierdienstleistungsrichtlinie-  
          Herausforderungen bei der Gestaltung der Richtlinie 
 
7  Michael Findeisen    Nationale und internationale Maßnahmen gegen die 
Geldwäsche und die Finanzierung des Terrorismus  – ein 
Instrument zur Sicherstellung der Stabilität der 
Finanzmärkte 
   
8  Regina Nößner    Kurs- und Marktpreismanipulation – Gratwanderung  
          zwischen wirtschaftlich sinnvollem und strafrechtlich  
          relevantem Verhalten 
 
9  Franklin R. Edwards    The Regulation of Hedge Funds: Financial Stability and  
          Investor Protection 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Hedge Funds, Risks and 
           Regulation, 2004, S. 30 ff.) 
 
10  Ashley Kovas     Should Hedge Fund Products be marketed to Retail  
          Investors? A balancing Act for Regulators 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Hedge Funds, Risks and 
           Regulation, 2004, S. 91 ff.) 
 
11  Marcia L. MacHarg    Waking up to Hedge Funds: Is U.S. Regulation Taking a 
   New Direction? 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Hedge Funds, Risks and 
           Regulation, 2004, S. 55 ff.) II 
 
 
12  Kai-Uwe Steck    Legal Aspects of German Hedge Fund Structures 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Hedge Funds, Risks and 
           Regulation, 2004, S. 135 ff.) 
 
13  Jörg Vollbrecht    Investmentmodernisierungsgesetz – Herausforderungen bei  
          der Umsetzung der OGAW – Richtlinien 
 
14  Jens Conert      Basel II – Die Überarbeitung der 
Eigenkapitalmarktregelungen der Kreditinstitute im Fokus 
von Wirtschaft- und Wettbewerbspolitik 
 
15  Bob Wessels      Germany and Spain lead Changes towards International  
          Insolvencies in Europe 
 
16  Theodor Baums /    Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate  
  Kenneth E. Scott    Governance in the United Stated and in Germany 
(publ. in: AmJCompL LIII (2005), Nr. 4, 31 ff.; abridged 
version in: Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Vol. 17 
(2005), Nr. 4, 44 ff.) 
 
17  Bob Wessels      International Jurisdiction to open Insovency Proceedings in 
Europe, in particular against (groups of) Companies 
 
18  Michael Gruson    Die Doppelnotierung von Aktien deutscher Gesellschaften 
an der New Yorker und Frankfurter Börse: Die sogenannte 
Globale Aktie 
(publ. in: Die AG 2004, 358 ff.) 
 
19   Michael Gruson    Consolidated and Supplemetary Supervision of Financial  
          Groups in the European Union 
          (publ. in: Der Konzern 2004, 65 ff. u. 249 ff.) 
 
20  Andreas Cahn     Das richterliche Verbot der Kreditvergabe an Gesellschafter  
          und seine Folgen 
          (publ. in: Der Konzern 2004, 235 ff.) 
 
21  David C. Donald    The Nomination of Directors under U.S. and German Law 
 
22  Melvin Aron Eisenberg  The Duty of Care in American Corporate Law 
          (deutsche Übersetzung publ. in: Der Konzern 2004, 386 ff.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 III 
 
 
23  Jürgen Than      Rechtsfragen bei der Festlegung von Emissionsbedingungen 
           für Schuldverschreibungen unter besonderer 
           Berücksichtigung der Dematerialisierung und des 
           Depotgesetzes 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Die Reform des  
          Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, S. 3 ff.) 
 
24  Philipp von Randow    Inhaltskontrolle von Emissionsbedingungen 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Die Reform des  
          Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, S. 25 ff.) 
 
25  Hannes Schneider    Die Änderung von Anleihebedingungen durch Beschluß der 
           Gläubiger 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Die Reform des  
          Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, S. 69 ff.) 
 
26  Hans-Gert Vogel    Die Stellung des Anleihetreuhänders nach deutschem Recht 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Die Reform des  
          Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, S. 94 ff.) 
 
27  Georg Maier-Reimer   Rechtsfragen der Restrukturierung, insbesondere der 
           Ersetzung des Schuldners 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Die Reform des  
          Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, S. 129 ff.) 
 
28  Christoph Keller    Umschuldung von Staatenanleihen unter Berücksichtigung 
           der Problematik einer Aggregation aller Anleihegläubiger 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Die Reform des  
          Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, S. 157 ff.) 
 
29  René Bösch      Die Emission von Schuldverschreibungen nach 
schweizerischem Recht  – ein Rechtsvergleich mit dem 
geplanten deutschen Schuldverschreibungsrecht 
(publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Die Reform des  
          Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, S. 189 ff.) 
 
30  Lachlan Burn     Bond Issues under U.K. law: How the proposed German 
     Legislation compares 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Die Reform des  
          Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, S. 219 ff.) 
 
31  Patrick S. Kenadjian    Bond Issues under New York and U.S. Law: Considerations 
           for the German Law Maker from a U.S. Perspective 
          (publ. in: Baums/Cahn [Hrsg.] Die Reform des  
          Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, S. 245 ff.) 
 IV 
 
 
32  Andreas Cahn     Bankgeheimnis und Forderungsverwertung 
          (publ. in: WM 2004, 2041 ff.) 
 
33  Michael Senger    Kapitalkonsolidierung im Bankkonzern 
          (publ. in: Der Konzern 2005, S. 201 ff.) 
 
34  Andreas Cahn     Das neue Insiderrecht  
          (publ. in: Der Konzern 2005, 5 ff.) 
 
35  Helmut Siekmann    Die Unabhängigkeit von EZB und Bundesbank nach dem 
       geltenden Recht und dem Vertrag über eine Verfassung für 
     Europa 
 
36  Michael Senger    Gemeinschaftsunternehmen nach dem Kreditwesengesetz 
 
37  Andreas Cahn     Gesellschafterfremdfinanzierung und Eigenkapitalersatz 
          (publ. in: Die AG 2005, S. 217 ff.) 
 
38  Helmut Siekmann    Die Verwendung des Gewinns der Europäischen 
           Zentralbank und der Bundesbank 
 
39  Guido Ferrarini    Contract Standards and the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID): An Assessment of the Lamfalussy 
Regulatory Architecture 
(publ. in: European Contract Law Review 2005, p. 19) 
 
40  David C. Donald    Shareholder Voice and Its Opponents  
          (publ. in: The Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Vol. 5,  
          Issue 2, 2005) 
 
41  John Armour      Who should make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus 
           Regulatory Competition 
          (publ. in: 58 Current Legal Problems [2005], p. 369 ff.) 
 
42  David C. Donald    The Laws Governing Corporations formed under the 
           Delaware and the German Corporate Statutes 
 
43  Garry J. Schinasi/    The Lender of the Last Resort in the European Single  
Pedro Gustavo Teixeira  Financial Market 
        (publ. in: Cross Border Banking: Regulatory Challenges, 
         Gerard Caprio Jr., Douglas D. Evanoff, George G. Kaufman 
eds., 2006) 
 
44  Ashley Kovas     UCITS – Past, Present and Future in a World of Increasing 
           Product Diversity 
 V 
 
 
45  Rick Verhagen    A New Conflict Rule for Securitization and other Cross- 
          Border Assignments – A potential threat from Europe 
          (publ. in: Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quaterly 
           2006, p. 270) 
 
46  Jochem Reichert/    Berichtspflicht des Vorstands und Rechtsschutz der  
  Michael Senger                      Aktionäre gegen Beschlüsse der Verwaltung über die  
Ausnutzung eines genehmigten Kapitals im Wege der 
allgemeinen Feststellungsklage 
(publ. in: Der Konzern 2006, S. 338 ff.) 
 
47  Guido A. Ferrarini     One Share – One Vote: A European Rule? 
          (publ. in: European Company and Financial Law Review  
          2006, p. 147) 
 
48  Theodor Baums    Die Fremdkapitalfinanzierung der Aktiengesellschaft durch 
           das Publikum 
(publ. in: Bayer/Habersack (eds.), Aktienrecht im Wandel 
der Zeit, Vol. 2, 2007, 952 ff.) 
 
49  Ulrich Segna      Anspruch auf Einrichtung eines Girokontos aufgrund der  
          ZKA-Empfehlung „Girokonto für jedermann“? 
          (publ. in: BKR 2006, S. 274 ff.) 
 
50  Andreas Cahn     Eigene Aktien und gegenseitige Beteiligungen 
(publ. in: Bayer/Habersack [Hrsg.] Aktienrecht im Wandel, 
Band II, 2007, S. 763 ff.) 
 
51  Hannes Klühs/    Beteiligungstransparenz im Aktienregister von REIT-  
            Roland Schmidtbleicher  Gesellschaften 
          (publ. in: ZIP 2006, S. 1805 ff.) 
 
52  Theodor Baums    Umwandlung und Umtausch von Finanzinstrumenten im 
           Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht 
          (publ. in: Festschrift für Canaris, Bd. II, 2007, S. 3 ff.) 
 
53  Stefan Simon/     Die Umsetzung der Richtlinie über grenzüberschreitende 
  Daniel Rubner    Verschmelzungen ins deutsche Recht 
(publ. in: Der Konzern 2006, S. 835 ff.) 
 
54  Jochem Reichert    Die SE als Gestaltungsinstrument für grenzüberschreitende  
          Umstrukturierungen 
(publ. in: Der Konzern 2006, S. 821 ff.) 
 
55  Peter Kindler      Der Wegzug von Gesellschaften in Europa 
(publ. in: Der Konzern 2006, S. 811 ff.) VI 
 
 
56  Christian E. Decher    Grenzüberschreitende Umstrukturierungen jenseits von SE 
           und Verschmelzungsrichtlinie 
(publ. in: Der Konzern 2006, S. 805 ff.) 
 
57  Theodor Baums    Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht 
          (publ. in: Die AG 2007, S. 57 ff.) 
 
58  Theodor Baums    European Company Law beyond the 2003 Action Plan 
(publ. in: European Business Organization Law Review  
Vol. 8, 2007, 143 ff.) 
 
59  Andreas Cahn/    Ad-hoc-Publizität und Regelberichterstattung 
Jürgen Götz      (publ. in: Die AG 2007, S. 221 ff.) 
 
60  Roland Schmidtbleicher/  „Defensive bids“ für Staatsanleihen – eine  
Anh-Duc Cordalis                  Marktmanipulation? 
        (publ. in: ZBB 2007, 124-129) 
 
61  Andreas Cahn     Die Auswirkungen der Kapitaländerungsrichtlinie auf den 
           Erwerb eigener Aktien 
          (publ. in: Der Konzern 2007, S. 385) 
 
62  Theodor Baums    Rechtsfragen der Innenfinanzierung im Aktienrecht 
 
63  Theodor Baums    The Law of Corporate Finance in Europe – An Essay 
 
64  Oliver Stettes     Unternehmensmitbestimmung in Deutschland –  
Vorteil oder Ballast im Standortwettbewerb? 
 
65  Theodor Baums/    Fortschritte bei Klagen gegen  
  Astrid Keinath/     Hauptversammlungsbeschlüsse? Eine empirische Studie 
  Daniel Gajek      (publ. in: ZIP 2007, S. 1629 ff.) 
 
66   Stefan Brass/      Die zentrale Gegenpartei beim unzulässigen Erwerb eigener 
  Thomas Tiedemann    Aktien 
          (publ. in: ZBB 2007, S. 257 ff.) 
 
67  Theodor Baums    Zur Deregulierung des Depotstimmrechts 
          (publ. in: ZHR 2007 [171], S. 599 ff.) 
 
68  David C. Donald    The Rise and Effects of the Indirect Holding System: How 
           Corporate America ceded its Shareholders to Intermediaries 
 
69  Andreas Cahn     Das Wettbewerbsverbot des Vorstands in der AG & Co. KG 
          (publ. in: Der Konzern 2007, S. 716 ff.) 
 VII 
 
 
70  Theodor Baums/    Weitere Reform des Rechts der Anfechtung von 
  Florian Drinhausen    Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen 
          (publ. in: ZIP 2008, S. 145 ff.) 
 
71   David C. Donald    Die Übertragung von Kapitalmarktpapieren nach dem US- 
          Amerikanischen Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)   
 
72  Tim Florstedt     Zum Ordnungswert des § 136 InsO 
          (publ. in: ZInsO 2007, S. 914 ff.) 
 
73  Melanie Döge/    Abmahnung von GmbH-Geschäftsführern in befristeten 
  Stefan Jobst      Anstellungsverhältnissen 
 
74  Roland Schmidtbleicher  Das „neue“ acting in concert – ein Fall für den EuGH? 
          (publ. in: Die AG 2008, S. 73 ff.) 
 
75  Theodor Baums    Europäische Modellgesetze im Gesellschaftsrecht 
 
76  Andreas Cahn/    Eigene Aktien und Wertpapierleihe  
  Nicolas Ostler  
 